Rationality of animals. by Kagan, Connie B-h,
INFORMATION TO USERS
This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfîlming. While the 
most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document 
have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material 
submitted.
The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand 
markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.
1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document 
photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing 
page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. 
This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating 
adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an 
indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of 
movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete 
copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a 
good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photo­
graphed the photographer has followed a definite method in “sectioning” 
the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand comer 
of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with 
small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning 
below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by 
xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and 
tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our 
Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we 




3 0 0  N.  Z E E B  R OAD,  ANN A R B O R ,  Ml 4 8 1 0 6  




The University of Oklahoma PH.D. 1 9 7 9
University 
Microfiims









SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 











I t  i s  my pleasant  duty to acknowledge the ass is tance  of the 
following individuals  during the prepara t ion of  th i s  d i s s e r ta t i o n .
Clark Glymour of the University of  I l l i n o i s  a t  Chicago Circle 
and Kenneth Merri ll  of the University of  Oklahoma, in t h e i r  ro les  
as co-chairmen o f  the committee, have provided d i rec t io n ,  moral sup­
p o r t ,  and in te re s t in g  d iscussions .  I am esp ec ia l ly  gra teful  to 
Professor  Glymour for  logging hundreds of miles in order to ask me 
hard questions.
J i tend ra  Mohanty and William Horosz of  the University of Okla­
homa have provided helpful suggestions and encouragement. Roger Fouts 
of the Universi ty  of Oklahoma Department of Psychology has generously 
provided mater ia ls  and time for  discussion th a t  provided the perspec­
t iv e  of  another d i sc ip l in e .
Robert Hill of the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center 
has provided ass is tance  in locat ing  p e r t in e n t  research m ater ia ls .  
Jaquine Hudson L i t t e l l  has provided c l e r i c a l  a ss i s tance .  My s i s t e r ,  
Sondra McIntyre, edited  the Notes and Bibliography.
I am also grateful to o ther  members of my family fo r  t h e i r  en­
couragement and a ss i s tance .  Bate made me wonder about these questions. 
My husband, Marty, has provided the opportunity fo r  me to think about 





ILLUSTRATION .........................................................................................................  vi
Chapter
I .  INTRODUCTION............................................................................................  1
Significance of  Rat ional i ty  in Tradit ional  His to r ica l  
Posi tions  Regarding the Moral Status of  Animals
Significance of  Ra t iona l i ty  fo r  Deontological and 
U t i l i t a r i a n  Systems 
Deontological 
U t i l i t a r i a n





I I .  NEUROPHYSIOLOGY....................................................................................  45
Use of  the Neurophysiological S im i la r i ty  Notion in 
Philosophy and Zoology 
Philosophy 
Zoology
Empirical Evidence fo r  Correlat ion between Neurophysio­
logical  Complexity and the Capacity for  Inductive 
Reasoning
Evolutionary Development of  the B i la te ra l  Brain 
Anatomical Asymmetry 
Other Anatomical Comparisons 
Functional Asymmetry
Significance of  the Empirical Evidence




Skinner 's  Empiricist  Theory 
Chomsky's R a t iona l i s t  Theory
Evidence fo r  Linguis t ic  Behavior 
Use of  Symbols 
Rule-following 
Summary











Significance of  Ra t iona l i ty  in Tradi t ional  H is to r ica l  
Posi t ions  Regarding the Moral Sta tus  of  Animals 
From the f i f t h  century BC un t i l  the nineteenth century,  the 
Chain o f  Being paradigm provided the p r in c ip le s —plen i tude ,  grada­
t i o n ,  and con t inu i ty—which were used in determining the moral 
s t a tu s  of animals.  These were metaphysical p r inc ip les  from which 
moral p r inc ip le s  were derived [1] .
The pleni tude p r in c ip l e ,  formulated by P la to ,  proposes tha t  
everything th a t  could be i s .  In P l a t o ' s  metaphorical language, 
the Good, an immaterial unity which i s  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  to ta l  
r e a l i t y ,  i s  a lso  the logical  ground and dynamic source of the 
exis tence of  a l l  things including the natural  world [2] .
The gradation and con t inu i ty  p r in c ip le s  were formulated by 
A r i s to t l e  [3] .  According to the gradat ion p r in c ip le ,  the natural 
world is  a natural  order  since the  s t ru c tu r e  of  the universe is  a 
s e r i a l  order  of  forms of  being. In A r i s t o t l e ' s  formulation th i s  
order  i s  an onto logical  scale  based on the development from po^ 
t e n t i a l i t y  (matter) to a c tu a l i t y  (form), and p a r a l l e l l e d  by a 
scale  o f  value in which good increases  in d i r e c t  proportion to 
form.
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The con t inu i ty  p r in c ip le ,  which presupposes the gradation 
p r in c ip le ,  proposes a q u a l i t a t i v e  continuum inherent  in nature 
such th a t  overlappings occur between some forms on a graduated 
sca le .  The gradation p r inc ip le  emphasizes d i s t i n c t i v e  cha rac te r ­
i s t i c s  used fo r  ranking forms o f  beings while the con t inu i ty  p r in ­
c ip le  emphasizes shared c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .
A r i s to t l e  i l l u s t r a t e s  the use of  these p r inc ip les  in consid­
er ing the moral s ta tus  of  animals [4].  Animals, l i k e  man, have 
" n u t r i t i v e  and s e n s i t iv e  soul" ( c o n t in u i ty ) ,  but only man has 
" ra t ional  sou l" (gradat ion) .  N utr i t ion  and sensation are physical 
funct ions whose presence is  in fe r red  from observing the behavior 
of animals.  Animals can perceive p a r t i c u la r s  (a i s t h e s i s ),  but 
only man can think conceptually  (n o i s i s ) s ince only man has the 
necessary immaterial ra t iona l  soul.  This appears c i r c u l a r  (only 
man i s  ra t iona l  because only man has ra t iona l  so u l) ,  but A r i s to t l e  
argues th a t  man's d i s t i n c t iv e  capac i ty  fo r  thought i s  r e la ted  to 
his capaci ty  fo r  proposit ional speech. Logos is  used in the sense 
of reason and also in the sense of  discourse  or  language. Aris ­
t o t l e  takes man's unique capacity  fo r  proposi tional  speech as ev i ­
dence for  his d i s t i n c t iv e  capacity  fo r  conceptual thought.  Then, 
given the value scale  th a t  p a r a l l e l s  the ontological sca le ,  man's 
ontological  and moral su p e r io r i ty  i s  e s ta b l i sh ed .  A r i s to t l e  con­
cludes th a t  the natural and moral function of  animals is  to  serve 
man through use as food, s a c r i f i c i a l  o f fe r in g s ,  and laborers  [5] .
The basic  pa t te rn  of  th is  argument was repeated fo r  centur ies  
with novel t ies  only as va r ia t io n s  on the theme.
Aquinas, fo r  example, provided re l ig ious  va r ia t ions .  In 
Summa Contra Genti les , his argument t h a t  the worth of animals is  
instrumental i s  based on t h e i r  lack o f  i n t e l l e c t  [6] .  I will not 
recount the e n t i r e  argument, but several points will  i l l u s t r a t e  
his approach. (1) Only rat ional  creatures  are f ree  agents.  Those 
th a t  are not f ree  agents are instruments for  f ree  agents.  (2) God 
is  the l a s t  end of  the universe. Since animals are unable to a t ­
ta in  th i s  end by knowing and loving God, t h e i r  proper end is  to 
serve those who can a t t a in  knowledge of  God. (3) Since i n t e l l e c ­
tual natures are more l ike  God, he provides a l l  non- in te l lec tual  
natures fo r  the sake of  the i n te l l e c tu a l  ones.
In Summa Theoloqica, Aquinas considers the question,  "Wheth­
er  i t  i s  lawful to k i l l  any l iv ing  thing" [7].  He argues tha t  
"the order of things is  such tha t  the imperfect are for  the per­
fect"  so th a t  i t  i s  natural and moral for  each form of  l i f e  to be 
used by those forms superior  to i t .  Furthermore, even though mur-' 
der is  a sin because i t  deprives aman of  l i f e ,  i t  would be a mis­
take to think th a t  k i l l i n g  animals i s  a s in  because i t  deprives 
them of l i f e .  I t  would be a mistake because animals "are devoid 
of  the l i f e  of  reason",  and we should not be fooled into think­
ing they have reason by the f ac t  tha t  they move since t h e i r  move­
ment i s  due merely to natural impulse.
Aquinas' l a s t  point  provides a bridge to the fam il ia r  Cartesian 
posit ion th a t  animals are machines th a t  lack reason and therefore 
cannot experience pain and pleasure .  Descartes '  posi t ion is  more 
sub t le ,  though probably no less  odd, than many presentat ions of i t
suggest,  and I will  discuss i t  in more de ta i l  f u r th e r  on. But the 
expected motifs are there .  Animals d i f f e r  q u a l i t a t i v e ly  from 
humans in th a t  they are not r a t io n a l ,  as evidenced by t h e i r  lack 
of  proposi tional  speech. Unlike animals,  humans have an immaterial 
immortal soul.  Descartes himself makes the moral inference. "My 
opinion i s  not so much cruel to animals as indulgent to men . . .  
s ince i t  absolves them from the suspicion of  crime when they ea t  
or  k i l l  animals" [8].
And so i t  went unti l  the nineteenth century,  when the Chain 
of Being paradigm began to be displaced by the Evolution paradigm. 
This conceptual t r a n s i t i o n  g rea t ly  a l t e r e d  the p r inc ip les  tha t  
had guided thinking about the moral s ta tu s  of  animals.  Discard­
ing the plenitude p r inc ip le  had the consequences t h a t  (a) expla­
nation of  lower forms of  l i f e  by higher ones was replaced by the 
explanation of  higher forms by lower ones; and (b) the emphasis on 
mind-body dualism was replaced by a monistic explanat ion of the 
common or ig in  of  a l l  l i f e .  The notion of  f ixed essences , central 
to the gradat ion p r in c ip le ,  was replaced by a notion of  dynamic 
organic forms influenced by t h e i r  environment. The s t a t i c ,  atem­
porel con t inu i ty  p r inc ip le  in the Chain of  Being paradigm was tem­
poral i zed.
Some e f fec t s  of  these t r a n s i t i o n s  on discussions  about the 
moral s ta tu s  of  animals are seen c le a r ly  in the work of  the 
nineteenth-century  c la ss ica l  u t i l i t a r i a n s .  Bentham re jec ted  ra ­
t i o n a l i t y  as an appropriate c r i t e r i o n  fo r  membership in the moral 
community. He argued th a t  such membership ought to  be based on
having I n t e r e s t s ,  th a t  sentience i s  the natural fea ture  t h a t  en­
t a i l s  having i n t e r e s t s ,  t h a t  animals are se n t ien t  and there fore  
ought to be included in the moral community. As he put i t  in a 
well-known sta tement,  "The question i s  not.  Can they reason?, Can 
they t a l k ? , but.  Can they s u f f e r ? "[9].
J .S .  Mill defended u t i l i t a r i a n i s m ,  s p e c i f i c a l l y  including 
Bentham's inclusion of  animals in the moral community, aga ins t  
Whewell, arguing th a t  i t s  seeming "unnatural" to Whewell is  not 
s u f f i c i e n t  grounds for  i t s  r e jec t io n  [10].
With th i s  b r i e f  review to provide h i s to r i c a l  context ,  I want 
now to consider the a h i s t o r i c a l ,  but ca tegorical  s ign i f icance  of  
r a t i o n a l i t y  in major types of  e th ica l  systems.
Signif icance of R a t iona l i ty  for  Deontological 
and U t i l i t a r i a n  Systems
Deontological
In deontological systems, r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  claimed to be the 
c r i t e r i o n  for  membership in the moral community. This admits a l l  
humans and excludes a l l  animals.  Behavioral c r i t e r i a  are i r r e l e ­
vant since even individual humans who seem i r r a t i o n a l  (insane) or 
non-rat ional  ( in fan ts )  are included. Their inclusion i s  based on 
species-membership, i . e . , the norm for  the species i s  r a t i o n a l i t y  
and although they are abnormal, they are included since they 
share another fea tu re ,  species-membership, with the normal ones.
In some cases i t  i s  sa id  t h a t ,  although they are  not r a t io n a l ,  
they are p o t e n t i a l l y  ra t iona l  and therefore  qua l i fy .  I t  i s  not 
always c l ea r  what " p o te n t i a l i ty "  means in th i s  context .  In the 
case of  i n f a n t s ,  i t  seems to mean a developmental d ispos i t ion .
In the case of  insane people who had once been sane, i t  may mean, 
o p t im i s t i c a l l y ,  a d isp o s i t io n  to re tu rn  to a previous s t a t e .
Or, in the case of the insane as well as th a t  of  congenital or 
severely  brain-damaged i d i o t s ,  i t  may simply express a counter- 
f a c tu a l .  So p o t e n t i a l i t y  does not serve well to  shore up r a ­
t i o n a l i t y  as a firm c r i t e r i o n .  The basic  c r i t e r i o n  is  not r a ­
t i o n a l i t y ,  po ten t ia l  or  a c tu a l ,  but species-membership.
I t  might be argued th a t  r a t i o n a l i t y  is a necessary condition 
fo r  membership in a deontological moral community because the 
fundamental conception of  moral duty i s  a ra t iona l  concept and 
r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  required to grasp i t .  I t  does seem to be a 
necessary condit ion th a t  some members of  the moral community be 
r a t i o n a l ,  but not t h a t  every member must be. Non-rational members 
ben e f i t  without rec ip roca t ion .
I t  might be i n t e r e s t i n g  to consider the proportion of  ra t iona l  
agents to non-reciprocat ing b e n e f i c i a r i e s .  When the moral 
community i s  l imited to humans, the number of agents f a r  exceeds 
the number of  non-reciprocat ing b en e f ic ia r ie s .  I f  animals are 
not r a t i o n a l ,  then t h e i r  admission to the moral community (on 
some o ther  bas is )  would swing the balance in the o ther  d i re c t io n .  
The moral community would be composed of  a small percentage of 
ra t iona l  agents and a large percentage of  non-reciprocat ing
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b e n e f i c i a r i e s .  This s i tu a t io n  r a i s e s  basic  questions about the 
purpose of  the moral e n te rp r i s e .  One i n t u i t i v e  response is  th a t  
any such arrangement would be unfa i r  to the agents ,  but th a t  r e ­
sponse overlooks the notion of  duty in deontological systems.
Given,that  notion,  the agents would be the fo r tuna te  few who are 
able to express t h e i r  nature as moral beings.
I f  r a t i o n a l i t y  were in f a c t  the c r i t e r i o n  for  membership, 
the moral community might include some humans (sane adu l ts )  and 
some animals (e . g . , b r igh t  primates) and exclude some humans 
( in f a n t s ,  i d i o t s ,  insane) and some animals.  Furthermore, there  
would be a need to  determine what i s  meant by r a t i o n a l i t y  since 
i t  would no longer be a code word fo r  "member of  the human species".
Even without regard to these d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  given, say, the 
Kantian system, there  are  problems about r a t i o n a l i t y  [11].  In 
th i s  system, one has no dut ies  d i r e c t ly  to animals,  though one 
may have dut ies  d i r e c t l y  to other  humans th a t  regard animals.
So one ought not m uti la te  his  neighbor 's  cow because one could 
c e r t a in ly  not wil l  the p r inc ip le  of  tha t  ac t ion (destroying or 
defacing ano the r 's  property)  to be a universal law. One may also 
have in d i re c t  dut ies  to humans th a t  regard animals.  These e i th e r  
cons tra in  or encourage various ac t ions .  One ought not be u n ju s t i ­
f iab ly  cruel to animals because being u n ju s t i f i a b ly  cruel to an i ­
mals encourages c ru e l ty  to humans. (In a h i s to r i c a l  ins tance ,  
doctors and butchers were excluded from ju ry  duty in England on 
the grounds th a t  t h e i r  hear ts  were hardened.)
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Nozick argues aga ins t  the view t h a t  c rue l ty  to animals en­
courages c rue l ty  to humans by asking i f  butchers commit more 
murders [12].  I do not think Nozick's point succeeds as a reply 
aga ins t  the argument in Kant 's form because i t  overlooks the q u a l i ­
f i c a t io n  of  j u s t i f i a b i l i t y .  The argument i s  not th a t  being cruel 
to animals encourages c rue l ty  to humans, but ra the r  tha t  being 
u n ju s t i f i ab ly  cruel to animals encourages c rue l ty  to humans. The 
c r i t i c a l  point is  what i s  j u s t i f i a b l e  o r ,  r a th e r ,  the c r i t e r i a  for  
j u s t i f i a b i l i t y .
Kant, assuming the instrumental function of animals (means, 
not ends in themselves),  j u s t i f i e s  v iv isec t ion ,  but he says tha t  
such crue l ty  fo r  sport  cannot be j u s t i f i e d .  Vivisec tion,  unlike 
spor t ,  has a "praiseworthy aim". But the notion of a praiseworthy 
aim as a c r i t e r io n  is  s t i l l  problematic.  One must decide what 
i s  the aim of various ac t ions ,  e . g . , v iv isec t ion  and spor t .  Then 
one must decide whether or not such an aim is  praiseworthy. I f  
t h i s  is  not c i r c u l a r ,  ne i the r  is  i t  very helpful.  We began by 
seeking a c r i t e r io n  for  j u s t i f i a b i l i t y  and now must seek one for 
praiseworthiness .  Kant 's own examples suggest some ordering of 
a c t i v i t i e s  t h a t  serve various human purposes, but no pr inc ip le  
fo r  such ordering is  given.
Kant's treatment  of  the converse argument is  in te re s t in g .
One ought to be kind to animals inasmuch as they manifest human 
q u a l i t i e s  ( a c t s ,  motivations, or nature) since th is  encourages 
the fu l f i l lm en t  of duties  to humans. This i s  c losely  re la ted  to 
the basic p r inc ip le  th a t  one should always t r e a t  humanity in one­
s e l f  or  others  as an end in i t s e l f ,  never as a means. Animals 
have a dual s ta tu s .  As non-humans, they are means to human ends, 
but the "human" q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  they have must be respected.
But "human" q u a l i t i e s  in animals are not ac tua l ly  human q u a l i ­
t i e s ,  but animal q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  are analogous to human ones.
Kant gives the example of an old dog who had provided years of 
serv ice  and deserves to be cared fo r ,  with the notion of "service" 
as the analogous one. The c r i t i c a l  ques tion,  which is  not dea l t  
with, is  what j u s t i f i e s  the analogy.
Ut i l i  t a r i an
In most contemporary l i t e r a t u r e ,  as well as in the l a t e  
n ineteenth-century  u t i l i t a r i a n  l i t e r a t u r e ,  the c r i t e r io n  for  
membership in the moral community appears to be sentience.
Sentience is  taken to be the a b i l i t y  to feel pleasure or pain.
I say th a t  sentience appears to be the c r i t e r io n  because to say 
so is  to use a kind of shorthand.
Within a u t i l i t a r i a n  system, the i n t e r e s t s  of  a l l  members of 
the moral community are to be taken in to  account.  A necessary 
and s u f f i c i e n t  condition for  membership in the moral community 
is having i n t e r e s t s . But whom does t h i s  include? Or, more fo r ­
mally, what natural capacity i s  the condit ion fo r  having in te re s t s ?  
Many u t i l i t a r i a n s  hold t h a t  the natural  capacity of  sentience is  
such a condit ion.  Sent ient  beings have i n t e r e s t s .
Sentience i s  in fe r red  on the bas is  of physiological s t r u c ­
tu re  (organization and complexity of nervous system) or on the 
basis  of  behavior. All humans and many animals are  considered to
10
be s en t i e n t  and, the re fore ,  to have in t e r e s t s  t h a t  are to be given 
equal considera t ion in making moral decis ions .
The e g a l i t a r ia n  p r inc ip le  requ ires  th a t  a l l  members must be 
t r e a te d  a l ike  unless re levan t  d i f fe rences  j u s t i f y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
t reatment.  In any spec i f ic  case, given the e g a l i t a r i a n  p r in c ip le ,  
two f u r th e r  considerat ions must obtain .  One is  to determine whe­
the r  there is  a re levant  d i f fe rence  in some members of  the moral 
community t h a t  would j u s t i f y  t r e a t in g  them d i f f e r e n t ly  in th i s  
case. The o ther  is  to determine whether the ne t  r e s u l t  of  the 
act ion would increase pleasure (or decrease pain) fo r  the moral 
community as a whole. The second determines whether or not any 
ac tion should be taken. The f i r s t  determines who wil l  be t r e a ted  
d i f f e r e n t ly .
Although r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  not a c r i t e r io n  for  membership in 
the moral community, i t  i s  of ten a c r i t i c a l  f a c to r  a t  these two 
s teps .  Non-ra t ional i ty  may be proposed as a re levan t  d if ference  
in various s i tu a t io n s  in order to j u s t i f y  t r e a t in g  animals less  
well than humans. Of course, t h i s  is  not a successful s t ra teg y  
s ince the same arguments also  j u s t i f y  l e s s e r  treatment of  some 
humans ( in f a n t s ,  e t c . ).
Ra t iona l i ty  is  also  c r i t i c a l  when one weighs the advantages 
and disadvantages of any ac t ion .  So i t  may be argued th a t ,  be­
cause they are not r a t io n a l ,  animals do not a n t i c ip a te  pain and 
do not su f fe r  mental anguish although humans may do both. This 
introduces a q u a l i t a t iv e  d i s t i n c t io n .
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These are  the most common uses of  the notion of r a t i o n a l i t y  
within a u t i l i t a r i a n  s t r u c tu r e .  However, i t  a lso enters  in  in a more 
basic  way through the claim th a t  r a t i o n a l i t y  is  a necessary condi­
t ion  fo r  having i n t e r e s t s ,  which i s  the qualify ing c r i t e r io n  for  
membership in the moral community. On t h i s  view, sentience is  
not a s u f f i c i e n t  condit ion fo r  having in t e r e s t s  even i f  i t  i s  
allowed as necessary.
Review of  Representative  Contemporary Posit ions
These typical  views are  exemplified in recent journal a r t i ­
c l e s .  The ones t h a t  I want to review are  "Rights" by H. J .
McCloskey [13],  "All Animals are Equal" by Peter Singer [14] ,  and 
"The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism" by Tom Regan [15].  I have se­
lec ted  these because they are  f a i r l y  well known and because they 
attempt to present  susta ined arguments re levan t  to the major issues 
about the moral s ta tu s  of animals.
McCloskey
McCloskey's a r t i c l e  i s  a conceptual analysis  of the notion 
of  r i g h t s .  He considers what a r ig h t  i s  and who or what l o g i ­
c a l ly  may possess r ig h t s .  He presents  an ent i t lement  theory of 
r ig h t s  (en t i t lem ent  ^  "do, have, enjoy, or have done") as opposed 
to a claim aga ins t  someone; and he r e j e c t s  the p r inc ip les  of r e ­
c ip ro c i ty  and c o r r e l a t i v i t y  as necessary condi tions for  r ig h t s  [16].
. His i n t e r e s t  fo r  us i s  in h is  considerat ion of  who or what 
may possess r i g h t s ,  since he s p e c i f i c a l l y  considers animals.  In 
reviewing some other  pos i t ions  regarding animal r ig h t s ,  he approvingly
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presents  R i tc h ie ' s  argument t h a t  the a t t r i b u t i o n  of animal r ig h ts  
leads to absurd conclusions: (1) I f  animals have r ig h t s ,  they
invade each o t h e r ' s  r ig h t s  (e . g . , "the ca t  invades the r ig h t  of 
the mouse"); (2) I f  animals have r i g h t s ,  perhaps humans should 
have to "allow p a ras i te s  to continue to inhab i t  us i f  they do not 
have se r ious ly  de le te r ious  e f f e c t s  on our health" [17].  McCloskey 
r e j e c t s  Plamenatz's so lu t ion  to the  f i r s t  one, t h a t  r igh ts  are 
r ig h t s  aga ins t  ra t iona l  beings,  because of his own view tha t  
r ig h t s  are  pr imari ly  not claims, but en t i t lements .
McCloskey does not specify  what s o r t  of  en t i t lement  might 
be meant in e i t h e r  of the two so -ca l led  absurd conclusions, whether 
i t  i s  the r ig h t  to l i f e ,  to freedom of movement, e tc .  But even 
in the general sense presented,  i t  i s  not c le a r  th a t  the conclusions 
from a t t r i b u t i n g  r igh ts  are adequate bases fo r  not a t t r i b u t in g  
them. I do not want to say th a t  the conclusions are not absurd, 
only t h a t  they are  no more absurd when considering animals than 
when considering humans.
The argument th a t  supports the f i r s t  conclusion seems to be 
t h i s :  (1) Most members of  some species  of animals behave in ag­
gress ive  ways towards some members of  other  species of animals.
(2) This behavior is  n a tu ra l .  (3) I f  we a t t r i b u t e  r ig h t s  to a n i ­
mals,  then i t  wil l  follow th a t  some animals are n a tu ra l ly  v io la t ing  
the r ig h t s  of  other  animals.  /  Therefore , we should not a t t r i b u t e  
r ig h t s  to animals.  I f  t h i s  argument means th a t  r ig h ts  should not 
be a t t r i b u t e d  when they may be v io la te d ,  or s t ronger ,  when they 
will  be v io la te d ,  then we cannot make sense of human r ig h t s .  Those
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who ta lk  about r igh ts  think i t  makes sense to t a lk  about the r ig h ts  
of  blacks in South Africa or Jews in the Soviet Union, i . e . , t h a t  
possessing r igh ts  is  not conditional on assurances of non-violat ion.  
But one might i n s i s t  t h a t  the argument means th a t  r igh ts  should 
not be a t t r ib u te d  when (a) they may/will be v io la ted ,  and (b) such 
v io la t io n  is  a natural phenomenon. So we have to ask what "natural" 
means here. I t  seems to have the sense of  spec ie s - sp ec i f ic ,  gene­
t i c a l l y  determined, surv iva l-or ien ted  behavior.  But in th a t  case, 
the re  i s  no reason to exempt humans. To use another of McCloskey's 
(R i t c h ie ' s )  examples, a t i g e r  may v io la te  the r igh ts  of a human as 
well as the r igh ts  of a cow. I f  the possib le  natural v io la t ion  of  
the cow's r igh ts  i s  a good reason for  not a t t r i b u t in g  r ig h ts  to 
cows, then i t  i s  also a good reason fo r  not a t t r i b u t in g  r ig h t s  
to humans.
The f i r s t  McCloskey/Ritchie conclusion has to do with whe­
th e r  or not animals should be allowed moral s t a tu s .  The second is  
concerned with consequences of decisions  within the moral commu­
n i ty .  I f  paras i te s  are members of the moral community, and i f  
t h e i r  inhabit ing us does not have se r ious ly  de le te r ious  e f fe c t s  
on our hea l th ,  then should we allow them to do so? The so r t  of 
p a ra s i t e  he has in mind is  a f l e a ,  which suggests th a t  the c r i t e r io n  
for  membership in the moral community under considera t ion may be 
animation, ra ther  than sentience.  But, be th a t  as i t  may, i t  is  
hard to see why th is  i s  a forceful  object ion to animal r ig h t s .
The proposed question is  exactly the s o r t  of question th a t  has to 
be considered when membership i s  l imited to humans. I t  i s ,  in
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f a c t ,  almost iden t ica l  to the abor tion question.  To argue th a t  
one should not a t t r i b u t e  r igh ts  when doing so will  r e s u l t  in having 
to confront s i tu a t io n s  where r igh ts  seem to c o n f l i c t  t r i v i a l i z e s  
the notion of  r ig h t s .  The way the s i tu a t io n  i s  presented-- the  
f l e a ' s  hab i ta t ion  does not have se r ious ly  de le te r ious  e f f e c t s  on 
the human--suggests th a t  the outcome of  d e l ibe ra t ion  wil l  be 
t h a t  the p a ra s i t e  ought to remain, s ince the human's suffer ing  
is  outweighed by the p a r a s i t e ' s  requirement fo r  surv iva l .  I t  i s  
not obvious th a t  th i s  would be the r e s u l t  of  careful d e l ibe ra t ion ,  
but l e t  us suppose i t  to be so. Surely, the human's suffer ing 
does not provide a good reason for  r e je c t in g  the a t t r i b u t io n  of 
r ig h ts  to the p a r a s i t e .  Since one of  the fea tu re s  of moral pr in ­
c ip les  i s  o b j e c t iv i t y ,  r igh ts  are not a t t r i b u t e d  to others  on the 
basis  of  predetermined benef i t s  to onese lf  or withheld from others 
on the basis  of predetermined disadvantages to oneself .
In both cases,  the conclusions to which the a t t r i b u t i o n  of 
animal r ig h ts  leads provide no b e t t e r  reasons for  re jec t in g  animal 
r ig h t s  than human r ig h t s .  I f  the conclusions are absurd, they are 
absurd in the case of humans as well .  McCloskey has apparently 
overlooked t h i s  and sees absurdity  only in the case of  animals.
What he says i s  t h a t  R i tch ie ' s  conclusions "suggest th a t  animals 
cannot be possessors o f  r ig h t s ,  but i t  does not e s ta b l i sh  th a t  
t h i s  i s  so" [18].
McCloskey then mentions what he takes to be some re levant  
considerat ions  th a t  have been overlooked by advocates of  animal 
r ig h t s .  (1) Does the claim th a t  animals have r ig h ts  include a l l
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animals? (2) Why are r ig h ts  general ly  claimed only fo r  (some or 
a l l )  s e n t i e n t  beings r a th e r  than animate ones or inanimate things? 
He then argues t h a t  although f ree  moral agents ( i . e . , ra t iona l  
humans) may possess r i g h t s ,  freedom or  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  not the t e s t
fo r  possessing r ig h ts  since i t  seems reasonable to claim th a t
lu n a t ic s  and in fan ts  are e n t i t l e d  to decent trea tment ,  even though 
they themselves are unable to demand t h e i r  en t i t lem ents .
McCloskey then s t a t e s  th a t  the  s i t u a t io n  of animals i s  d i f ­
fe re n t  from th a t  of luna t ics  and in fa n ts .  With regard to legal 
r ig h t s ,  he says t h a t  although legal claims may be made on behalf  
of animals,  the law confers du t ies  on humans, not r ig h t s  in the
animals.  His argument here i s  purely l i n g u i s t i c .  Since most
people (he acknowledges exceptions)  are r e lu c t a n t ,  d i s in c l in e d ,  and 
uneasy in ta lk ing  about legal r ig h t s  of animals,  then i t  i s  inaccu­
ra t e  and misleading to do so. What he i s  claiming i s  t h a t  the 
f a c t  t h a t  most people do not t a lk  as though animals have legal 
r ig h t s  demonstrates t h a t  they do not .  The " fa c t " ,  in th i s  case, 
is  a genera l iza t ion  of  h is  own i n t u i t i o n .  But suppose i t  were the 
case. The argument i s  inva l id  since the conclusion does not follow 
from the premise. Suppose th a t  most people do not t a lk  as though 
animals e x i s t ;  the lack of  such t a lk  does not demonstrate th a t  
animals do not e x i s t .
But then he says t h a t ,  with regard to  both legal and moral 
r i g h t s ,  such ta lk  is  a consequence of  the f a c t  t h a t  animals do not 
have r i g h t s ,  and th a t  f a c t  i s  based on the inappropriateness  of  
applying our concept of  " in t e r e s t s "  in the case of  animals "because
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the concept of  i n t e r e s t s  has t h i s  ev a lu a t iv e -p re sc r ip t iv e  over­
tone" [19]. Having r igh ts  i s  condi tional on having i n t e r e s t s  and 
animals f a i l  to meet t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  because of  the "evaluat ive-  
p re sc r ip t iv e  overtone" of  the concept of  i n t e r e s t s .  Unfortunately, 
McCloskey does not t e l l  us what he means by the "evalua t ive-pre­
s c r ip t iv e  overtone". He says, "The concept of  i n t e r e s t s  which i s  
so important here i s  an obscure and elusive  one" [20].  But since 
i t  i s  the concept on which h is  argument r e s t s ,  his  f a i l u r e  to 
explain i t  makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  to assess  his argument.
He then proposes a second c r i t e r i o n  fo r  having r i g h t s ,  v i z . , 
the a b i l i t y  to  possess property,  and he argues th a t  s ince  animals 
do not have t h i s  a b i l i t y ,  they do not have r ig h t s .  There are 
two things wrong with th i s  argument. F i r s t ,  to be able to  possess 
property does not seem to be a reasonable c r i t e r i o n  for  possessing 
r ig h t s .  I t  seems to be a s o r t  of category mistake t h a t  confuses 
commodities and condit ions.  Secondly, even i f  i t  were a reasonable 
c r i t e r i o n ,  i t  i s  not obvious t h a t  a l l  animals would f a i l  to meet 
i t .  He asks a rhe to r ica l  ques tion:  "Can a horse possess any­
th ing ,  e . g . , i t s  s ta b le ,  i t s  rug, in a l i t e r a l  sense of 'pos­
s e s s '? "  [21].  I do not know about horses ,  but I do know th a t  anyone 
who has spent much time with dogs can reca l l  instances  when a dog 
hid an o b jec t ,  ran o f f  with i t  i f  approached, or r e s i s te d  attempts 
to take i t  out  of  i t s  mouth or otherwise remove i t ,  a l l  examples 
of l i t e r a l  possession.  Furthermore, animals can have legal  pos­
session of  o b jec t s ,  e . g . , as b en e f ic ia r ie s  of bequests.
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McCloskey thinks t h a t  his  c r i t e r i a  for  having r ig h t s —having 
i n t e r e s t s  and a b i l i t y  to  possess—are adequate and th a t  animals 
do not meet them and therefore  do not have r ig h t s .  He notes,  how­
ever ,  t h a t  congenital id io t s  "whose level o f  existence f a l l s  f a r  
short  o f  th a t  of  the highest  animals" do not meet the c r i t e r i a  [22].  
He o f fe r s  a pragmatic so lu t ion .  He says t h a t  "animals,  or a t  l e a s t  
the higher animals,  may use fu l ly  be said to have r ig h t s  by analogy", 
although- he acknowledges th a t  r ig h t s  by analogy have d i f f e r e n t  
implications from r ig h t s .  He a lso  says t h a t  i t  may be "a useful 
l i e "  to a t t r i b u t e  r igh ts  to humans who do not meet the c r i t e r i a  
s ince to deny them "opens the way to a dangerous s l ide"  [23].
I t  might help us to understand McCloskey's denial of r igh ts  
to animals on the i n t e r e s t s  c r i t e r i o n  i f  he explained on what 
bas is  r ig h t s  by analogy were to be a t t r i b u t e d ,  but he provides no 
explanation.  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to surmise what he thinks  the use­
fulness  of " r ig h ts  by analogy" fo r  animals and r ig h t s  by pretense 
fo r  humans might be.
Singer
S inger ' s  main concern i s  to show why animals ought to be 
included in the moral community. His pos it ion  is th a t  the appro­
p r i a t e  c r i t e r i o n  for  membership in the moral community is  having 
i n t e r e s t s  and th a t  sentience i s  a necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condi­
t ion  fo r  having i n t e r e s t s .  Sentience is  taken to mean the "capacity 
to su f fe r  or experience enjoyment or happiness".  The eg a l i t a r ia n  
p r in c ip le  ought to be extended to o ther  species on the basis  of 
sentience and not to do so is  a r b i t r a r y  and immoral discr iminat ion
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th a t  Singer c a l l s  "speciesism".
What we are in te re s ted  in now, of  course, i s  how the notion of 
r a t i o n a l i t y  f i t s  in to  Singer 's  arguments. The most obvious f ac t  
is  t h a t  although the notion appears a number of t imes, i t  i s  not 
t rea ted  thematical ly  and indeed, there seems to be some ambiguity 
in S inger’s pos it ion .
I do not intend to recount S inger ' s  en t i re  argument, but 
r a th e r ,  to look c lose ly  a t  those points  where Singer does discuss 
r a t io n a l i t y .  I will  also look a t  those points where he discusses 
in te l l ig en ce  or thinking,  since Singer does not make f ine  d i s ­
t inc t ions  between these  cognates.  What he does is  to lump th ink­
ing, in t e l l ig en ce ,  and r a t io n a l i t y  together  and r e fe r  to them as 
" a b i l i t i e s " .  These cogni tive a b i l i t i e s  are opposed to sentience,  
which is  r e fe r red  to as a "capacity".
I t  i s  important to remember t h a t  S inger ' s  comments about 
r a t i o n a l i t y  are of two s o r t s ,  which we can ca l l  "formal" and "sub­
s t a n t i a l " ,  When he ta lks  about r a t i o n a l i t y  in a formal way, he 
i s  discussing how the notion f i t s  in to  a moral scheme. When he 
ta lk s  about i t  in a substantive way, he t e l l s  us who he thinks i s ,  
i s  not ,  or may be r a t io n a l .
Singer r e j e c t s  r a t i o n a l i t y  as a c r i t e r i o n  fo r  membership 
in the moral community. His pos i t ion  i s  tha t  sentience i s  the 
necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condition fo r  having i n t e r e s t s ,  which i s ,  
in tu rn ,  the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  condition for  membership in 
the moral conmunity. He points out th a t  there are  factual in eq u a l i ­
t i e s  in capac i t ie s  and a b i l i t i e s  among individuals  or groups and
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t h a t  these may even be gene t ica l ly  determined. But these in eq u a l i ­
t i e s  do not j u s t i f y  exclusion of the i n f e r io r s  from the moral commu­
n i ty .  Imagine, he suggests ,  a h ie ra rch ica l  soc ie ty  based on IQ, 
such th a t  the i n t e r e s t s  of a l l  those with IQs above 100 would be 
preferred to those whose IQs were below 100. In th i s  example, the 
unequal considera t ion of in te re s t s  is  based on factual  d ifferences  
in i n t e l l e c tu a l  a b i l i t i e s .  What i s  wrong with t h i s  arrangement. 
Singer th inks ,  i s  t h a t  equa l i ty  i s  not an as se r t ion  of f a c t ,  but a 
moral idea l .  "The claim to equal i ty  does not depend on in te l l ig e n c e ,  
moral capacity ,  physical s t reng th ,  or  s im i la r  matters of fac t"  [24].  
The e g a l i t a r ia n  p r inc ip le  i s  a p re sc r ip t iv e  p r inc ip le  that '"requires 
equal considera t ion of i n t e r e s t s .
Since having in t e r e s t s  depends on sen t ience ,  sentience pro­
vides the boundary of moral concern. Whatever can su f fe r  i s  in ­
t e re s ted  in not suffer ing  and whatever can experience pleasure is  
in te re s ted  in doing so. To use in te l l ig e n c e  or r a t i o n a l i t y  as a 
c r i t e r io n  for  membership in the moral community i s  a r b i t r a r y  and 
i r r e l e v a n t .  "Our concern for  others ought not to depend on . . .  what 
a b i l i t i e s  they possess" [25].
Singer then asks a rhe to r ica l  question which is  re levan t  to 
the formal ro le  of r a t i o n a l i t y  as a c r i t e r i o n  fo r  membership in 
the moral community, but the question makes use of a substantive 
assumption about who i s  i n t e l l i g e n t .  He asks, " I f  possessing a 
higher degree of  in te l l ig e n ce  does not e n t i t l e  one human to  use 
another fo r  his own ends, how can i t  e n t i t l e  humans to exp lo i t  
nonhumans?" [26].  Singer obviously th inks ,  given his previous
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arguments, t h a t  i t  cannot. That i s ,  i t  cannot i f  one i s  ta lk ing  
about the boundary of  membership in the moral community.
But not ice  the assumption th a t  humans are  more i n t e l l i g e n t  
than non-humans. This becomes extremely important once we have moved 
beyond the ques tion of membership in the moral community and begin 
to cons ider  s p e c i f ic  ac t io n s .  Assume t h a t  some animals are includ­
ed in the moral community on S inger ' s  terms, i . e . , cogni t ive  a b i l ­
i t i e s  are i r r e l e v a n t  cons ide ra t ions .  These a b i l i t i e s ,  which were 
considered i r r e l e v a n t  with regard to membership, become re levan t  
as soon as sp ec i f ic  decis ions  about behavior must be made. Singer 
himself puts i t  qu i te  c l e a r ly :  " I t  is  an implicat ion of th i s  p r in ­
c ip le  of  equa l i ty  t h a t  our concern for  o thers  ought not to depend 
on what they are l i k e ,  or what a b i l i t i e s  they possess—although 
p rec ise ly  what th i s  concern requ ires  us to do may vary according 
to the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of those a f fec ted  by what we do" [27].  The 
f i r s t  par t  of th i s  sentence, which declares  a b i l i t i e s  to be i r r e l ­
evant ,  i s  about the c r i t e r i o n  fo r  membership in the moral commu­
n i ty ;  the second p a r t  of  th i s  sentence, which declares  ch a rac te r ­
i s t i c s  to be r e levan t ,  is  about behavior within  the moral community.
There i s  nothing eccen t r ic  about t h i s .  Singer i s  following 
the usual u t i l i t a r i a n  p a t te rn .  F i r s t ,  one decides who q u a l i f i e s  
fo r  membership in the moral community; then one decides what ac t ion 
is  j u s t i f i e d  in a s p e c i f i c  case and which d i f fe rences  among members 
are re levan t  to j u s t i f y  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t reatment  in t h a t  case. We 
have seen th a t  Singer thinks  cogni t ive  a b i l i t i e s  are i r r e l e v a n t  with 
regard to membership, but he c l e a r ly  thinks they are general ly
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r e levan t  when making decis ions within the moral community.
He says, "There are  important d i f fe rences  between humans and 
o the r  animals,  and these d i f fe rences  must give r i s e  to some d i f f e r ­
ences in the r igh ts  t h a t  each have" [28].  He equates "capable of  
making ra t iona l  decisions" with "capable of understanding the s ig ­
n i f icance  of voting" and says t h a t  s ince dogs are incapable of the 
l a t t e r ,  they cannot have the r i g h t  to vote .  He also says t h a t  
s ince  a pig cannot vote,  i t  i s  meaningless to t a lk  of i t s  r ig h t  to 
vote.
He emphasizes th a t  equal considerat ion of i n t e r e s t s  does not 
requ ire  iden t ica l  treatment.  "The extension of  the basic  p r inc ip le  
of  equ a l i ty  from one groupto  another  does not imply th a t  we must 
t r e a t  both groups in exact ly  the same way, or grant  exact ly  the same 
r ig h t s  to both groups. Whether we should do so wil l  depend on the 
nature  of the members of the two groups" [29].
I t  i s  in considering behavior within the moral community 
t h a t  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  a r e lev an t ,  and of ten  c r i t i c a l ,  f ea tu re .  In 
d iscuss ing v iv i sec t io n .  Singer says t h a t  i t  i s  simple d iscr imina­
t ion  not to use orphaned human infants  s ince  "adul t  apes, c a t s ,  
mice, and other  mammals are more aware of what i s  happening to them, 
more s e l f - d i r e c t i n g ,  and so f a r  as we can t e l l ,  a t  l e a s t  as se n s i ­
t i v e  to pain,  as any human infant"  [30].  In discuss ing vege ta r ian ­
ism, he says th a t  what is  pr imari ly  wrong with eat ing animals is  
the r e la t e d  su ffe r ing ,  not the k i l l i n g .  He says th a t  k i l l i n g  
humans i s  the g r ea te s t  wrong one can do to a human because humans 
are  "conscious of t h e i r  exis tence over time, and have des ires  and
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purposes th a t  extend in to  the fu ture"  [31].  His a s se r t io n  th a t  
su f fe r in g ,  not k i l l i n g ,  i s  the primary wrong in eating animals is  
obviously based on an assumption th a t  animals and humans d i f f e r  in 
th i s  regard.  But then he acknowledges possible  exceptions.  " I f  
one took th i s  view one would have to hold . . .  th a t  k i l l i n g  a human 
in fa n t  or  mental defect ive is  not in i t s e l f  wrong, and i s  less  
ser ious  than k i l l i n g  c e r ta in  higher mammals t h a t  probably do have 
a sense of  t h e i r  own existence over time" [32]. This i s  obviously 
both vague (which mammals is  not spec if ied)  and cautious ("probably 
do", e t c . ) . The major po in t ,  though, is  formal,  i . e . , fo r  whoever 
has these a b i l i t i e s  for  fu tu re  p ro jec t ion ,  to be k i l l e d  is  a 
g rea te r  wrong than to be made to su ffe r .
I do not think Singer argues th i s  point persuasively .  In 
order to con t ras t  k i l l i n g  and su ffe r ing ,  l e t  us take k i l l i n g  to 
mean immediate, pain less  death. To say th a t  X i s  the g r e a te s t  
wrong one can do to a subjec t  implies th a t  X i s  the a l t e r n a t iv e  
l e a s t  prefer red  by th a t  subjec t .
We can immediately think of counter-examples to  S inger ' s  view— 
a request  for  mercy k i l l i n g ,  a suic ide or  su ic ide  at tempt,  spies  
who carry  cyanide t a b l e t s .  In each of  these cases,  the su b je c t ' s  
assumption i s  t h a t  being k i l l e d  i s  preferable  to su f fe r ing .  And 
i t  w il l  not do to claim th a t  any of  these is  i r r a t i o n a l  behavior,  
fo r  t h a t  merely begs the question whether or not a ra t iona l  subject  
p re fe rs  suffer ing  to being k i l l e d .
S inger ' s  argument is  t h a t  subjects  p refer  suffer ing  because 
they are ra t ional  (in the sense of self-consciousness over time
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and having future  p ro je c t s ) .  But the examples above can e a s i ly  be 
spec i f ied  such th a t  to be k i l l e d  i s  preferred  p rec ise ly  because 
the subject  i s  ra t iona l  [33]. The form of  the s u b je c t ' s  argument 
could be, "I have l ived a long, f u l l  l i f e ;  the fu ture  seems in ­
to le rab ly  grim, so i t  i s  best  to die now."
I f  one 's  r e l ig ious  be l ie f s  include a p leasant  a f t e r - l i f e ,  then 
being k i l l e d  would be not merely a termination to t h i s  l i f e ,  but 
a necessary t r a n s i t io n  to one which i s  b e t t e r .
But suppose one's b e l i e f s  do not include notions of an a f t e r ­
l i f e .  Dying might be one of the fu ture  pro jects  t h a t  the ra t iona l  
subjec t  has. There i s  a body of recent  l i t e r a t u r e  in psychology 
s t r e s s in g  the psychological importance of perceiving one 's  own 
death as one 's  own pro jec t .  Included in th i s  i s  the notion t h a t ,  
to the g re a te s t  extent  possib le ,  one ought to be in control of 
his  own dying; th a t  to plan fo r  and p a r t i c ip a te  in one's own 
dying is  not i r r a t i o n a l ,  but i s  much more ra t iona l  than t r e a t in g  
death as the ul timate horror over which one has no contro l .  That 
does not suggest th a t  one wil l  necessar i ly  p re fe r  death to s u f f e r ­
ing ,  but i t  does suggest th a t  doing so can be r a t io n a l .
Since we can think of cases where a subject would p refer  
death to suffer ing and th a t  preference would be a ra t iona l  choice, 
then Singer ' s  claim th a t  the g r e a te s t  wrong one can do to ra t iona l  
subjec ts  is  to k i l l  them seems too s trong.  And when the claim i s  
properly q u a l i f i ed ,  then i t  wil l  not provide a d i s t i n c t  con t ras t  
with the g rea tes t  wrong one can do to non-rational  sub jec ts .  That 
i s ,  in both cases ,  the g r e a te s t  wrong may be to cause the subjects  
to suffer,.
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There i s  a po in t  of  s im i l a r i t y  between S inger ' s  argument r e ­
garding ra t io n a l  s u b je c ts —i t  i s  b e t t e r  to l iv e  miserably than 
not to continue to l i v e —and one of ten  used to j u s t i f y  m i s t r e a t ­
ment o f  animals—i t  i s  b e t t e r  to have l ived  miserably than never 
to have l ived  a t  a l l .  The shared poin t  i s  th a t  l i f e  is  p re fe rab le  
to not  l i v in g .  But beyond t h a t ,  the arguments and t h e i r  implica­
t ions  are  q u i te  d i f f e r e n t .
In the second one, the proposi t ion  th a t  l iv ing  is  p re fe rab le  
to never having l ived  is  taken to be s e l f - e v id e n t .  I f  t h a t  is 
accepted , then the moral questions  t h a t  are ra ised  are about the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of  those who are  a l ready l iv in g  to "those" who are  
not .  For example, i t  might seem th a t  contracept ion and abort ion are 
p roh ib i ted  and th a t  cons tant  copulat ion i s  a moral idea l .
In S in g e r ' s  argument, the p roposi t ion  th a t  continuing to l iv e  
is  p re fe rab le  to not doing so is  based on one 's  sense of  his  e x i s ­
tence over t ime and his  i n t e r e s t  in h is  own fu tu re  p ro je c t s .  The 
moral quest ions  th a t  are ra i sed  are about circumstances tha t  
would overr ide  the prima fac ie  p ro h ib i t ion  ag a in s t  k i l l i n g  ( e . g . , 
war, cap i ta l  punishment, euthanas ia)  and about the d i s t i n c t io n  be­
tween k i l l i n g  someone and l e t t i n g  them die (e . g . , m a lnu t r i t ion ,  
maintenance o f  chemical or  mechanical l i f e - s u p p o r t  devices ,  su ic id e -  
prevention programs).
What we have considered so f a r  is  the case in which a ra t iona l  
being A determines what is  in his  or her own i n t e r e s t ,  makes those 
i n t e r e s t s  known, and p refers  to be k i l l e d  to su f fe r in g .
25
There i s  another kind of  case t h a t  a lso  serves as a counter­
example to S inge r ' s  claim—the case in which another person B, a s ­
suming the n o n - ra t io n a l i ty  o f  A, determines what i s  in A's i n t e r e s t s ,  
B assumes th a t  A i s  s e n t i e n t ,  des ir ing  to increase  pleasure  and 
diminish pain. Let us suppose t h a t  A needs painful surgery, 
though the surgery provides only the  opportunity fo r ,  not the assur­
ance of  recovery. Consequently, B does not know i f  A's endurance 
of the painful surgery wil l  r e s u l t  in A's g rea te r  happiness in the 
long run since the surgery may or may not be successfu l .  B has 
been advised t h a t  i f  A does not have the surgery, the condit ion may 
or  may not be n a tu ra l ly  a r re s t e d  and the conjectured p r o b a b i l i t i e s  
are about 50-50. In e i t h e r  case,  A wil l  su f fe r  pain t h a t  will  be 
prolonged i f  the condit ion i s  not n a tu r a l ly  a r res ted .
This i s  a case where i t  seems reasonable to hold t h a t  k i l l i n g  
A would be a g re a te r  harm to  him than causing him (or allowing him) 
to s u f f e r .  I f  A i s  an animal, then th i s  is  a case where i t  i s  
assumed th a t  su ffe r ing  i s  p re fe rab le  to being k i l l e d .  This kind 
of  case circumscribes S inge r ' s  claim th a t  in the case of  animals,  
su ffe r ing  is  worse than being k i l l e d .
Near the end of h is  a r t i c l e .  Singer c r i t i c i z e s  the work of  
several social  philosophers who exclude animals from the moral 
community with what Singer cons iders  to  be devious arguments.
One of  these  i s  William Frankena who proposes equal t reatment of 
humans simply because they a re  human. What makes them human, ac­
cording to Frankena, is  t h a t  "they have emotions and des ires  and 
are able to  th ink ,  and hence are capable of  enjoying a good l i f e
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in a sense in which other  animals are not ."  Frankena adds t h a t  by 
the "good l i f e "  he means "not so much the morally good l i f e  as the 
happy or s a t i s f a c to ry  l i f e "  [34].
Singer points  out t h a t  including thinking as a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
o f  humans excludes some people. He i s  not sure how i t  appl ies  to 
animals.  He says, "We may doubt th a t  they [o ther  animals] can 
th ink--al though the behavior of  some apes, dolphins and even dogs 
suggests t h a t  some of  them can—but what i s  the relevance of 
thinking?" [35]. Indeed, his concern i s  not with whether or  not 
animals can th ink ,  but to show th a t  thinking i s  i r r e l e v a n t  to a 
happy or  s a t i s fy in g  l i f e .  But th i s  is  a very hard pos i t ion  to 
support given common human experience.  Most people recognize qual­
i t a t i v e  d ifferences  as well as q u a n t i t a t iv e  ones in happiness or 
s a t i s f a c t i o n s ,  and these are  general ly  r e la ted  to cognit ive a b i l ­
i t i e s .
Singer i s  ac tu a l ly  somewhat incons is ten t .  He f i r s t  says th a t  
thought is  i r r e l e v a n t  to enjoying a good l i f e  and then he says i t  
i s  unnecessary. The l a t t e r  is  e a s i e r  to defend, but Singer does 
not seem to make the d i s t i n c t io n  between relevance and necess i ty  
here th a t  would make for  a co n s is ten t  argument. He argues tha t  
"every s e n t i e n t  being is  capable of leading a l i f e  th a t  i s  happier 
or  l e ss  miserable than some a l t e r n a t iv e  l i f e " .  His point  seems 
to be t h a t  sen t ience ,  not th inking,  is  the necessary condi tion fo r  
enjoying a good l i f e .  So f a r ,  so good. But then he adds t h a t  "in 
t h i s  r e spec t ,  the d i s t in c t io n  between humans and nonhumans i s  
not a sharp d iv is io n ,  but r a th e r  a continuum along which we move
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gradual ly ,  and with overlaps between the species ,  from simple 
cap ac i t i e s  fo r  enjoyment and s a t i s f a c t io n ,  or pain and su f fe r ing ,  
to more complex ones" [36].  I f  t h i s  continuum were simply de­
grees of  sentience.  Singer would be r e i t e r a t i n g  the claim th a t  
sentience is  the necessary condition ibrenjoying a good l i f e .
But I th ink he intends th a t  the more complex capac i t ies  fo r  en­
joyment and s a t i s f a c t io n  involve thought s ince j u s t  before th is  
he has said t h a t  "only some people are capable of  leading in ­
t e l l e c t u a l l y  s a t i s fy in g  l i v e s ,  or  morally good l i v e s " . And t h i s ,  
of course, is  an as se r t ion  th a t  thought i s  re levant  to enjoying a 
good l i f e ;  indeed, thought, i s  a necessary condition a t  t h a t  pole 
of the continuum th a t  represents  the most complex enjoyment and 
s a t i s f a c t io n .  So thought i s  not i r r e l e v a n t  to enjoying a good 
l i f e  and indeed i s  necessary for  the highest possible enjoyment.
What Singer ought to have done here is  to make the same so r t  
of d i s t i n c t io n  th a t  he had previously made in arguing th a t  thought 
i s  i r r e l e v a n t  as a c r i t e r io n  fo r  membership in the moral commu­
n i ty ,  but re levant  within the community. I am not suggesting th a t  
th a t  i s  an indefeasib le  pos i t ion ,  but t h a t  i t  would be in te rn a l ly  
co n s is ten t  and a lso  cons is ten t  with the r e s t  of his argument.
Throughout, S inger ' s  comments about the cognit ive a b i l i t i e s  
of  various species seem r a th e r  off-hand.  At no point  does he 
recognize a need for  t ry ing to determine more d e f in i t e ly  what cogni­
t iv e  a b i l i t i e s  animals might have, even though, as we have seen, th i s  
becomes crucial in making decis ions  within the moral community.
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Regan
Regan's argument fo r  vegetarianism is  based on two major 
e th ica l  precepts:  (a) t h a t  i t  i s  wrong to cause undeserved s u f f e r ­
ing and (b) the r ig h t  to l i f e —plus arguments to show th a t  there  
i s  no j u s t i f i c a t i o n  for  excluding animals from the moral commu­
n i ty .  Although i t  i s  obvious t h a t  Regan's se lf -ass igned  task  is  
both lengthy and complex, i t  seems to me th a t  he gl ides  over a 
few troublesome points t h a t  warrant c lo se r  a t t e n t io n .  I t  i s  
those po in ts ,  ra ther  than the e n t i r e  argument, t h a t  I want to .  
consider here since they are not unrela ted to the matter  of r a ­
t i o n a l i t y .
Given the s im i l a r i t i e s  between o ther  animals and humans in 
physiology and pain behavior,  Regan thinks i t  reasonable to 
adopt the "naive" pos i t ion  th a t  animals do feel pain unt i l  a
compelling counterargument i s  presented. Regan r e j e c t s  the
Cartesian pos i t ion ,  and although I agree with his conclusion, I think 
his  argument fo r  i t  i s  f au l ty .
He presents  the Cartesian claim as follows: t h a t  animals can­
not use language implies th a t  they do not th ink,  which implies
th a t  they have no minds, which implies t h a t  they have no conscious­
ness ,  which implies t h a t  they do not experience pain. He points
out th a t  t h i s  argument can be challenged e i t h e r  by disput ing the
f a c t  th a t  animals cannot use language or  by disputing the as se r t ion  
th a t  language use i s  a necessary condit ion for  experiencing pain, 
and he chooses the l a t t e r  tack.
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He uses in fan ts  and paralyzed adul ts  as counter-examples, 
pointing out th a t  we do not deny t h e i r  experiencing pain simply 
because they cannot use language. He adds t h a t  we do not think an 
i n f a n t ' s  po tent ia l  fo r  language i s  co r re la ted  with a potent ia l  
f o r  f e e l in g ,  but r a th e r  t h a t  he f e e l s ,  say, pain now although 
he cannot say so. Our b e l i e f  t h a t  non-language-using humans or 
animals are in pain is  based on behavioral evidence o ther  than 
l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.
I t  seems qui te  r ig h t  t h a t  language use i s  not a necessary 
condit ion for  experiencing pain, and i t  i s  a lso  t rue  t h a t  Descartes 
claimed t h a t  animals are incapable of language and th a t  they do 
not experience pain. But Descartes '  point  is  more sub t le  than 
Regan's presenta t ion  suggests.  To say th a t  language use is  a 
necessary condition th a t  i s  the f i r s t  in a chain of e n t a i Iments 
i s  a b i t  misleading.
Descartes d is t ingu ishes  between (a) the a b i l i t y  to use lan­
guage, which i s  bound up with thought, and (b) the use of  language, 
s p e c i f i c a l ly  speech, which i s  "the only ce r ta in  sign" of the a b i l i ­
ty  to use language. L inguis t ic  a b i l i t y  and thought are bound to ­
gether  s ince ,  for  Descartes ,  thought involves a proposi t ion and a 
proposi tional  a t t i t u d e ,  and th i s  necessar i ly  requires  language [37]
Descartes assumes th a t  animals do not have the a b i l i t y  to 
use language because the ce r ta in  s ign ,  speech, i s  absent in t h e i r  
case. In a l e t t e r  to More, he says th a t  i t  i s  possible  t h a t  an i ­
mals th ink ,  and th a t  we cannot prove i t  i s  not so. But s ince the 
sign (speech) is  absent ,  i t  seems l ik e ly  th a t  they do not [38].
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Given t h i s  assumption, Descartes allows th a t  animals can experience 
some mechanical phys iological sensa t ions ,  but not pain, since the 
formulation of  the proposit ion "I am in pain" requ ires  language.
For Descartes ,  the animal case and Regan's human case ( in ­
fan ts  and paralyzed adu l t s )  would not be analogous. As in the 
animal case, the sign (speech) of  l i n g u i s t i c  a b i l i t y  i s  absent ,  
but in the human case, the  absence of  the sign i s  not counted as 
evidence for  the i n a b i l i t y  to use language. I t  i s  t rue  t h a t  th i s  
may r e f l e c t  an thropocentr ic  b ia s ,  motivated in Descartes '  case by 
theological  b e l i e f s .  But there  are  o ther  reasons fo r  his f a i l u r e  
to t r e a t  the same phenomenon (absence of  speech) as re levan t  e v i ­
dence in the animal case but not in the human case. Given the 
doctr ine  of  innate  ideas, thought i s  a universal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of 
humans. The i n f a n t ' s  p o t e n t i a l i t y  fo r  speech is  assumed because 
i t  i s  assumed th a t  he al ready has the a b i l i t y  to use language. And 
s ince he has the a b i l i t y ,  i t  i s  possib le  t h a t  he is  thinking "I am 
in pain" though he is  not saying t h a t ,  but merely screaming.
Since Regan's argument g l ides  over the d i s t i n c t io n  between 
not using language and not being able  to use language, he misses 
some important problems in the Cartes ian pos i t ion .  (1) He r e j e c t s  
a re la t io n sh ip  between the experience of pain and speech. The 
more bas ic  point  i s  the r e l a t io n s h ip  between experience and l i n ­
g u i s t i c  a b i l i t y .  Descartes '  p o s i t io n ,  th a t  the r e a l i t y  of  much of 
our experience depends on formulating proposi t ions  about i t ,  seems 
very odd given common human experience.  (2) Furthermore, a ser ious  
c r i t i c a l  ana lys is  of Descartes '  pos i t ion  must cons ider  whether or
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not h is  formulation of  the doctr ine  of innate  ideas is  sound. (3) 
Also, one needs to consider the ro le  o f  negative evidence in 
Descartes '  denial of l i n g u i s t i c  a b i l i t y  to animals.
Regan mentions, as indicated  above, th a t  Descartes '  pos i t ion ,  
as Regan presents  i t ,  could be challenged by disputing the f a c t  
th a t  animals do not use language. Regan r e j e c t s  t h i s  tack because 
of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved in the concept of language. Although 
such d i f f i c u l t i e s  abound, Descartes makes the argument e a s i e r  in 
his  case by c le a r ly  s ta t in g  what i s  necessary and s u f f i c i e n t ,  i . e . , 
the a b i l i t y  to formulate proposi t ions .  Overlooking the d i f f i c u l ­
t i e s  l i s t e d  above, i f  one accepts Descartes '  pos i t ion ,  i t  seems 
p lau s ib le  to argue th a t  some primates (e . g . ,  Washoe, Lucy, Lana, 
Koko) have demonstrated the required l i n g u i s t i c  a b i l i t y .  And 
th a t  would require  reconsidera t ion  of  the ro le  of  negative ev i ­
dence and the ro le  of innate  ideas .  But I think th i s  would 
be merely an academic exerc ise ,  s ince i t  depends on accepting 
Descartes '  questionable  notion of  the re la t io n sh ip  between l i n ­
g u i s t i c  a b i l i t y  and experience.
Regan's argument t h a t  i t  i s  wrong to cause animals undeserved 
su ffe r ing  i s  s t ruc tu red  to show: (1) t h a t  undeserved su ffe r ing  is
wrong in the case of humans, and (2) t h a t  humans and animals 
share the re levant  fea tu res  required fo r  membership in the moral 
community, so th a t  what i s  wrong in the case o f  humans i s  a lso 
wrong in the case of animals.
The c r i t e r io n  fo r  membership in the moral community i s  having 
i n t e r e s t s  and needs; sentience ( c a p a b i l i ty  of experiencing pleasure
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and pain) is  the natural fea ture  th a t  e n t a i l s  having in t e r e s t s .
Regan combines the value judgments t h a t  pain is  i n t r i n s i c  evil  and 
pleasure is  i n t r i n s i c  good with the p r in c ip le  of  non-injury ( th a t  
in juring  a se n t ien t  being i s  prima fac ie  wrong), so th a t  aggres­
sion requires  j u s t i f i c a t i o n .
Regan then considers d i s t r ib u t io n s  of pleasure and undeserved 
pain in four s i tu a t io n s :
(a) pain to animals more than pleasure to humans
(b) pain to animals equal to pleasure to humans
(c) pain to animals s l i g h t l y  less  than pleasure to humans
(d) pain to animals g rea t ly  less  than pleasure  to humans.
He presents (a) as the tort  of  case presented by the nineteenth- 
century u t i l i t a r i a n s .  For Regan, given the prima fac ie  obligation 
not to cause pain and the assumption th a t  the animals do not deserve 
the pain, then i t  follows tha t  the p rac t ice  i s  immoral.
He spec i f ie s  (b) and (c) such th a t  severely mentally re tarded 
humans are subs t i tu ted  fo r  animals in fac tory  farm s i tu a t io n s .  He 
suggests th a t  the p rac t ices  would be considered morally object ion­
able.  He does not argue fo r  t h i s ,  but apparently assumes an in ­
t u i t i v e  response.
Regan then presents a se r ie s  of arguments to show th a t  i f  the 
animal pain and human pain are comparable, then there is  no j u s t i ­
f i c a t io n  for  d i f f e r e n t i a l  treatment of humans and animals in these 
cases.  The theme of  his arguments i s  th a t  the most p lausible  
argument for d i f f e r e n t i a l  t reatment,  i . e . , t h a t  humans are and 
animals are not the so r t s  of beings who can have r ig h t s ,  i s  an
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untenable argument. I do not  want to consider  a l l  his arguments, 
but r a th e r ,  the assumption th a t  i s  c r i t i c a l  to a l l  of them, i . e . , 
t h a t  the pain animals s u f fe r  in e i t h e r  case (b) or (c) i s  comparable 
to the pain humans su f fe r  in e i t h e r  case. Although comparability 
is  essen t ia l  to Regan's pos i t ion ,  he provides only a p a r t i a l  analy­
s i s  of i t .
His judgment t h a t  pain i s  an i n t r i n s i c  evi l  provides fo r  
comparabili ty in a formal sense. Since the evil  i s  i n t r i n s i c ,  
p a in ' s  evil  ness does not depend on where i t  occurs,  but on what i t  
i s .  I t  i s  j u s t  as evi l  when i t  occurs in animals as i t  i s  when i t  
occurs in humans.
What Regan omits i s  an analys is  of comparabili ty of pain in 
a material  sense. Given (a) h is  judgments t h a t  pain is  evi l  and 
th a t  pleasure i s  good, and (b) his  b e l i e f  t h a t  moral behavior 
should decrease pain and increase p leasure ,  mater ia l d i s t in c t io n s  
are required.  Moral a l t e r n a t iv e s  generally  do not include e l im i­
nating pain, but ,  r a th e r ,  various means fo r  minimizing i t  o r ,  
perhaps, merely r e d i s t r ib u t in g  i t .
The problems are not unfamil iar .  (1) What c r i t e r io n  (amount, 
i n t e n s i ty ,  dura t ion ,  e t c . ) i s  appropria te  and adequate for  quant i ­
fying pain? (2) How reconci le  the use of  an ob jec t ive  c r i t e r io n  for  
q u an t i f ica t ion  with subjec t ive  individual v a r ia t io n s  in experience? 
(3) How take into account re levan t  q u a l i t a t i v e  fea tures?  For exam­
p le ,  i t  i s  sometimes claimed th a t  s ince humans are ra t iona l  and 
animals are not ,  human suffe r ing  is  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  since 
i t  involves mental anguish. A l te rn a t iv e ly ,  i t  i s  sometimes claimed
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t h a t  because of t h e i r  r a t i o n a l i t y  and mental preoccupations,  humans, 
are less  se n s i t iv e  than animals to  pain. These a l t e rn a t iv e s  a r i s e  
because of  the pecu l ia r  nature  of pain. Regan's f a i lu r e  to consid­
e r  material comparabili ty weakens h is  s e r ie s  of  arguments th a t  
depend on the assumption of  comparabili ty.
Regan then considers case (d) ,  in which the amount of pain is  
g rea t ly  exceeded by the amount of pleasure  a p rac t ice  produces.
Given a l l  possible  arrangements (p leasure to humans much grea te r  
than pain to animals,  pleasure to some animals much g rea te r  than 
pain to o ther  animals,  pleasure  to some humans much g rea te r  than 
pain to o ther  humans, pleasure to animals much g rea te r  than pain 
to humans), Regan suggests t h a t  the p rac t ice  might be j u s t i f i e d  i f  
the pain i s  t r i v i a l ,  but he thinks i t  would not be i f  the pain is  
n o n - t r i v i a l .
Here Regan comes c lo se r  to a problem which he has sk i r ted  
before ,  i . e . , the s t ru c tu ra l  problem of  j u s t i c e  within a u t i l i t a r i a n  
framework. To th i s  poin t ,  his  suggestions about which prac t ices  
would or would not be considered morally object ionable have depend­
ed on an in tu i t i v e  sense of  j u s t i c e  to  temper the unadulterated 
app l ica t ion  of  the u t i l i t y  p r in c ip le .  He now formulates a p r in c i ­
ple of j u s t i c e  (though he r e fe r s  to i t  only as "a moral p r in c ip le " ) :  
"No prac t ice  which causes undeserved, no n - t r iv ia l  pain can be j u s t i ­
f ied  so le ly  on the grounds of the amount of pleasure i t  brings 
about for  o the rs ,  no matter  how 'h igh '  the qu a l i ty  of the pleasure 
might be supposed to be" [39].  His suggested " te s t"  fo r  th i s  
p r inc ip le  is  again an appeal to an i n t u i t i v e  sense of  j u s t i c e .
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He uses t h i s  p r in c ip le  to answer the supposed object ion th a t  
since  pleasures  d i f f e r  q u a l i t a t i v e l y ,  not j u s t  q u a n t i t a t iv e ly ,  and 
since only humans are  n a tu ra l ly  endowed to experience higher-qual-  
i t y  p l e a s u re s ,  then humans have a g rea te r  claim than animals to 
be spared undeserved pain.
Regan's formulation of  a p r in c ip le  of  j u s t i c e  acknowledges 
the need fo r  a r e co n c i l i a t io n  of  the u t i l i t y  p r inc ip le  and a j u s t i c e  
p r in c ip l e ,  but i t  does not adequately e f f e c t  such a r e co n c i l i a t io n .  
And while i t  would be unreasonable to  expect him to deal thoroughly 
with the s t ru c tu ra l  problems of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  while he is  using 
i t  to analyze a s p e c i f i c  moral problem, i t  i s  a lso  unreasonable to 
embrace his conclusions without a more carefu l  consideration of  the 
theory from which they come.
The supposed object ion  to which he i s  responding also ra i se s  
again the other  s t ru c tu ra l  problem th a t  Regan does not adequately 
handle, i . e . , the problem of comparabi li ty within u t i l i t a r i a n i s m .  
What he says here i s ,  "Even i f  we assume, what i s  debatable,  th a t  
pleasures can d i f f e r  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  one from another ,  th i s  objection 
must offend a moral p r in c ip le  to which we would a l l  subscr ibe" ,  
i . e . , h is  p r in c ip le  of j u s t i c e , [40].
His pos i t ion  here, I th ink ,  can be understood only in l i g h t  of 
his understanding o f  the comparabi li ty of  pain in a formal, not 
m a te r ia l ,  sense. What he i s  saying i s  t h a t  materia l comparabili ty 
of p leasu res ,  i f  there  i s  such a thing ,. does not mat ter since pain 
is  pain (the formal sense) and ought to be avoided. This also  sug­
g es ts ,  of course , a notion of the primary goal of u t i l i t a r i a n i s m  as 
decreasing pain, r a th e r  than increasing pleasure .
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This a c tu a l ly  introduces another  dimension of  the compara­
b i l i t y  problem. In the discussion above, I pointed out the d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  in Regan's pos i t ion  p e r t in e n t  to comparing pain to pain. 
Here, the d i f f i c u l t y  includes comparing pain to  pleasure and 
pleasure to p leasure .
I sa id  above th a t  i t  i s  reasonable to be ch a r i t ab le  about 
Regan's f a i l u r e  to pursue the problem of  reconci l ing p r inc ip les  of 
u t i l i t y  and j u s t i c e .  I think i t  i s  a lso  reasonable to be somewhat 
le ss  cha r i tab le  about his  inadequate t reatment  of  the compara­
b i l i t y  problem because of the c r i t i c a l  ro le  of  his notion of compar­
a b i l i t y  in his arguments. Even the p r in c ip le  of  j u s t i c e  th a t  
he presents  depends on his notion of  pain as comparable in a formal 
sense without regard to materia l comparabil i ty .  But as I have 
shown, to t r e a t  comparabil i ty of pain in a purely formal sense is  
not s u f f i c i e n t .
The second major sect ion of  Regan's paper has to do with 
r i g h t - t o - 1 i f e  arguments, since he recognizes t h a t  the pain argu­
ments, even i f  successfu l ,  are  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to support vegetar ian­
ism.
In discussing the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  animal r i g h t s ,  Regan consid­
ers  a common type of  object ion to ascr ib ing  r ig h t s  to animals,  
i . e . , t h a t  i t  leads to the absurdi ty  t h a t  a wolf who eats  a lamb 
should be said to v io la te  the lamb's r ig h t s .  Regan's argument 
i s  th a t  i t  would not be co r rec t  to say th a t  the wolf v io la tes  
the lamb's r ig h t s  s ince the lamb can have r ig h t s  only agains t  
those who can be morally responsible  fo r  t h e i r  ac t ions  ( i . e . , are
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capable of  considering relevant  fea tures  and making moral deci­
s io n s ) .  Regan thinks th a t  a wolf cannot do t h i s ,  i s  not morally 
responsib le ,  and i s  not the kind of  being agains t  whom the lamb 
has r ig h t s .  He compares the w olf 's  s i tu a t io n  to t h a t  of  severely 
re tarded humans and claims th a t  they cannot be expected to recog­
nize our r igh ts  and cannot be said to v io la te  them regardless  of 
t h e i r  ac t ions .
I t  seems to me th a t  th is  i s  not an adequate reply  to the ob­
je c t io n  since i t  introduces i n s t a b i l i t y  in to  the notion of r ig h t s .  
Regan's posit ion has these consequences: I f  one non-rational  human,
X, i s  k i l l i n g  another human, Y, X is  not v io la t ing  Y's r ig h t s ,
since Y has no r igh ts  agains t  X in th a t  s i tu a t io n .  Would ra t iona l
human Z be morally obligated to in te r f e re ?  Let us suppose tha t
in addit ion to the r ig h t  not to su ffe r  and the r ig h t  to l i f e ,  Y has
the r i g h t  to have those r igh ts  enforced aga ins t  those who cannot 
recognize them, in th i s  case, aga ins t  X. On Regan's view, the 
enforcement r ig h t  i s  meaningless since X i s  not v io la t ing  Y's 
r i g h t s ,  indeed, cannot do so since he cannot recognize them. This 
seems more absurd than the alleged absurdity i t  i s  intended to 
counter.
I t  seems more reasonable to say tha t  Y has spec i f ied  r igh ts  
th a t  are non-circumstantia l,  i . e . , they are r igh ts  aga ins t  anyone 
who i s  physically  capable of  v io la t ing  them. In t h a t  case, we 
would say tha t  X is  v io la t ing  Y's r ig h t s ,  though he (X) is  not 
morally culpable ,  and Z has a prima fac ie  obl iga t ion  to  i n t e r f e r e .
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To re tu rn  to Regan's animal example, we would say th a t  the 
wolf Is v io la t ing  the lamb's r ig h t s  by eat ing i t ,  though he i s  not 
morally culpable .  A ra t iona l  adu l t  has a prima fac ie  obl igat ion 
to i n t e r f e r e ,  though he might make a moral decision th a t  the 
lamb's r ig h t s  ought to be overridden, given the p a r t i c u la r  c i r ­
cumstances.
Regan's major argument in t h i s  sect ion  i s  t h a t  the most 
p laus ib le  argument fo r  human r ig h t  to l i f e  a lso  supports animal 
r i g h t  to l i f e .  The r i g h t - t o - 1 i f e  argument i s  as follows: Ind i ­
viduals  have p os i t ive  i n t e r e s t s  ( "d e s i re s ,  goals,  hopes, preferences,  
and the l i k e " ) ,  the s a t i s f a c t io n  of  which brings i n t r i n s i c  
value to t h e i r  l i v e s . /  The i n t r i n s i c  value of any one l i f e  is  "as 
good judged in i t s e l f "  as th a t  of  any o t h e r . /  Therefore, each 
individual has a r ig h t  to pursue his  i n t e r e s t s  (so long as he does 
not v io la te  ano the r 's  r i g h t s ) . /  Life i s  a necessary condition for  
pursuing i n t e r e s t s . /  Therefore, a l l  ind iv iduals  who possess in ­
t e r e s t s  have a r ig h t  to l i f e .
Regan says th a t  he is  not sure th a t  t h i s  argument wil l  with­
stand s c ru t iny ,  but t h a t  i t s  s trength i s  the notion of  having 
i n t e r e s t s  as a condition for  the r ig h t  to l i f e .  Regan here argues 
th a t  animals'  having in t e r e s t s  i s  demonstrated by behavior th a t  
shows p re fe ren t ia l  choice and goa l -d irec ted  ac t ion .  Later,  he 
says t h a t  the assumption of  animals'  having in t e r e s t s  is  "an 
empirical question,  to  be answered on the  bas is  of reasoning by 
analogy—th a t ,  roughly speaking, beings who are  very s im i la r  to 
us,  both in terms of  physiology and in terms of  non-verbal behavior.
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a re ,  l ik e  us,  beings who have i n t e r e s t s .  The d i f f i c u l t y  l i e s  in 
knowing how fa r  t h i s  analogy can be pushed" [41].
The notion of  i n t e r e s t s  t h a t  Regan seems to have in mind 
here—"des i res ,  goals ,  hopes, preferences ,  and the l ike" --sugges ts  
t h a t  the capacity to reason i s  the natural fea tu re  that ,  e n ta i l s  
these  kinds of  i n t e r e s t s .  He says, f o r  example, t h a t  primates 
are  a paradigm of  those animals who have these i n t e r e s t s ,  but 
th a t  i t  i s  le ss  c le a r  in the case of  o thers .  This notion of having 
i n t e r e s t s  seems to d i f f e r  from the notion of  having in t e r e s t s  th a t  
he uses in the pain arguments. There, the i n t e r e s t s  are  in decreas­
ing pain and increasing pleasure ,  and sentience i s  the natural 
fea tu re  th a t  e n t a i l s  having those i n t e r e s t s .
I t  i s  c e r t a in ly  p laus ib le  to suppose t h a t  the same individual 
might have both fea tu res  and both kinds of  i n t e r e s t s .  But i t  
seems to me th a t  Regan's d i s t in c t io n  has undermined or a t  l e a s t  
severe ly r e s t r i c t e d  his own argument fo r  vegetarianism. The suc­
cess of t h a t  argument depends on showing th a t  i f  the pain arguments 
and the r i g h t - t o - 1 i f e  arguments hold fo r  humans, they also  hold 
fo r  animals.  But s h i f t in g  the notion of  i n t e r e s t s  r e s u l t s  in 
e i t h e r  excluding or p rov is iona l ly  excluding most animals from the 
r i g h t  to l i f e .  Regan prefaced his a r t i c l e  with the statement th a t  
his in ten t ions  are fundamentally p r a c t i c a l ,  not t h e o r e t i c a l .  But, 
as a matter  of  p ra c t i c e ,  most people are  not ea t ing  humans or 
o ther  primates.
What s t r a t e g i e s  are avai lab le  to Regan to save his position? 
Leaving as ide the many in terna l  def ic ienc ies  in h is  arguments, the
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basic  s t ru c tu re  o f  his  argument could be maintained i f  i t  could be de­
monstrated t h a t  o ther  animals (cows, p igs ,  e t c . ) do have the so r t s  of 
i n t e r e s t s  required by the r i g h t - t o - 1 i f e  argument. This might be de­
monstrated e i t h e r  by showing th a t  they have the necessary capacity to 
reason or  by showing th a t  such in t e r e s t s  are en ta i led  by another fea­
tu re  t h a t  they do have. Furthermore, Regan i s  wrong to  suppose th a t  
t h i s  i s  purely an empirical mat ter ,  since such determinations depend 
on using c r i t e r i a  whose appropriateness  i s  a th eo re t ica l  concern.
Prospectus
The review of  h i s to r i c a l  and contemporary views about the moral 
s ta tu s  of  animals shows: (1) t h a t  the usual assumption is  th a t  an i ­
mals are not r a t i o n a l ,  and (2) th a t  much use i s  made of  assumptions 
about the r a t i o n a l i t y  of  animals in arguments about the moral s ta tu s  
of animals,  but the notion of  animal r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  not as c lea r  as i t  
ought to be.
C lar i fy ing  the notion of  animal r a t i o n a l i t y  would sure ly sharpen 
arguments about the following kinds of  issues  th a t  are germane to a 
cons idera t ion  of the moral s ta tu s  of animals; (1) What are the neces­
sary and s u f f i c i e n t  bases fo r  having the so r t s  of  i n t e r e s t s  th a t  qual­
i fy  one fo r  membership in the moral community? (2) Who has those 
fea tures?  (3) Within the moral community, which fea tures  might be 
genera l ly  re lev an t  to decis ions  about d i f f e r e n t i a l  treatment? (4)
What bases are appropria te  fo r  making in t e r s p e c i f i c  comparisons?
I t  i s  beyond the scope of  th i s  work to  explore thoroughly a l l  
those i s sues .  My purpose i s  the more fundamental one of  c la r i fy in g
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the notion of  the r a t i o n a l i t y  of  animals,  which seems to be a neces­
sary prelude fo r  considerat ion of  those i ssues .  My concern is  
epistemological in t h a t  I want to consider  how one might go about 
t ry ing  to determine whether animals are r a t io n a l .
On the bas is  of  human experience, we can id en t i fy  s t ru c tu ra l  
f ea tures  of  behavior t h a t  i s  considered r a t io n a l .  Such behavior 
i s  based on a body of  b e l i e f s  th a t  are  based on sound inductive 
processes .  When behavior i s  charac te r ized  by th i s  fea tu re ,  i t  is  
properly considered r a t io n a l .  This fea tu re  can be used as a c r i ­
t e r io n  for  a sc r ib ing  (or in fe r r ing )  r a t i o n a l i t y .  I want to emphasize 
t h a t  I am not proposing a behavioral d e f in i t io n  of  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  
bu t ,  r a th e r ,  a behavioral c r i t e r i o n  fo r  the proper a sc r ip t io n  of 
the concept.
How can we know i f  behavior is  based on such b e l ie f s?  What 
can count as evidence for  th i s  fea ture?  What e n t i t l e s  us to in fe r  
from some behavior ( s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  animal behavior) th a t  t h a t  behav­
io r  i s  based on b e l ie f s  based on sound inductive procedures? What 
guidelines or constraining p r inc ip les  are appropria te  to d i r e c t  
our inferences?
Our problem is  to find ways to determine whether or not the 
behavior of  any given species i s  based on a body of b e l i e f s  based 
on sound induct ive processes.  An immediate r e s t r i c t i o n  on what we 
need to f ind  i s  suggested by what we know about the complex r e l a ­
t ionships  among b e l i e f s ,  d e s i re s ,  and human behavior.  (1) Some 
human behavior is  ra t iona l  in t h a t  i t  i s  based on b e l i e f s  infe rred  
from sound inductive processes.  (2) Some i s  i r r a t i o n a l  in th a t  i t  
i s  based on b e l ie f s  not in fe r red  from sound induct ive processes.
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(3) Some behavior i s  nonrational in th a t  i t  i s  independent of  be­
l i e f s .  This type of  behavior i s  usually  thought of as gene t ica l ly  
programmed or i n s t i n c t iv e ,  and although i t  i s  nonrational,  i t  may 
be purposive in t h a t  i t  has survival value or i t  contr ibutes  to 
individual pleasure .  (4) Some b e l ie f s  in fe rred  from sound inductive 
processes are not acted upon. Beliefs  and desires  seem to be 
re la ted  such t h a t  they form conditional p a i r s ,  e . g . , given des ire  X, 
then A ac ts  on b e l i e f  Y; or given b e l i e f  X, then A ac ts  on des ire  
Y. Some b e l ie f s  infe rred  from sound inductive processes may not be 
manifest in behavior because the conditional des ire  i s  not present 
or because i t  i s  superseded by a st ronger des ire .  For example, I 
may bel ieve th a t  eating wil l  s a t i s f y  my hunger, but I am not hun­
gry, or  perhaps I am hungry, but I want to wait  for  my dinner com­
panion, so I do not eat .  The point is  th a t  there i s  conditional 
behavioral manifestation of b e l ie f s .
What th i s  b r i e f  analysis  suggests for us is  th a t  we do not 
need to  assume or to discover th a t  a l l  behavior of a species is  
based on b e l ie f s  based on sound inductive processes,  but only th a t  
some of  i t  i s .  This r e s t r i c t i o n  is  based on the assumption of 
s im i la r i ty  between human behavior and animal behavior. Whether or 
not t h a t  i s  defensible will  be considered in what follows, but 
i t s  provis ional  use a t  the beginning seems unobjectionable.
I want to suggest two c r i t e r i a  for  determining whether some 
behavior of  a biological  species is  based on b e l ie f s  based on sound 
induct ive processes: (1) neurophysiological complexity (NPC) and
(2) language use (LU). The f i r s t  i s  prospective in the sense th a t
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i f  an animal has a c e r ta in  level o f  NPC, we might expect i t  to be 
capable of  ra t iona l  behavior. The second i s  re t ro spec t ive  in the 
sense t h a t  i f  an animal uses language, we might take such LU as ev i ­
dence fo r  ra t iona l  behavior.  The NPC c r i t e r i o n  is  not I t s e l f  be­
haviora l .  The LU c r i t e r i o n  i s  behavioral .  J o in t ly ,  they may be used 
to determine whether some of  the behavior o f  any given biological  
species i s  based on a body of  b e l i e f s  based on sound inductive pro­
cesses ,  i . e . . whether the behavior under consideration is  charac te r ­
ized by th i s  formal fea tu re  of  behavior t h a t  is  considered to be 
ra t iona l  behavior in the human case.
I want to emphasize t h a t  I am not claiming th a t  the only ra ­
t ional  beings are  those whose behavior meets these c r i t e r i a .  My sug­
gestion i s  the  more conservat ive one th a t ,  in the case of biological  
organisms, a l l  those whose behavior meets these c r i t e r i a  may be 
considered r a t io n a l .
The formal fea tu re  of  ra t iona l  behavior th a t  is  our guide ( i . e . ,  
t h a t  i t  i s  based on a body of  b e l ie f s  t h a t  are based on sound induc­
t iv e  processes)  i s  taken from human experience. Given the assumption 
of  evolutionary c o n t inu i ty ,  i t  seems reasonable to use NPC and LU 
as c r i t e r i a  fo r  determining whether th a t  fea tu re  of human ra t iona l  
behavior cha rac te r ize s  the behavior of o ther  species.
We wil l  have to consider the notion of  analogy. The very idea 
of  moral s ta tu s  fo r  animals i s  based on thinking about the analo­
gies between humans and other  animals.  The comparison of i n t e r ­
sp ec i f ic  behavior involves the use of analogy. Consider,  for  
example, the usual ch a rac te r iza t ion  of b iological  concepts as poly­
typ ic .  Propert ies  or a c t i v i t i e s  (behavior) which are considered to
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be appropria te ly  charac ter ized  by a s p e c i f ic  polytypic concept share 
a family resemblance (in a Wit tgensteinian sense) and th a t  resem­
blance i s  one of  analogous function.  In considering c r i t e r i a  fo r  
inferences  from animal behavior,  we wil l  have to consider grounds 
fo r  analogical  arguments. What we want to  know is  the conditions
under which we can appropria te ly  say t h a t  two molar or  general be­
haviors are  analogous.
I wil l  consider each of  the proposed c r i t e r i a  (NPC and LU) in 
de ta i l  in order to determine i t s  appropriateness  and usefu lness ,  and 
secondari ly ,  I wil l  consider whether there  i s  evidence th a t  some
animal species  meet the c r i t e r i a .
CHAPTER II 
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY
Use of  the Neuroph.ysioloqical S im i la r i ty  Notion 
in Philosophy and Zoology 
Philosophers and zoologists  make use of  the rough notion th a t  
s im i l a r i t y  of  neurophysiological s t ru c tu re  allows assumptions about 
s im i la r  exper ience.  I want to review the way th i s  notion has been 
used in both d i sc ip l in e s  in order to  point out i t s  usefulness and 
i t s  l im i t s .  Then I want to consider current  empirical evidence 
fo r  the c o r re la t io n  between NPC and the capacity  fo r  inductive 
reasoning.
Philosophy
Perhaps the best  example for  our purpose is  the work th a t  has 
been done about the problem of radical  in te rp r e ta t io n  or radical  
t r a n s l a t i o n  which i s ,  in Quine's apt phrase, the o ther  minds problem 
s o c ia l i z e d .  Lewis' formulation of the problem ind ica tes  more ex­
p l i c i t l y  than most th a t  the inferences  are grounded in the physical 
f a c t s  about the Subject:  "Given P, the fac ts  about Karl as a
physical system, solve fo r  the re s t"  [42].  What the r e s t  includes 
i s  Kar l ' s  b e l i e f s  and des ires  as he could express them in his own 
language and as we could express them in ours .  The basic presuppo­
s i t i o n  i s  th a t  P determines the r e s t  to the ex tent  th a t
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anything does. Then, given th a t  P determines b e l i e f s  and des i res ,  
and given the assumption th a t  the physical systems of a l l  persons 
are  roughly the same, we can suppose t h a t  Karl 's  b e l i e f s  and des ires  
wil l  be roughly the same as our own. This supposi t ion,  which 
serves as a cons tra ining p r inc ip le  in our in t e rp r e t a t i o n s ,  is  
genera l ly  known as the Charity p r in c ip le  (which seems to be a mis­
nomer s ince to follow the reasonable conclusion may be considered 
s en s ib le ,  but hardly c h a r i t a b le ) .
There are  v a r ian t  formulations of  the Charity p r inc ip le  whose 
variance i s  due to d if ferences  in the s o r t  of  mental or psycho­
logical  s im i l a r i t y  th a t  is  claimed. Davidson's formulation seems 
to  emphasize the a sc r ip t ion  of iden t ica l  b e l i e f s  and des ires .
"We wil l  t r y  fo r  a theory th a t  f inds  him c o n s is te n t ,  a be l iever  
of  t r u t h s ,  and a lover  of  the good (a l l  by our own l i g h t s ,  i t  goes 
without saying)" [43]. Lewis, on the o ther  hand, re je c t s  a Charity 
p r in c ip le  t h a t  requires  ascrib ing to the Subject the same be l ie f s  
and des i re s  as the t r a n s l a t o r ' s  in favor of one th a t  makes more 
allowance fo r  developmental d i f fe rences .  In Lewis' formulation, 
what i s  shared i s  some common induct ive method and some common 
underlying system of basic  i n t r i n s i c  values [44].  What is  common 
to the formulat ions i s  the a t t r i b u t i o n  of  r a t i o n a l i t y  to others 
(.and im p l ic i t ly  to onese l f ) .  I f  P determines the r e s t ,  and the 
r e s t  includes r a t i o n a l i t y ,  then i t  i s  the physical system of  humans 
t h a t  determines th a t  they are  capable of  ra t iona l  thinking.
I t  i s  the s im i l a r i t y  of  human physical systems th a t  grounds 
analogical  arguments. The use of  such arguments i s  j u s t i f i e d  because
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of  the neurophysiological s im i la r i ty  of  the observer and the sub­
j e c t .  Quine provides an example when he discusses the problem 
(in a hypothetical f i e ld  s i tu a t io n )  of  determining which p a r t i c u la r  
physical s timulation prompts a specif ied  l i n g u i s t i c  response.
Quine points  out th a t  besides formal procedures,  there  are " i n t u i ­
t iv e  judgments based on d e ta i l s  of  the n a t iv e ' s  behavior: his 
scanning movements, his sudden look of  recogni t ion,  and the l ike"  
[45].  These so r t s  of judgments are both " in tu i t iv e "  and acceptable 
because of  the assumed s im i l a r i t i e s  of  the t r a n s l a to r  and the sub­
j e c t .  The p a r t i c u la r  un i t  of non-1inguist ic behavior by the subject  
i s  taken by the t r a n s l a to r  to be highly analogous to his own behav­
ior  in s im i la r  circumstances p recise ly  because of t h e i r  other  
kinds of  basic  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  i . e . , neurophysiological s t ruc tu re  
and consequent general psychology.
We are in te re s ted ,  of  course, in the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  the tenets  
of  radical  in te rp r e ta t io n  to o ther  species .  I f  P determines the 
r e s t ,  then we suppose t h a t  there is  psychological s im i l a r i t y  among 
the individuals  in any given species.  Are we to suppose t h a t  the 
mental s t a t e s  of  another species are l ike  our own? I f  P d e te r ­
mines the r e s t ,  then we might suppose th a t  when the neurophysiolog­
ical s t ru c tu re  of  another species is  s im i lar  to ours,  the mental 
s t a t e s  a re ,  a lso .  And in th a t  case, the soundness of analogical 
arguments about other  species might be cor re la ted  with the degree 
of  s im i la r i ty  between t h e i r  neurophysiology and our own.
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Zoology
Most zoological s tu d ie s ,  whether m o lecu la r -ce l lu la r  or molar, 
assume the p r inc ip le  of  evolutionary con t inu i ty  and make use of a 
s im i l a r i t y  assumption. I t  i s  the assumption of  neurophysiological 
s im i l a r i t y  between humans and animals t h a t  underl ies  much in te rp r e ­
t a t io n  of experimental observat ions.  As in philosophy, neurophysio­
logical  s im i l a r i t y  grounds a ce r ta in  c la ss  of  analogical argument. 
This takes two forms: (1) in te rp re t in g  animal behavior by analogy
to human behavior,  and (2) making inferences about human behavior 
on the basis  of  animal behavior.
In the f i r s t  case, the in te rp r e t a t i o n  of  animal behavior by 
analogy to human behavior,  the typical  assumptions t h a t  are par t  
of  the r a t io n a le  fo r  the study are:  (1) t h a t  neurophysiology in ­
f luences  behavior,  and (2) th a t  there is  re levan t  s im i la r i ty  be­
tween the neurophysiology of humans and t h a t  of the non-human sub­
j e c t  species .  The behavior of  se lected  indiv iduals  in the subject  
species i s  observed. Then, given the s im i l a r i t y  assumption, i n ­
ferences are made about experiences or  mental s ta te s  of the subject  
animals.  Given the s im i la r i ty  between the subjec t  animals and 
humans, the behavior is  understood as ,  say, pain behavior because 
i t  i s  s im i la r  to how humans do behave or would behave in s im i la r  
circumstances. Then, given the fu r th e r  assumptions of  manifesta­
t ion  and t ru th fu lness  on the animal 's  p a r t ,  the human researcher  
in fe r s  t h a t  the animal i s  experiencing pain. In these s tu d ie s ,  the 
neurophysiological s im i la r i ty  grounds the analogical  arguments 
t h a t  j u s t i f y  the inferences  about animal behavior.
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Behaviorists  know th a t  t h e i r  methodological co n s t ra in ts  are too 
parsimonious, and a common s t r a teg y  i s  to  use the notion of  func­
t ional  r e la t io n sh ip s  between observable s timuli  and response events.  
To explain learn ing ,  the researcher  assumes: (1) th a t  the process
underlying learned react ions  e n t a i l s  the formation of an assoc ia ­
t io n ,  and (2) t h a t  the elements t h a t  are  assoc ia ted  are funct ion­
a l l y  equivalent  or  isomorphic to those designated in the observed 
S-R re la t io n sh ip  [46].  What i s  of i n t e r e s t  to us here i s  th a t  the 
very notion of  functional equivalence obviously depends on some 
s o r t  of s im i l a r i t y  assumption. Whether or  not funct ional  equiv­
alence can be construed as a weak or  strong analogy depends on 
c i rcumstantia l  d e t a i l s ,  but the poin t  i s  t h a t  such a notion is  
introduced as a necessary assumption fo r  the research of  the behav­
ior!  s t .
Furthermore, i f  pushed on the notion of mental s t a t e s ,  most 
behavior is ts  f a l l  back on a r e d u c t io n i s t  version of  the id e n t i ty  
theory such t h a t  mental s ta t e s  are  nothing but brain  s t a t e s .  I f  
t h a t  were t ru e ,  then i t  would seem p laus ib le  t h a t  those with 
s im i la r  brain s t a t e s  have s im i la r  experiences of  such mental s t a t e s  
as pain. I t  a lso  seems p laus ib le  t h a t  the complexity (degree of  
organizat ion)  of  neuroanatomy would determine what so r t  of brain 
s t a t e s  (mental s t a t e s )  could be experienced. But i f  th i s  were so, 
then i t  would seem remarkably unparsimonious to suppose a s i g n i f i ­
cant dichotomy between Homo sapiens and o ther  species .
In the second kind of  study l i s t e d  above, not only does the 
zoologis t  i n t e r p r e t  animal behavior by analogy to human behavior.
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but the neurophysiological s im i l a r i t y  is  used to j u s t i f y  addit ional  
inferences about human response and behavior based on animal r e ­
sponse and behavior.  This includes most heal th  and medical research. 
Because of  the neurophysiological s im i l a r i t y ,  i t  is  assumed th a t  
human physiological and behavioral responses to various external 
s timuli  will  be s im i la r  to th a t  o f  the te s ted  animals.
An example of  th i s  type of  study is  a recent  wel l-publicized 
p ro jec t  by the American Museum of  Natural History in which ca ts  
and k i t t e n s  were denervated (nerve ends in the g e n i t a l i a ,  central  
nervous system, or eyes, noses, and ears were severed), in order  to 
observe the e f f e c t s  of such nerve damage on t h e i r  psychosexual 
behavior.  The experimenters noted such things as whether being 
blinded a f fec ted  sexual behavior and whether penis denervation in­
t e r fe r e d  with normal sexual behavior. The National I n s t i t u t e  of 
Health financed th i s  study and the Museum's s t a f f  conducted i t  on 
the assumption th a t  the neurophysiological s im i l a r i t y  between cats  
and humans allowed va l id  inferences  about human sexual problems.
Given the assumption of evolut ionary con t inu i ty ,  the necess i ty  
of a s im i l a r i t y  assumption as pa r t  of the r a t io n a le  fo r  zoological 
s tud ies  does not seem problematic to most zoo log is ts .  Although i t  
i s  t rue  t h a t  th eo re t ic a l  b io lo g i s t s  are in te re s t e d  in the logical 
fea tu res  of polytypic concepts,  they do not question t h e i r  v a l id i ty  
or  u t i l i t y .  What i s  of ten  a t  issue  is  the v a l i d i t y  of  the s imi­
l a r i t y  assumption as spec if ied  in a given ins tance .  A common s t r a ­
tegy fo r  a t tacking  study r e su l t s  i s  to a t tack  the v a l id i t y  or plau­
s i b i l i t y  of the spec i f ied  s im i l a r i t y  on which the r e su l t s  depend.
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At the molecular l e v e l ,  an example i s  the well-known Canadian 
government study of  sacchar in as a carcinogen. The subjec t  animals 
were rodents whose neurophysiology i s  s im i la r  to t h a t  of  humans.
The study depended on the assumptions: (1) t h a t  the rodents and
humans are s en s i t iv e  to the same carcinogens, to the same degree, 
and (2) t h a t  any change in the dose of  a carcinogen wil l  cause an 
exact ly  proportional change in the incidence of  tumors. The f i r s t  
assumption, which i s  the spec i f ied  s im i l a r i t y  assumption, is  widely 
disputed. According to a 1975 report  from the National Academy of 
Sciences: "There i s  the p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  such t e s t s  may also  iden­
t i f y  chemicals carcinogenic to rodents th a t  do not pose such a 
th re a t  to man" [47].  Uncertainty about the assumption i s  c lea r ly  
s ta ted  by Dr. Marvin Schneiderman of  the National Cancer I n s t i t u t e :  
"The c o r re la t io n  between man and animals may be wrong. Man may be 
less s en s i t iv e  than animals to a carcinogen. But he may j u s t  as 
e a s i ly  be more sens i t ive"  [48].
At a behavioral l e v e l ,  the Museum's study of  f e l in e s  provides 
an example. I t  can be argued th a t ,  although there  i s  neurophysio­
logical s im i l a r i t y  between cats  and humans, the g rea te r  complexity 
of  the neurophysiological s t ru c tu re  of  humans allows for  adaptive 
behavior,  e . g . , in the case of  bl indness ,  such th a t  the inferences 
from f e l in e  behavior are  questionable .
Whenever spec i f ied  s im i la r i ty  assumptions are a t tacked,  what 
i s  questioned i s : ( l )  the empirical evidence fo r  the claim of 
s im i l a r i t y  of  re levan t  f ea tu re s ,  and (2) the relevance of  the se­
lec ted  fea tu res  of  the compared species in t h a t  case. The issue 
i s  the s t reng th  of  the analogy in the given instance.
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Empirical Evidence fo r  Correlat ion Between Neurophysiological 
Complexity and the Capacity fo r  Inductive Reasoning
In the two preceding sec t ions ,  we have seen some of the ways in 
which philosophers and zoologists  make use of  the notion th a t  simi­
l a r i t y  of  neurophysiological s t ru c tu re  allows assumptions about 
s im i lar  experience. This notion grounds a ce r ta in  c lass  of analo­
gical argument in both d i sc ip l in e s .  In general ,  s im i la r i ty  of 
neurophysiological organization is  co r re la ted  with s im i la r i ty  of  
physiological response and behavior.
For our present  purpose, we are in te re s ted  in a more spec i f ic  
c o r re la t io n ,  i , e . , the re la t io n sh ip  between the complexity of neu­
rophysiological s t ruc tu re  and the capacity fo r  inductive reasoning.
I t  is  general ly  thought th a t  humans are capable of inductive reason­
ing because of  the neurophysiological complexity of  the species .  I 
want b r i e f ly  to review the empirical evidence for  t h a t  claim as 
well as thé empirical evidence re la ted  to the neurophysiological 
complexity of some other  species ,  and consider the implications  
for  the claim th a t  those species have the capacity  fo r  inductive 
reasoning.
Before proceeding with t h a t ,  however, I want to point out why 
I think such a review of empirical data i s  a useful approach. The 
question of  the relevance of empirical data to theor ies  of mind-body 
(or more s p e c i f i c a l ly ,  mental s ta t e -b ra in  s t a t e )  r e l a t io n  i s  c e r t a in ly  
an in te re s t in g  and d i f f i c u l t  ques tion,  but i t  i s  not a question 
th a t  need detain us here. I t  may well be the case th a t  the empir­
ical  data are cons is ten t  with many theo r ie s .  But fo r  our present
53
purpose, a l l  we need i s  an empirica lly  supported c o r re la t io n ,  not a 
theory to account fo r  i t .  The th eo re t ic a l  claim th a t  there i s  a 
co r re la t ion  between brain s ta te s  and mental s ta t e s  (the l a t t e r  in ­
fe r red  from observable behavior) i s  not the same as a theore t ica l  
claim th a t  accounts fo r  the c o r re la t io n .  I t  i s  the former type of 
claim th a t  i s  re levan t  to our present  purpose.
In l i g h t  of  curren t  neurophysiological knowledge, i t  i s  probably 
quain t ly  misleading to speak of the " loca l iza t ion"  of brain s t a t e  
co r re la te s  of  spe c i f ic  mental s t a t e s ,  but fo r  the moment, to speak 
in th i s  way wil l  help c l a r i f y  the boundaries of  our concern. Wher­
ever a brain s t a t e  co r re la te  may be loca ted ,  the brain state-mental 
s t a t e  c o r re la t io n  remains puzzling. But fo r  our purpose, such loca­
t ion i s  the re levan t  issue inasmuch as we a re  in te re s te d  in the 
capac i t ies  of brains  of d i f f e r e n t  species  t h a t  d i f f e r  in complexi­
ty .  For example, suppose (again putt ing the matter  very crudely) 
t h a t  the mental s t a t e s  t h a t  co n s t i tu te  inductive reasoning are 
cor re la ted  with brain  s ta t e s  th a t  involve the neocortex. I f  the 
brains of a se lec ted  animal species lack neocortex, i t  would be 
p lausib le  to be skeptical  about t h a t  spec ies '  neurophysiological 
capacity  fo r  induct ive reasoning.
Our task i s  not an easy one. During the recent pas t  and a t  
present ,  research in the neurosciences has been specia l ized  and 
fragmented. One r e s u l t  of th i s  organization of  research i s  tha t  
there i s  serious  disagreement about fundamental i s sues ,  e . g . , the 
r e l a t io n  between e l e c t r i c a l  and chemical changes in and among 
nerve c e l l s .  There i s  agreement, however, about the rudimentary
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nature of  even the most advanced knowledge. Perhaps fo r  these  
reasons , comparatively meager a t t e n t io n  has been given to the devel­
opment of  th eo re t ica l  neuropsychological models t h a t  would account 
f o r  the piecemeal and of ten c o n f l ic t in g  data .  Furthermore, i t  i s  
recognized th a t  the ava i lab le  models a re  not e n t i r e ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
[49].
Given th i s  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s ,  i t  seems to me th a t  a reasonable 
way to proceed to f ind  out what we want to know is  to s e l e c t  the 
bes t  a v a i lab le  th eo re t ica l  model and review the empirical 
data in l i g h t  of  t h a t  model. Formally, the data in which we are 
in te re s te d  are  empirical genera l iza t ions  t h a t :  (1) describe ob­
servable  p roper t ies  and e s ta b l i sh  the frequency of  occurrence of 
those p roper t ie s  in repeated observat ions ,  and (2) hypothesize a 
r e l a t io n  (between a th eo re t ic a l  independent continuous var iab le  x 
and a dependent th eo re t ica l  continuous va r iab le  ÿ) th a t  i s  assumed 
to correspond approximately to  r e l a t io n s  t h a t  would be obtained 
between x  ̂ and i f  the experiments were repeated in d e f in i t e ly ,  
and i f  x  ̂ were replaced by a continuous var iab le  th a t  within a 
c e r ta in  range, could take any value. But s ince frequency of  co n f i r ­
mation does not necessar i ly  ru le  out non-spurious empirical gene­
r a l i z a t i o n ,  i t  seems des irab le  to consider  these empirical general­
iza t io n s  in the context of a theory t h a t  incorporates  them, even 
though our primary i n t e r e s t  a t  the moment is  not the theory,  but 
the empirical genera l iza t ions  [50].  Philosophers do not o rd in a r i ly  
know neurophysiology, but they do know the fea tu res  of  good theo­
r i e s ,  and those fea tures  can serve as c r i t e r i a  in se le c t in g  a
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th eo re t ic a l  model to guide our present review of  empirical data and 
allow fo r  cons is ten t  in t e rp re ta t io n .
On the basis  of such c r i t e r i a ,  I propose to use Wassermann's 
in tegra ted  model (which he ca l l s  a neuropsychological molecular 
b iological  mapping theory) [51].  I f  Wassermann's model should turn 
out to be s u b s ta n t i a l ly  wrong, what would be required ,  re levan t  
to our present  i n t e r e s t ,  would be to find the next bes t ava i lab le  
model to help us co n s is ten t ly  in t e rp r e t  research data .
One of the v i r tues  of  Wassermann's theory is  i t s  in teg ra t ion  
of  s t ru c tu ra l  and functional brain p roper t ie s .  S truc tura l  l a t e r a l ­
i za t ion  and funct ional hemispheric s p ec ia l iz a t io n  have been key 
concerns in i n t e r s p e c i f i c  comparative s tud ies .  Typical questions 
are about: (1) the evolutionary development of  b i l a t e r a l  b ra in s ,
(2) morphological symmetry and asymmetry, (3) functional symmetry 
and asymmetry, and (4) the r e la t ionsh ip  between morphological and 
funct ional symmetry and asymmetry.
Evolutionary Development of the B i la te ra l  Brain
The evolut ionary h i s to ry  of the l a t e r a l i z e d  brain involved 
three major phases: (1) paired sense organs, paired  motor s t r u c ­
tu re s ,  and paired and p a ra l l e l  bra ins ;  (2) commissural interconnec­
t ion  of the p a ra l le l  b ra in s ,  and (3) crossed l a t e r a l i z a t i o n .  In 
symmetrical l a t e r a l i z a t i o n ,  each hemisphere acts  as the mirror  
image of  the o ther .  The f i r s t  known ver tebra tes  had a brain in 
which the f ive  fundamental regions were already es tab l ished  and 
i t  formed a l a t e r a l  s t ru c tu re  much l ike  present  typical  ve r teb ra te  
brains [52]. Later anatomic development included the growth of
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the l a t e r a l  s t ru c tu re s  (p a r t i c u la r ly  the midbrain and telencephalon) ,  
a progressive  tendency towards asymmetry, and the development of 
mammalian cerebral  commissures, p a r t i c u la r ly  the corpus callosum 
which progressively  increases in s ize  phylogenetical ly .  There are 
d i f fe rences  in the speed of conduction across the callosum in d i f ­
f e re n t  species  [53].
All ve r teb ra tes  have b i l a t e r a l  systems fo r  perception and motor 
function.  Given the symmetry of  v e r teb ra te  body s t ru c tu re ,  such 
b i l a t e r a l  brain  systems are c le a r ly  adaptive fo r  survival .  So, 
i t  i s  an in t r igu ing  question why there has been evolut ionary pro­
gression towards asymmetry. Both anatomical and functional asym­
metry i s  found in Homo sapiens and o ther  species .  One plausible  
hypothesis i s  t h a t ,  fo r  higher mammals, the capacity  for  complex 
cognit ive a c t i v i t y  is  even more adaptive than the capacity fo r  sen­
sorimotor a c t i v i t y  [54].  I t  i s  because of  the supposed r e la t ionsh ip  
between asymmetry and cogni tive capacity t h a t  in t e r s p e c i f i c  com­
parisons  of  anatomical and functional asymmetry are p a r t i c u la r ly  
re levan t  to our present purpose of  determining whether or not some 
nonhuman species  have spec i f ic  kinds of cognit ive cap ac i t i e s .
Anatomical Asymmetry
Anatomical asymmetry in the p o s te r io r  regions of the temporal 
lobes has been observed in ad u l t ,  neonate,  and fe ta l  humans and in 
nonhuman primates [55].
In humans, the superior  (upper) horizonta l  surface of  the 
Sylvian f i s s u r e —the par t  of  the temporal lobe pos te r io r  to Heschl 's
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transverse gyrus which i s  the primary auditory c o r t e x - - i s  usually 
la rger  (longer) in the l e f t  than in the r ig h t  hemisphere. This 
surface,  the planum temporale, i s  p a r t  of  the auditory  associa t ion  
areas .  There is  extensive development of gyri around the Sylvian 
f i s s u re .  The pos te r io r  portion of the superior  temporal gyrus i s  
the core of Wernicke's language comprehension region, i . e . , Wer­
nicke 's  area is  folded within the Sylvian f i s s u re .  (See Figure 1.)
There is  also considerable evidence fo r  anatomic asymmetry in 
temporal lobe regions in nonhuman primates.  In s tudies  of various 
species ,  i t  has been shown th a t  the Sylvian f i s s u re  i s  longer 
more f requently  in the l e f t  hemisphere. The most s t r ik in g  case 
i s  tha t  of chimpanzees in which 80 per cent of  those studied showed 
longer lef t-hemisphere Sylvian f i s s u re s  (compared to 84 per cent of  
humans). This i s  p a r t i c u la r ly  in te re s t in g  s ince the observed 
neural asymmetry i s  in the audi tory associa t ion  cor tex,  but the 
modalit ies  th a t  have been used in developing language s k i l l s  in 
chimpanzees have been visual and manual, r a th e r  than auditory [56].
What i s  the s ign if icance  of  the evidence for  th i s  marked ana­
tomical asymmetry? The anatomical asymmetry c o r re la te s  with t r a ­
d i t io n a l ly  accepted functional asymmetry, i . e . ,  l e f t  hemisphere 
dominance fo r  language. Although a la rge r  anatomical area does 
not necessar i ly  mean tha t  i t  i s  more important for  a p a r t i c u la r  
funct ion,  "there are  precedents in neural organization to ind ica te  
t h a t  s ize  of co r t ic a l  representa t ion  of  function i s  po s i t iv e ly  
corre la ted  with degree of function" [57].
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FIG. 1. LATERAL ASPECT OF LEFT HEMISPHERE.
59
Never theless ,  the r e la t io n s h ip  between neurostructure  and func­
t ion  i s  unclear .  There are  normal asymmetries in various paired 
human anatomical s t ru c tu re s ,  e . g . , the l e f t  leg i s  longer but the 
r ig h t  arm and r ib s  are  longer .  In the b ra in ,  there  are  asymmetries 
in the cerebral veins,  cerebral blood flow and volume, EEG a c t i v i t y ,  
and various subcort ica l  nuclei and pathways. The volume of the l e f t  
l a t e r a l  v e n t r ic le  i s  g r e a te r  than the r i g h t ,  and the to ta l  weight 
of  the r ig h t  hemisphere i s  g r e a te r ,  which suggests t h a t  the re  is  
less  t i s s u e  mass in the l e f t  hemisphere. The s ign if icance  of  the 
l a rg e r  l e f t  Sylvian f i s s u re  is  based on i t s  co r re la t io n  with inde­
pendently e s tab l ished  l e f t  hemisphere dominance fo r  language. 
However, o ther  areas  co r re la ted  with language--Heschl 's  gyrus,
Broca 's  a rea ,  and the major pa r t  o f  Wernicke's a rea—are la rg e r  in 
the r i g h t  hemisphere [58].
For our purposes, i t  i s  serendip i tous  t h a t  data are ava i lab le  
about the s im i l a r i t y  of  the Sylvian f i s s u r e  asymmetry in human and 
nonhuman primates ,  s ince i t  r e l a t e s  to cogni t ive  ( l i n g u i s t i c )  a b i l ­
i t i e s .  But the s ign if icance  of the morphological asymmetry is 
unclear  s ince the p rec ise  ro le  of  the planum temporale in l i n g u i s ­
t i c  behavior is  not known [59].
Other Anatomical Comparisons
Some data r e la ted  to i n t e r s p e c i f i c  neuroanatomical comparisons 
o ther  than anatomical asymmetry are  av a i la b le .  Quant i ta t ive  d i f ­
ferences between human and o ther  primate brains are  shown by several 
types of measurements.
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F i r s t  i s  the comparison of brain  volume/body surface area r a t i o ,  
a dimensional encephalizat ion index. Among primates,  there  i s  a 
l i n ea r  r e la t io n sh ip  between brain weight (E) and body weight (P) 
when p lo t ted  on a double-logarithmic scale  by the following f o r ­
mula: E = kP2/3.  Such p lo t t in g  shows l i n e a r  progression from
baboons through pongids ( including chimpanzees and g o r i l l a s )  to 
humans [60].  This analys is  of  encephalizat ion i s  cons is ten t  with 
other  s tudies  t h a t  ind ica te  t h a t  higher apes have g rea te r  capaci­
t i e s  than monkeys or gibbons [61].  In general ,  there  is  c o r re la ­
t ion  between high encephal iza tion of  species  and independent a t t r i ­
butions of i n t e l l ig e n c e ,  e . g . , humans, dolphins,  e lephants ,  g reat  
apes, and monkeys [62].  The cephalic index of  bot t lenose  dolphins 
is  approximately the same as humans [63]. Although in t r a s p e c i f i c  
ana lys is  of  brain  s ize  is  charac ter ized  by marked "e r ro r  var iance",  
as an in t e r s p e c i f i c  s t a t i s t i c ,  i t  has s tab le  c o r re la t ion  with other  
neural measurements including to t a l  co r t ic a l  neurons, co r t ic a l  
volume, neuron densi ty ,  g l ia /neuron r a t i o ,  length of  dendr i te  t r e e ,  
ch lor ide ,  ace ty lcho l ines te rase ,  and co r t ic a l  surface  [64].
A second type of quan t i f ied  comparison i s  a progression index 
th a t  shows the extent  of a p a r t i c u la r  component neural s t ru c tu re ,  
e . g . , how many times la rg e r  the neocortex i s  in a given species  
than i t  is  in an average basal in sec t ivo re  of  the same weight.
A simian scale  on a progression index for  neocortex (which i s  
considered an anatomical c o r re l a t e  of in te l l ig en ce )  shows g o r i l l a s  
a t  31, chimpanzees a t  59, and humans a t  154 (with base 1) [65].  
Although neocort ical  extent  is  highly co r re la ted  with brain s ize
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and encephalizat ion ind ices ,  i t s  usefulness as a c o r re l a t e  of  i n t e l ­
ligence is  r e s t r i c t e d  inasmuch as i t  discounts the ro le  of  paleocor- 
t i c a l  s t ru c tu re s  in in te l l ig e n c e  [66],
I t  i s  general ly  agreed th a t  there are q u a l i t a t iv e  d ifferences  
between d i f f e r e n t  areas of the neocortex ( f r o n t a l ,  p a r i e t a l ,  tem­
poral ,  and occ ip i ta l  lobes) .  The only reported comparative study 
of  these areas  measured the s ize  of  prefronta l  areas in r e l a t io n  
to t o t a l  neocortex [67],  The r e su l t s  were 11.3 per cent  in 
macaques, 16.9 per cent in chimpanzees, and 29 per  cent  in humans 
[68].
What these s tudies  show are r e l a t iv e  q u an t i ta t iv e  d ifferences  
in neuroanatomic s t ru c tu re  among humans and other  primates.  Again, 
what they do not show is  the functional s ignif icance  of such d i f ­
ferences.
Functional Asymmetry
Brain researchers  are in te re s ted  in finding more prec ise  co r ­
re la t io n s  between s t ru c tu re  and function. On the one hand, a t t e n ­
t ion has been given to obtaining information about normal neuro­
s t ru c tu re  including morphological asymmetries. Although knowledge 
in t h i s  area is  l imited ,  i t  does allow for  some in te r s p e c i f i c  com­
parisons such as those discussed in the preceding sec t ions .
On the o ther  hand, a t t en t io n  has been given to obtaining 
information about normal brain funct ions by: (1) noting physiologi­
cal responses or behavior,  given specif ied  neuroanatomical or  neuro­
physiological condit ions (e . g . , u n i la te ra l  le s ions ,  commisurectomy.
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hemispherectomy, ca ro t id  amytal in je c t io n s ,  e l e c t r i c a l  s t im ula t ion ,  
or normal), or (2) noting neuroanatomical or neurophysiological 
condi t ions ,  given specif ied  responses or  behavior f e . a . . aphasia 
or  handedness (long term) or  s p e c i f i c  task performance or response 
to stimulus (shor t  term)).  On the basis  of these co r re la t io n s ,  
the functional proper t ies  of  brain regions are  in fe r red .
Functional asymmetry in human brains has been documented fo r  
more than a century. The t r a d i t io n a l  descr ip t ion  of  d ifferences  
includes the following, with the f i r s t  term in each pa i r  r e fe r r in g  
to the l e f t  hemisphere and the second term to the r ig h t  hemisphere: 
verbal-nonverbal ; p reposi t iona l- imaginat ive ;  an a ly t ic - sy n th e t ic ;  
e x p l i c i t - t a c i t ;  l i n g u i s t i c - s p a t i a l  and manipulative; sequen t ia l - 
h o l i s t i c ;  s e le c t iv e  a t t en t io n -su s ta in ed  concentrat ion;  a r i thm et ic -  
geometric [69].
Recent research has ind ica ted ,  however, th a t  most functional 
d ifferences  between hemispheres are a matter  of r e l a t iv e  domination, 
not exclusive sp ec ia l iz a t io n  [70].  Furthermore, although hemispheric 
functional spec ia l iza t ion  i s  evident ,  there i s  g rea t  functional 
v a r ie ty  in neurological s t ru c tu re s .  In humans who have undergone 
commissurotomy, e . g . , there  is  marked v a r i a b i l i t y  in the amount and 
kind of  language capacity associa ted  with the r ig h t  hemisphere [71]. 
Experiments with hemidecorticate humans have shown th a t  the r ig h t  
hemisphere is  able to support a level of l i n g u i s t i c  function grossly  
comparable to t h a t  of the l e f t  hemisphere, and experiments with g lo ­
bal aphasies have shown t h a t ,  under those condi t ions,  the r ig h t  
hemisphere is  unable to support any l i n g u i s t i c  function [72].  Right
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hemisphere control of l i n g u i s t i c  function is  markedly var iab le .
The evidence suggests t h a t  the hemispheres are not behavior- 
s p e c i f i c ,  but t h a t  there i s  processing s p e c i f i c i t y .  D i f fe ren t ia l  
processing of Japanese languages provides an i l l u s t r a t i o n  of  pro­
cessing s p e c i f i c i t y .  Katakana represents  the sounds of  speech while 
Kanji represents  ideas and has l i t t l e  d i r e c t  r e la t io n sh ip  to speech. 
A l e f t  hemisphere stroke impairs a b i l i t y  to read and wri te  Katakana 
but has l i t t l e  e f f e c t  on a b i l i t y  to read and write  Kanji. Although 
the use of e i t h e r  i s  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior,  Katakana (primari ly  verbal 
and temporal) i s  pr imar i ly  processed by the l e f t  hemisphere whereas 
Kanji (primari ly  visual and s p a t i a l )  i s  pr imari ly  processed by the 
r ig h t  hemisphere [73].  "Language i s  a complex of  behaviors ,  each 
of  which may l a t e r a l i z e  (and lo ca l ize )  in varying ways and in vary­
ing degrees" [74].
Studies with neonates have shown changing asymmetrical func­
t ioning generated by stimuli  with no verbal content  in d i f f e r e n t  
modali t ies  (auditory and v i su a l ) .  "These asymmetries are  r e la ted  
to cerebral  speech dominance, but appear to represent  the more fun­
damental processes in which language appears to be only a par t  
s ince they do not require  stimuli  with 've rba l '  content" [75].
" I t  i s  becoming increasingly  apparent t h a t  many tasks th a t  might 
s u p e r f i c i a l l y  be labe l led  l i n g u i s t i c  or v isuospat ia l  are comprised 
of processing stages th a t  ind iv idua l ly  engage one or the other  
hemisphere" [76].
I want to emphasize t h a t  pa r t  of what i s  being claimed is  th a t  
there  i s  complex cogni tive a c t i v i t y  in the absence of  speech. Addi­
t ional  evidence for  th is  comes from experiments with global aphasies
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designed to t e s t  f o r  cognit ive capacity  in the r ig h t  hemisphere.
These p a t ien t s  have learned the non-verbal language system devel­
oped by Premack fo r  chimpanzees. In o the r  experiments,  they have 
demonstrated an e f f i c i e n t  memory system, the a b i l i t y  to ca tegor ize ,  
to conceptual ize ,  and to make inferences [77].
The l im i ted  knowledge av a i lab le  about funct ional capac i t ie s  
(and anatomical c o r re la te s )  in nonhuman animals makes i n t e r s p e c i f i c  
comparisons d i f f i c u l t .  I t  has been reported th a t  to ta l  commissu­
rotomy has no observable e f f e c t s  on the behavior of  cats  [78].  The 
s tud ies  t h a t  have been done with nonhuman primates suggest func­
t ional  hemispheric s p e c ia l i z a t io n .  Right hand preference by baboons 
f o r  i n t r i c a t e  motor tasks suggests l e f t  hemisphere sp ec ia l iz a t io n  [79], 
Experiments with monkeys have genera l ly  ind ica ted  no cerebral 
asymmetry in visual learning,  but there  i s  recent  evidence tha t  
le s ions  of  the p a r ie ta l  cortex t h a t  produce profound spa t ia l  d i s o r i ­
en ta t ion  in humans produce s im i la r  d i so r i e n ta t io n  in rhesus monkeys 
[80].  There i s  evidence of a major functional hemispheric d i f f e r ­
ence in monkey brains in the audi tory  mode, the mode th a t  gives 
r i s e  to verbal a b i l i t i e s .  Lesions of  the l e f t  superior  temporal 
gyrus (the homologue of  Wernicke's area in humans) impair perform­
ance on d i f f i c u l t  auditory  tasks  whereas r ig h t - s id e d  les ions  in 
the same area do not [81].  Chimpanzees have demonstrated l i n g u i s ­
t i c  a b i l i t y ,  possib ly  r e la ted  to  the longer Sylvian f i s s u re  in the 
l e f t  hemisphere. Recent s tud ies  with humans have indicated v isua l ,  
aud i to ry ,  and o l fa c to ry  t r a n s f e r  through the a n te r io r  commissure, 
and behavioral s tudies  have ind ica ted  visual t r a n s f e r  through the
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a n te r io r  commissure in nonhuman primates [82].
Clearly ,  there  i s  some evidence fo r  hemisphere sp ec ia l iza t ion  
in nonhuman primates s im i la r  to t h a t  of  humans. As we have j u s t  
seen, however, there  i s  cons iderable  evidence th a t  what i s  hemisphere 
sp ec i f i c  in human brain function i s  not behavior,  but processing.
I f  what is  spec ia l ized  in human l i n g u i s t i c  behavior i s  not the be­
havior ,  but the underlying processing mechanisms, then i t  i s  plau­
s ib le  to suppose t h a t  the processes of nonhumans are  s im i la r  even 
though the behavior may be non-1inguis t ic  [83],
Signif icance of  the Empirical Evidence
Our purpose in reviewing empirical data about neurostructure  
and funct ion in humans and o ther  species was to determine whether 
those data co n s t i tu te  evidence f o r ; ( l )  c o r re la t io n s  between neuro­
s t ru c tu re  and cognit ive capacity  in  humans, and (2) s t ru c tu ra l  and 
funct ional  s im i l a r i t y  between human brains  and those of  some non­
human species .
Our review of the data has shown t h a t  there  i s  some evidence 
fo r  both claims, but caution i s  c l e a r ly  in order fo r  a number of 
reasons. F i r s t ,  the ava i lab le  data about humans as well as non­
humans are qu i te  l im i ted .  I t  i s  easy to see why there  i s  general 
agreement among neu rosc ien t i s ts  t h a t  t h e i r  knowledge i s  rudimentary. 
Although the usual sociological explanations fo r  th i s  s t a t e  of  a f ­
f a i r s  sure ly  a p p ly - - s c ie n t i s t s  cannot do everything a t  once-- there  
i s ,  in th i s  ins tance ,  another re levan t  f a c to r .  With regard to 
primates,  for  example, Witelson suggests t h a t  "the general lack of 
evidence fo r  l a t e r a l i z a t i o n  of  cogni t ive  functions  in primates to
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date [1977] may well be because i t  was not looked for  since i t  was 
not expected in nonl inguis t ic  animals" [84].
Furthermore, some of the data th a t  are avai lab le  have been 
obtained by methods which r e s t r i c t  genera l iza t ions .  Data obtained 
from pathological cases or from human or nonhuman individuals  with 
c l i n i c a l l y  or experimentally induced abnormalities may not provide 
r e l i a b le  information about normal b ra ins .  The matter is  fu r th e r  
complicated by the f a c t ,  in the case of  humans, th a t  the induction 
of  c l in ica l  abnormalities i s  undertaken because o f  already ex is te n t  
brain damage. For example, p r io r  to surgery, most commissurotomy 
pa t ien ts  have severe e p i l e p t i c  seizures  due to lesions in the cortex. 
Not only t h a t ,  but the standard surgical  procedure i t s e l f  usually  
causes addit ional lesions  [85]. But much of human brain research 
has been limited to abnormal brains because of e th ical  cons t ra in ts .  
Wada, whose research i n t e r e s t  i s  human infant  b ra ins ,  puts the mat­
t e r  quite  succinct ly :  "Infant  brains without neurological damage 
are hard to come by" [86].  Brains from humans who have died a re ,  
of  course, ava i lab le  for  research,  but t h e i r  very a v a i l a b i l i t y  
r e s t r i c t s  t h e i r  usefulness in assessing brain funct ions. Apart 
from these p rac t ica l  and methodological problems, there are con­
ceptual questions about the ra t iona le s  fo r  many brain research 
s tudies .
The Sylvian f i s s u re  asymmetry s tudies  i l l u s t r a t e  some of the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The observation of  anatomical asymmetry (in disem­
bodied brains)  is  considered important because of i t s  assumed r e l a ­
t ionship to  l i n g u i s t i c  functioning in l iv ing  human b ra ins ,  i . e . .
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l e f t  hemisphere dominance fo r  language. The Sylvian f i s s u re  s tudies  
show anatomical asymmetry in approximately 80 per cent of  humans, 
but s tudies  of  aphasies with un i la te ra l  brain damage show 95 per 
cent with l e f t  hemisphere dominance fo r  language while in t ra c a ro t id  
sodium amytal s tudies  with apparently normal humans show 90 per cent  
with l e f t  hemisphere dominance fo r  language. How are the d iscrep­
ancies to be explained? [87].
The f i r s t  p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  procedural.  Witelson suggests,  fo r  
example, t h a t  macroscopic measurement of  the planum may be too im­
precise  to  c o r re la te  well with funct ional  var iab les  and th a t  such 
attempts might be more successful i f  h i s to lo g ic  s tudies  were done 
f i r s t  in order b e t t e r  to define the area.  Of course,  t h i s  would 
s t i l l  not account for  the discrepancy between the aphasie and sodium 
amytal s tud ies .  Nor does i t  address the problem of  the appl ica­
b i l i t y  of evidence from s tud ies  of  damaged or abnormal brains to 
normal ones.
The suggestion fo r  procedural precis ion a lso  introduces a 
conceptual problem in formulating hypotheses fo r  Sylvian f i s su re  
and o ther  anatomical s tud ies .  "To a t t r i b u t e  the capacity  for  lan ­
guage simply to quant i ta t ive  parameters such as s ize  or number of 
c e l l s  i s  a gross overs implif ica t ion"  [88].  I t  i s  possible  tha t  
various methods of  assessment (anatomical measurement, t e s t in g  
functions of aphasies with l a t e r a l  l e s io n s ,  t e s t in g  functions  
of  normal individuals  in jec ted  with sodium amytal) are "sens i t ive  
to d i f f e r e n t  aspects  of neural organization" [89].
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The l a t t e r  p o s s ib i l i t y  i s  congruent with recent  data th a t  
ind ica te  that  the t r a d i t io n a l  ways of thinking about brain s t r u c ­
ture  and function (ways of  thinking th a t  provided study ra t iona le s  
and determined appropria te  methodologies) have been misleading.
One example, which we considered above, is  the notion of  language. 
Attempts to make sense of  var ian t  data have led to a conceptual 
s h i f t  in the notion of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.  The notion of l e f t  
hemisphere dominance fo r  language i s  being superseded by a concept 
of l i n g u i s t i c  behavior as a complex s e r i e s  of  processes s e le c t iv e ly  
involving both hemispheres.
One consequence of such a s h i f t  is  a necessary reassessment of  
data and the infe rred  empirical genera l iza t ions  obtained in previous 
s tud ies .  A re levan t  example i s  s tudies  of  cognit ive funct ions in 
non l inguis t ic  animals.  Studies designed to t e s t  cognit ive a b i l i t i e s  
by t e s t in g  functional l e f t  hemisphere dominance may be seen as 
poorly designed, and the conclusions would be suspect.
The s i tu a t io n  is  the same a t  a c e l l u l a r  lev e l .  Recent e lec-  
t rophysiological  s tud ies  of neurons have indicated th a t  brain 
functioning i s  much more complex than had been supposed. "Clear ly , 
we cannot expect,  even a t  the simplest l e v e l s ,  any one-to-one 
r e la t io n  between s t ru c tu re  and response" [90].
One of  the v i r tues  of Wassermann's neuropsychological theory 
i s  th a t  i t  provides a coherent explanation of data th a t  have seemed 
qui te  puzzling in the l i g h t  of t r a d i t io n a l  th eo r ie s .
Wassermann's theory takes account of  the f a c t  th a t  a brain is  
a se lf -o rgan iz ing  system whose component types and numbers are not
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i n i t i a l l y  f ixed  and whose component types can be se lf -genera ted  
during i t s  development (formation of  new c e l l s  and new ce l l  types) 
or  functioning (formation of  engrams). The theory attempts to ex­
p la in  the psychobiology of  brain  in terms of both s t ru c tu ra l  and 
functional  p roper t ie s  of  neurons and associa ted  c e l l s  [91].
The cen t ra l  issue in neuropsychology i s  the type of code and 
encoding s t ru c tu r e s  t h a t  nervous systems use. Wassermann r e j e c t s  
the t r a d i t i o n a l  models t h a t  propose t h a t  nerve impulses serve as 
encoding means and proposes ins tead  a molecular mapping paradigm.
He argues t h a t  genet ic  systems control a developmental wir ing- in  
of  nervous systems th a t  i s  very highly sp ec i f ic  (due to q u a l i t a ­
t i v e l y  sp ec i f ied  c e l l - l a b e l l i n g  systems car r ied  on the outside 
surface o f  ce l l  membranes). Neurons are  c a r r i e r s  of cab le - l ike  
molecular channel systems, such th a t  any p a r t i c u la r  channel can 
pass in ,  through, and out of  various neurons, and t raverse  pre- and 
postsynaptic  membranes and synaptic  c l e f t s .  These molecular chan­
nels  ( l i n e a r  polymeric cables whose monomers are  prote ins)  are 
pos tu la ted  to  be the actual message encoders and c a r r i e r s ,  and each 
channel i s  chemospecific.  Nerve impulses funct ion as non-select ive  
energizers  of  the molecular machinery, and messages are encoded and 
t ransm it ted  along a channel in the form of an e lec t ron ic  ex c i ta t io n  
wave.
Within the synaptic  c l e f t s  of  many CNS neurons, c e r ta in  molecu­
l a r  channel components t h a t  t rave rse  the c l e f t s  form "uni t  molecu­
l a r  mapping systems" (UMMSs). These UMMSs code both (1) stimulus 
conf igura t ions  (p ic to r i a l  mappings of  images) and (2) symbolic
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(conceptual) represen ta t ions  and t h e i r  respect ive  engrams, though 
in d i f f e r e n t  ways, and the two types of  engrams are  d issoc iab le .  
Furthermore, the mapping machinery i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  s im i la r  fo r  
d i f f e r e n t  sensory modes. The type o f  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  engram- 
forming UMMSs determines the formation of  long-term memories, 
short- te rm memories, and sequences of  UMMSs form engrams of s e r i a l l y  
ordered image sequences and concept sequences.
The model does not require  t h a t  a l l  message propagation s t a r t  
from receptor  neurons (which would ru le  out c rea t iv e  cognit ive 
a c t i v i t i e s ) ,  but allows fo r  s p e c i f i c  c e n t r a l l y  ongoing message 
propagation as primary i n i t i a t o r s  of the mapping processes involved 
in c re a t iv e  cognit ive a c t i v i t i e s .  Furthermore, although some p e r i ­
pheral and centra l  neurons are ac t iv a ted  in response to the s t imula­
t ion  o f  ce r ta in  se ts  of sensory recep tor  neurons, the response is  
not an analys is  ( fea tu re  d e te c t io n ) ,  but recognit ion of configura­
t ions  which involves engram formation [92].
We have seen th a t  current  research suggests t h a t  there are 
bas ic processing mechanisms th a t  under l ie  various behaviors i n ­
cluding l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.  On Wassermann’s model, the same 
mechanisms map both p ic to r i a l  and conceptual rep resen ta t ions  (and 
t h e i r  respec t ive  engrams). P ic to r i a l  and conceptual represen ta t ions  
may be connected by molecular channels,  but they are d issoc iab le .  
Lesions or commissurotomy might sever  some of these connections. 
Channel connections allow for  intermodal a s so c ia t io n s ,  e . g . , audi­
to ry -v isua l  assoc ia t ions  which are  important in l i n g u i s t i c  behav­
io r  . They a lso  allow fo r  the intramodal assoc ia t ions  (compounds
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of  concepts) necessary fo r  complex cogni tion.
The model 's allowance for  mult ip le  representat ions of engrams 
in both hemispheres explains the data indica t ing  marked v a r i a b i l i t y  
in hemisphere spec ia l iz a t ion  and hemisphere c a p a c i t i e s ,  and i t  a lso  
implies the enormous d i f f i c u l t y  of attempting to co r re la te  spec i f ic  
anatomical s t ru c tu re s  and functions.
Wassermann's theory is  about the human brain ,  but i t  seems 
p laus ib le  t h a t ,  i f  i t  holds a t  a l l ,  i t  holds fo r  animals as well .  
According to the theory, brain s ize  and weight are i r r e lev an t  in 
determining one 's  basic  cogni tive capacity .  Rather, i t  i s  d e te r ­
mined by g ene t ica l ly  specif ied  cel l  p ro te in s .  Wassermann himself 
notes t h a t  evidence from animal studies suggests th a t  the essen t ia l  
mechanisms "might appear in s implif ied  versions in a l l  kinds of 
lower animals which are endowed with adequate nervous systems" [93],  
For example, evidence tha t  co r t ic a l  lesions  in monkeys produce de­
f i c i t s  in objec t  recognit ion and pa t te rn  discrimination but not in 
de tec t ion  and lo ca l iza t io n  of visual stimuli or  in v isua l ly  guided 
movements r e la ted  to the stimuli can be explained by severed con­
nections of  molecular channels between image-representing and 
concept-representing UMMSs [94]. Studies of corpus callosum func­
t ioning in animals suggest mult ip le  representa t ion  of  engrams in 
both hemispheres which i s  the case for  humans on Wassermann's 
theory [95].
The theory depends on gene t ica l ly  contro l led  wir ing-in of ner­
vous systems such t h a t  there  i s  high s p e c i f i c i t y  of  c e l l s .  There 
i s  evidence th a t  "nervous systems as diverse as th a t  of the leech
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and of  mammals are a t  l e a s t  in some par ts  . . .  so highly accurate ly  
wired-in t h a t  any two neurons in those par ts  may d i f f e r  from each 
other  with respect  to s p e c i f i c i t i e s "  [96].  As noted above, the 
UMMSs, which are  the coding mechanisms, are located in the synaptic 
c l e f t s  of  many CNS neurons. Studies of the ves icu la r  gr id  (peak 
and hole pa t te rn  of  the brain) of  mammals and lower species show 
the presence of  dense pro ject ions  in synapses of many types of 
neurons [97].  Furthermore, even r e l a t i v e ly  small b ra in s ,  such as 
those of  mice, have a vast  number of  CNS synapses. In mice b ra ins ,  
on the average, there are 10^ synapses per c o r t ic a l  neuron. The 
f a c t  th a t  the molecular weight of neurofilaments varies  among spe­
c ies  i s  also congruent with Wassermann's theory s ince ,  on the theory, 
such f ilaments  serve as support s t ruc tu re s  fo r  molecular channels [98],
So, there  i s  genet ic ,  func t iona l ,  and anatomical evidence tha t  
the neuropsychology of animals is  e s s e n t i a l l y  the same as humans, on 
Wassermann's theory.
I pointed out above th a t  I would use Wassermann's theory to 
provide fo r  cons is ten t  in te rp r e ta t io n  of  empirical data ,  and th a t  
I se lected  i t  on the basis  of  i t s  formal fea tu res .  I t  i s  c lea r  
th a t  the theory 's  s trength  i s  i t s  explanatory power. Although 
the theory i s  formally more adequate than ava i lab le  a l t e rn a t iv e  
ones, we do not know whether or not i t  i s  co r rec t .  At present ,  
the biological  evidence is  in d i r e c t .  The theory is  in p r inc ip le  
t e s t a b l e ,  but i t  has not,  in f a c t ,  been adequately te s ted  [99].
I f  the theory i s  co r rec t ,  t h e n : ( l )  gen e t ic a l ly  determined 
neurostructure  determines cognit ive c ap ac i t i e s ,  (2) there  is
73
genet ical ly-determined s t ru c tu ra l  s im i l a r i t y  between humans and 
some nonhuman species ,  and (3) the one bas ic  processing mechanism 
is  e s s e n t i a l l y  the same in human and nonhuman brains.
Our review of  empirical research has shown th a t  there  is  em­
p i r i c a l  evidence cons is ten t  with the theory. But the questionable  
r e l i a b i l i t y  of  some of  the data and the uncer tain s ta tu s  of  the 
theory preclude firm conclusions.
The evidence does support the p l a u s i b i l i t y  of  using neuro- 
physiological organizat ion as one c r i t e r i o n  in determining whether 
some behavior of  a given species  i s  based on inductive reasoning, 
but i t  does not allow for  p rec ise  formulation of the c r i t e r i o n .
For the same reasons t h a t  we do not know how p rec ise ly  to formulate 
the c r i t e r i o n ,  we do not know how i t  might p rec ise ly  apply to 
various species .
CHAPTER I I I  
LANGUAGE
A second c r i t e r i o n  th a t  seems p laus ib le  fo r  use in determining 
whether some behavior of  a given species  i s  based on sound induc­
t i v e  processes is  the use of language.
We have j u s t  seen th a t  neurophysiologists  are beginning to 
conceptualize  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior in a way th a t  is  much broader 
than the t r a d i t i o n a l  notion of  language use. They have claimed 
t h a t  the processing mechanism i s  the same fo r  behavior t h a t  is 
usual ly  l ab e l led  l i n g u i s t i c  and behavior t h a t  i s  usually  labe l led  
n o n l in g u is t i c .  They have also claimed th a t  both types of  behavior 
may be composed of  processing s tages t h a t  defy common descr ip t ive  
l a b e l s .  Furthermore, they have claimed th a t  there  is  c le a r  ev i ­
dence of  the capacity  fo r  conceptual thought in the absence of  
language.
This c l e a r ly  c o n f l ic t s  with a t r a d i t i o n a l  philosophical view, 
which we discussed in Chapter I ,  t h a t  language use is  evidence of 
conceptual capac i ty ,  th a t  animals do not use language, and the re ­
fore  animals do not have (strong version)  or probably do not have 
(weak version)  the capacity  f o r  conceptual thought.
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In th inking about language use as a c r i t e r i o n  fo r  determining 
s p e c i f i c  cogni t ive  c a p a c i t i e s ,  i t  i s  important to be c l e a r  about 
which are the re levan t  and disputed po in ts .  We might ask a ques­
t ion  l i k e  t h i s :  Does language use ind ica te  the capacity fo r  con­
ceptual thought? We are not l i k e ly  to get  much argument, since i t  
i s  usually  assumed th a t  the nature of  language is  such th a t  i t s  use 
does c o n s t i tu t e  evidence of  various cogni t ive  c a p a c i t i e s ,  including 
the capaci ty  f o r  conceptual thought.  But what we want to examine, 
what i s  r e levan t  to our present  concern, i s  the assumption about 
the nature of language. The question of i n t e r e s t  fo r  us i s  t h i s :  
What counts as l i n g u i s t i c  behavior? This i s  not only a re levant  
mat te r ;  i t  i s  a lso  a highly disputed one.
There are  two bas ic  approaches to answering t h i s  question.
The f i r s t  i s  to find an adequate theory of  language—a language 
paradigm. The paradigm can then be used as a c r i t e r i o n  in making 
decis ions  in given ins tances .  The second approach i s  to consider 
what counts as evidence fo r  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior in the absence of 
a paradigm. I t  seems reasonable to begin by looking for  a para­
digm.
Theories of  Language
We are confronted with an immediate th eo re t ic a l  problem: How
do we know what to consider  as theor ies  of  language i f  we do not 
know what language is?  I t  i s  of  no use to say th a t  our inquiry 
i s  m e ta - l in g u i s t i c ,  fo r ,  in th i s  case, t h a t  i s  merely a second- 
order  begging the question.
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Let us begin by taking the case t h a t  is  general ly  considered 
to be paradigmatic l i n g u i s t i c  behavior--human preposi t ional  speech-- 
and considering theor ies  of language about th a t  behavior.  What we 
learn from th a t  inves t iga t ion  may then help us consider nonparadig- 
matic and borderl ine cases.
But there  is  another theore t ica l  problem: What wil l  count as 
a theory of language? I t  i s  a matter of f ac t  th a t  study of lan­
guage and l i n g u i s t i c  behavior i s  conducted in many d i sc ip l in e s ,  
including philosophy, psychology, l i n g u i s t i c s ,  and anthropology. 
Within each d i s c ip l in e ,  there are theor ies  th a t  e i th e r  purport 
to be or seem to be primari ly  descr ip t ive  and those th a t  purport 
to be or seem to be primar ily explanatory. In some ins tances ,  
the s ta tus  of  the theory i s  a matter  of considerable d ispute ,  
and, in some ins tances ,  the dispute derives from p r io r  var ian t  
assumptions about language.
Our choice might be pragmatically guided by our own i n t e r e s t s ,  
i . e . , the ro le  of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior as evidence for  ce r ta in  cog­
n i t iv e  a b i l i t i e s .  But I think i t  would be too r e s t r i c t i v e  to l im i t  
our considera tions  to those theories  which are  o rd in a r i ly  labe l led  
psycholinguis t ic ,  since i t  seems to me th a t  even those theor ies  
th a t  are pr imar i ly  s t ruc tu ra l  analyses of  natural or non-natural 
languages include e x p l i c i t  or im pl ic i t  notions about the r e l a t i o n ­
ship between language, l i n g u i s t i c  behavior,  and psychological or 
neurological phenomena. Indeed, questions about what language i s  
and how i t  i s  possible for  X to acquire language are c lea r ly  
re la ted .
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In a sense, the questions about language may be seen as ques­
t ions  about a s p ec i f i c  form of  knowledge, i . e . , (1) what i s  i t  t h a t  
X knows when X knows language (or a language) and (2) how is  i t  
poss ib le  fo r  X to know Cor come to know) language? Generally,  
theo r ie s  of  human knowledge explain knowledge pr imari ly  in terms 
of experience [em pir ic is t  theor ie s )  or  pr imari ly  in terms of mental 
s t ru c tu re  or a c t i v i t y  ( r a t i o n a l i s t  th e o r ie s ) .  We would expect 
em p i r ic i s t  theor ie s  of  language and r a t i o n a l i s t  theor ie s  of language 
and, of course , t h a t  is  the case.
For our purposes, then, I propose th a t  we examine an example 
of  each kind th a t  i s  ava i lab le  in order  to see i f  we can find an 
adequate paradigm. I think t h a t  the most c l e a r ly  i l l u s t r a t i v e  
theor ie s  of t h e i r  kind are Skinner ' s  em pir ic i s t  theory and Chomsky's 
r a t i o n a l i s t  theory.
Skinner ' s  Empiricist  Theory
Skinner 's  work i s  within psychology and his  theory i s  pre­
sented as a psychological theory [100].  The theory i s  empirical 
in t h a t  i t  explains language in terms of experience. Furthermore, 
in terms of methodology, i t  i s  presented as a radical  behavior is t  
theory, i . e . , the method cons is ts  in observing behavior without 
pos i t ing  unobservable mental s t ru c tu re s  or a c t i v i t i e s .
Behaviorism developed in react ion to assoc ia t iona l  psychology, 
in which language is  understood as an instrument fo r  communicating 
thoughts.  Internal  ideas,  access ib le  only to onese lf  through 
in t ro sp ec t io n ,  are ex terna l ized  by means of language in order to 
communicate with o thers .  The meaning of a word can be understood
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in terms of  i t s  regu lar  a s soc ia t ion  with a c e r t a in  idea.
Behaviorism re jec ted  the method of  in t ro spec t ion  fo r  the 
method of  observat ion.  I t  r e t a in e d ,  but rev ised ,  the notion of 
a s so c ia t io n .  In behaviorism, what is  a ssoc ia ted  i s  over t  behavior 
and environmental f a c to r s .  Behaviorism a lso  re ta ined  the notion 
of  h ie ra rch ica l  assoc ia t ions  such th a t  complex uni ts  can be under­
stood as composites of the s imples t  ones. Behavior is ts  hold th a t  
most behavior,  including l i n g u i s t i c  behavior ,  i s  learned ,  and 
they hold t h a t  the mechanism of  learning is  an assoc ia t ion  between 
stimulus and response [101].
What i s  remarkable about Skinner 's  theory is  h is  claim th a t  
l i n g u i s t i c  behavior can be adequately explained so le ly  in terms of 
a functional ana lys is  of  the behavior.  I t  i s  not only the case 
t h a t  Skinner 's  method cons is t s  in observing behavior without p o s i t ­
ing unobservable mental s t ru c tu re s  (methodological behaviorism), 
but a lso t h a t  he claims th a t  there  are no such mental s t ruc tu res  
(metaphysical behaviorism).
"The simplest  and most s a t i s f a c t o r y  view is  t h a t  thought is  
simply behavior . I t  i s  not some mysterious process responsible  
fo r  behavior but the very behavior i t s e l f  in a l l  the complexity 
of i t s  co n t ro l l ing  r e la t io n s"  [102]. "The range of  verbal be­
havior i s  roughly suggested, in descending order  of energy, by 
shouting,  loud ta lk in g ,  qu ie t  t a lk in g ,  whispering, muttering 'under 
one 's  b r e a t h ' ,  subaudible speech with de tec tab le  muscular ac t ion ,  
subaudible speech of unclear  dimensions, and perhaps even the 
'unconscious th ink ing '  sometimes in fe r red  in instances  of problem
79
so lv ing .  There i s  no point  a t  which i t  i s  p ro f i t a b le  to draw a 
l i n e  d is t inguish ing  thinking from ac t ing  on t h i s  continuum" [103].
Skinner acknowledges t h a t  physiological processes "mediate a l l  
the r e l a t io n s  d isc losed  in a funct ional ana lys is  of behavior",  but 
he thinks  i t  i s  sens ib le  to discuss behavior without  iden t i fy ing  
the muscular or neural substratum of verbal events [104].  Given 
Skinner 's  p o s i t io n ,  one i s  surpr ised  to read his  claim th a t  "al l  
behavior . . .  is  subjec t  to Kantian a p r i o r i ' s " ;  but apparently  he 
i s  using the notion o f  Kantian a p r i o r i 's  in a very loose way to 
mean any natural  co n s t ra in ts  on behavior,  fo r  he adds th a t  the 
claim is  so "in the sense t h a t  man as a behaving system has ines ­
capable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and l im i ta t io n s"  [105].
Skinner 's  view o f  man and his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and l im i ta t io n s  
i s  c e r t a in ly  not Kant's view: Skinner, committed to an Evolution
paradigm, sees man, l ik e  other  species ,  as an organism in i n t e r ­
ac t ion  with his  environment. When such in te ra c t io n s  a l t e r  behav­
io r  such t h a t  there  i s  "a sa fe r  or more useful interchange with 
the environment",  the benef i ts  to the organism tend to  s t a b i l i z e  
and maintain the behavior [106].  A c t iv i t i e s  t h a t  operate on the 
environment are c a l l ed  "operant behavior" and a u n i t  of  such 
behavior i s  ca l led  an "operant".  Operant behavior emerges from 
u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  undirected movements. For example, the babbling 
of  human in fan ts  i s  u n d i f f e ren t ia ted ,  undirected movement from 
which operant  verbal behavior develops in in te ra c t io n  with others 
[107].
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Verbal behavior i s  defined as behavior tha t  i s  re inforced 
through the mediation of  o ther  persons in those cases in which the 
o ther  person i s  "responding in ways which have been conditioned 
p rec ise ly  in order  to re in force  the behavior of  the speaker" [108]. 
What i s  ca l led  verbal behavior i s  not l im ited  to speech, but may 
include other  modes such as ges tu res ,  touch,  manipulation of  phy­
s ic a l  ob jec ts ,  e tc .  [109].
Children learn verbal behavior when und i f fe ren t ia ted  "voca l i ­
za t io n s ,  s e le c t iv e ly  re inforced ,  gradually  assume forms which pro­
duce appropria te  consequences in a given verbal community" [110]. 
Skinner suggests t h a t  the motivation fo r  the re inforc ing  adu l ts  is  
t h a t  i t  i s  advantageous to  have an addi t ional  l i t e r a t e  member of 
the group [111]. As a ch i ld  matures in a verbal community, he 
builds  a rep e r to i r e  of  verbal responses to  s t im ul i .
Psycholinguis t ic  research does suggest th a t  there is  "babbling 
d r i f t "  such th a t  a c h i l d ' s  babbling moves in the d i rec t ion  of the 
sounds he hears ,  including the in tonat ion  pa t te rns  [112]. Ac­
cording to Skinner,  ch i ldren learn language (a r ep e r to i r e  of  ver­
bal responses) in the same way they learn everything e l s e —by 
reinforcement of  acceptable  responses to s t im ul i .  I f  a ch i ld  says 
"bear" when his  mother holds up a teddy bear ,  his mother may smile,  
nod, give verbal a ssen t ,  hand him the bear ,  e t c . --behavior  th a t  
re in forces  the c h i l d ' s  behavior. I t  does seem to be the case th a t  
ch i ld ren  learn some language in t h i s  way, i . e . , they learn r e ­
fe ren ts  for  many th ings.  But, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as t h e i r  speech becomes 
more complex, the reinforcement i s  less  c l e a r .  For example, i f  a
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ch i ld  says "want apple",  the mother may give him a piece of  apple,  
a piece of  banana ( i f  no apples are th e r e ) ,  or nothing a t  a l l ,  and 
she may do any of  these e i th e r  without ta lk ing  to him or while 
ta lk ing  about the ra in .  Skinner ' s  assumption is  t h a t  a c h i l d ' s  
u t te rances  wil l  be pos i t ive ly  reinforced most of the time, but i t  
i s  not c le a r  what wil l  count as reinforcement in the case of  lan­
guage. The d i f f i c u l t y  is  in t ry ing  to s t r e tc h  the notion of r e in ­
forcement from reward for  behavior in a laboratory s i tu a t io n  to 
the s i tu a t io n  of language acqu is i t ion .
Furthermore, psycholinguis t ic  s tudies  have shown th a t  adul ts  
tend to re inforce  what is t ru e ,  not what is  grammatically co r rec t  
[113].  For example, given th a t  the teddy bear has brown f e e t ,  
i f  a child  says "Teddy foots  brown" or  "Teddy has pink f e e t " ,  the 
adu l t  is  l i k e ly  to re inforce the f i r s t  ( t rue ,  but ungrammatical 
statement) and not the second (grammatical, but untrue) .
Skinner has noted th a t  there  is  a standard schedule fo r  ma­
tu ra t io n  of  verbal behavior,  but he does not seem to  wonder why 
there  would be such s tandard iza t ion .  Chi ldren 's  babbling is  
followed by one-word ut te rances and two-word u t terances  t h a t  are 
nouns and verbs. At about the age of two, chi ldren begin using 
various grammatical forms, e . g . ,  plural  ( - s ) ,  pas t  tense ( -d ) ,  
copula (am, i s ,  a r e ) .  What i s  of special i n t e r e s t  is  t h a t  the 
sequence in which these forms appear in c h i ld re n ' s  speech is  a l ­
most iden t ica l  for  a l l  English-speaking chi ldren [114].  The next 
s tage includes the appearance of Wh- questions (what, where, why, 
who), and again there i s  a cons is ten t  sequence in the use of these
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forms by a l l  English-speaking chi ldren .  At f i r s t ,  the Wh- word i s  
placed in f ro n t  of  a sentence (When Mommy go?),  l a t e r  an au x i l ia ry  
verb is  added to  the main verb (When Mommy wil l  go?),  and even 
l a t e r ,  the a u x i l i a ry  verb i s  moved to  the grammatically co r rec t  
place in the sentence (When will  Mommy go?).  I t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  
some of  these  construct ions  are  not im i ta t ions .
Furthermore, correct ions  do not seem to be e f fe c t iv e  in 
teaching c o r rec t  grammar to a young ch i ld .  For example, i f  the 
ch i ld  says,  "Teddy foots brown", and the mother says,  "You mean 
Teddy has brown f e e t " ,  the chi ld  i s  l i k e ly  to rep ly ,  "Yes, Teddy 
foots  brown" [115].  Nor are expansions e f f e c t iv e .  For example, 
i f  the ch i ld  says, "Teddy f a l l " , a n d  the mother says, "Yes, Teddy 
i s  f a l l i n g  down the s t a i r s " ,  the ch i ld  i s  l i k e ly  to repeat; "Teddy 
f a l l "  [116].
Children seem to be cons is ten t  a t  c e r ta in  s tages ,  but the 
consis tency does not accord with the grammatical ru les  th a t  adults  
follow. How do we explain the f a c t  t h a t  there  are  these stages 
in language development and the f a c t  t h a t  they are  the same for  
a l l  ch ildren? To say th a t  language use develops in r e l a t io n  to 
general cognit ive development i s  not very informative unless one 
s p e c i f i e s  what i s  meant by general cogni t ive  development and by 
the r e l a t io n .
We have noted the vagueness of  the notion of  reinforcement in 
language acq u is i t io n .  According to Skinner, reinforcement is  also 
necessary fo r  the maintenance of  verbal responses in adu l t  behavior. 
The notion of reinforcement is  no le ss  vague in t h i s  case, e . g . ,
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i t  includes an t ic ip a ted  reward (which may never occur) as well as 
actual rewards. An example is  a poet who hopes t h a t  his  poetry 
wil l  be apprecia ted by someone, somewhere, a t  some time. Accord­
ing to  Skinner 's  d e f in i t io n  of verbal behavior,  i f  someone does 
respond p o s i t iv e ly  to the poetry, he wil l  do so "prec ise ly  in 
order  to re in fo rce  the behavior of  the speaker".  But i t  i s  hard 
to see how someone who genuinely apprecia tes  a Borges poem which 
she reads in a magazine in Lexington, Oklahoma, i s  responding "pre­
c i s e ly  in order  to re in force"  Borges' behavior.
Skinner claims th a t  one can p red ic t  and control verbal be­
havior by iden t i fy ing  the functional  r e l a t io n  between the co n t ro l ­
l ing  stimulus and the response. But the notions  of  stimulus and 
response are  a lso  vague. In any given s i t u a t i o n ,  we can id e n t i fy  
numerous f ac to rs  t h a t  might count as stimuli  and numerous actions  
th a t  might count as responses. Although Skinner claims th a t  his 
explanation of verbal behavior " is  not th e o re t ic a l  in the usual 
sense", he does want to e s ta b l i s h  lawful r e l a t io n s  between a stim­
ulus and a response, i . e . , he wants to show th a t  given stimuli  
control given responses. Skinner 's  view i s  t h a t  one can p red ic t  
and control  verbal behavior by iden t i fy ing  the funct ional r e l a t io n  
between the con t ro l l ing  stimulus and the response. One problem 
is  t h a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  id e n t i fy  a c o n t ro l l ing  stimulus inde­
pendently of  the con tro l led  response. I t  i s  only a f t e r  a response 
has occurred th a t  one can id e n t i fy  the co n t ro l l in g  st imulus.  In 
some cases ,  the r e l a t io n  i s  very loose.  For example, Skinner 
claims th a t  the repo r t  of a statesman about a s i t u a t io n  th a t  he
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had observed in a foreign country i s  under the "remote stimulus 
control"  of  those events.  The d i f f i c u l t y  with the notions o f  s tim­
ulus and response i s  the same as fo r  the notion of reinforcement,  
i . e . , in s t re tch in g  the notions from laboratory  s i tu a t io n s  to 
language use, they lose whatever prec is ion  and explanatory power 
they may have had.
Skinner 's  claim would be more reasonable i f  i t  were more 
moderate. What he could claim is  t h a t  there  seem to be lawful 
r e l a t io n s  between some given stimuli  and some given responses, 
and th a t  f u r th e r  research might confirm these cases and discover 
o the rs .  Apart from acq u is i t io n ,  there  i s  some evidence th a t  spe­
c i f i c  kinds of  responses increase  when they are re inforced .  For 
example, in contro l led  s tu d ie s ,  subjec ts  are l ik e ly  to increase  a 
s p e c i f ic  type of response (e . g . , p lura l  nouns) i f  each instance 
i s  re inforced by the experimenter (e . g . , by saying "good").
The s trength  of  Skinner ' s  theory i s  his emphasis on language 
use as a social behavior.  For Skinner,  verbal behavior necessar i ly  
involves a "speaker" and a " l i s t e n e r " .  But his  attempt to explain 
t h i s  r e l a t io n  in terms of  operant condi tioning is  inadequate for  
the so r t s  of  reasons we have discussed above.
Chomsky's R a t io n a l i s t  Theory
Chomsky works within l i n g u i s t i c s  and his  theory i s  presented 
as a l i n g u i s t i c  theory,  but he emphasizes t h a t  what i s  most in­
t e r e s t in g  and important about a theory of  language is  what i t  
explains about mental s t ru c tu re  [117]. The fundamental problem
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o f  l i n g u i s t i c  theory, as Chomsky sees i t ,  i s  to explain how i t
i s  possib le  fo r  a ch i ld  to  acquire knowledge of  a language.
Chomsky holds t h a t  the em pir ic i s t  explanation does not adequately 
account fo r  important fea tures  of language: (1) c r e a t iv i ty
(genera t ion and understanding of novel sentences) ,  (2) s t ru c tu re -  
dependence of  language, and (3) rapid acqu is i t ion  of  language by 
chi ldren  which is  unrelated  (he claims) to t h e i r  general i n t e l l i ­
gence.
Chomsky holds th a t  i t  i s  useless to t r y  to explain how c h i l ­
dren come tu know language without f i r s t  explaining what is  known
when they know i t ,  i . e . , what language i s .  The l i n g u i s t i c  prob­
lem, fo r  Chomsky, has "two var ian ts" :  (1) psychological--account­
ing fo r  language a cq u is i t io n ,  and (2) methodological—ju s t i f y in g  
grammars [118].
The grammar of  language i s  a theory of  language (including 
elements and r u le s ) ,  which i s  an account of  what is  known by a 
"speaker-hearer  who has mastered language" [119]. A grammar is  a 
theory about the "defining proper t ies  of human language" [120]. But 
the re  are r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the theory of  language th a t  derive from 
a r a t i o n a l i s t  approach. "Ra t iona l i s t  approaches . . .  assume th a t  
the form of  the systems o f  acquired knowledge i s  determined by 
a p r io r i  p r inc ip les  of  mind " [121]. These r e s t r i c t io n s  on a 
theory of  language (a grammar) also  l ink  a theory of  language (what 
i s  known when i t  i s  known) with a theory of  acquis i t ion  (how one 
comes to know). "Pla in ly ,  he [ the ch i ld ]  i s  endowed with some se t  
o f  mechanisms (what we may ca l l  his ' language f a c u l ty ' )  fo r  . . .
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achieving a ' f i n a l  s t a t e '  in which he knows the language" [122].
The a p r io r i  p r inc ip les  of  the human mind determine the form of 
language and they are the necessary condit ion fo r  learning lan­
guage.
Chomsky does not question th a t  there  are such p r inc ip le s .
His task i s  to f ind out what they are .  His method, which he claims 
i s  empirica l,  i s  to find "s ign i f ican t"  fea tures  t h a t  are common 
to a l l  human languages. "Let us define 'universal  grammar' . . .  as 
the system of  p r in c ip le s ,  condi t ions,  and ru les  t h a t  are elements 
or  propert ies  of a l l  human languages . . .  by necessi ty"  [123].
For our purposes, we are less  in te re s ted  in the technical  
l i n g u i s t i c  aspects  of  Chomsky's theory of grammar than in the l o g i ­
cal and epistemological s ta tu s  of the basic tene ts  of  his theory. 
What we want to know are the following kinds of  th ings:  (1) What, 
exac t ly ,  i s  meant by p r inc ip les  of the mind, mechanisms, and lan­
guage faculty? (2) I f  the p r inc ip les  of the mind are the neces­
sary condition fo r  language learn ing ,  what are  the s u f f i c i e n t  con­
d i t i o n s ,  and how are the other  condi tions r e la te d  to pr inc ip les  
of  the mind? (.3) What, exac t ly ,  is  meant by the claim th a t  a gram­
mar is  an account of  what i s  known by one who knows language? Is 
knowing a language iden t ica l  with knowing a grammar? In what sense 
does a speaker-hearer  know a grammar? What i s  the r e l a t io n  be­
tween knowing a language (grammar) and language use?
Chomsky holds t h a t  there  i s  a bio logical  bas is  fo r  what is 
innate in the mind. He notes th a t  he departs from t r a d i t io n a l  
views of innateness by "taking the 'a p r io r i  system' to be
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b io lo g ic a l ly  determined" [124].  However, he has e i t h e r  overlooked 
o r  discounted recent  neurological work which provides evidence 
f o r  funct ional  in te g ra t io n ,  r a th e r  than functional  lo c a l i z a t io n ,  
in  the human brain (as well as in the brains of  some other  spec ies) .  
He r e j e c t s  the notion o f  a general processing mechanism. "The 
proposal th a t  language learning i s  simply an instance of  'genera l ­
ized learning c a p a c i t i e s '  makes about as much sense, in the pre­
sen t  s t a t e  of  our knowledge, as a claim th a t  the sp e c i f ic  neural 
s t ru c tu re s  t h a t  provide our organizat ion of visual space must be a 
special  c lass  of  the c lass  of  systems involved a lso  in language 
use. This i s  t ru e ,  so f a r  as we know, only a t  a level so general 
as to give no in s ig h t  into the charac ter  or funct ioning of  the 
various systems" [125].  These remarks were published in 1975.
Given Chomsky's acknowledgement t h a t  an in teg ra t ion  theory of  
brain  function is  t rue  a t  a general le v e l ,  one might suppose th a t  
he would ca re fu l ly  consider  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  f u r th e r  neurologi­
cal research would provide addit ional  evidence for  functional in ­
teg ra t io n  and provide more de ta i led  explanations.  This i s ,  of 
course,  prec ise ly  what has occurred in the l a s t  few years .
Instead, Chomsky has proposed and argued fo r  a m en ta l i s t ic  
sp e c ia l - f a c u l ty  view, which he apparently supposes i s  somehow 
re la te d  to a lo ca l iz a t io n  theory of  neurophysiology. "Some i n t e l ­
lec tua l  achievements, such as language lea rn ing ,  f a l l  s t r i c t l y  
within b io log ica l ly  determined cognit ive capaci ty .  For these  tasks ,  
we have 'specia l  d es ig n ' ,  so t h a t  cognit ive s t ru c tu re s  of g rea t  
complexity and i n t e r e s t  develop f a i r l y  rapid ly  and with l i t t l e  i f
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any conscious e f fo r t "  [126].  Although Chomsky wants b iological 
determination in order  to support his  claims about the u n iv e r sa l i ty  
and s p e c i e s - s p e c i f i c i t y  (uniqueness to humans) of  language, his  
accounts of  the b iological  basis  of  what i s  innate  a re  vague and 
uninformed by cu r ren t  research.
He proposes t h a t  mind i s  the innate capaci ty  to form cogni t ive  
s t ru c tu re s .  Cognitive s t ru c tu re s  "express systems of  (unconscious) 
knowledge, b e l i e f ,  expecta t ion ,  eva lua t ion ,  judgement, and the 
l ike"  [127].  These cogni t ive  s t ru c tu re s  are learned. One such 
s t ru c tu r e  i s  language. When the "language f ac u l ty " ,  an innate  
f acu l ty  of  mind, i s  appropria te ly  s t im ula ted ,  i t  w il l  cons truc t  
a grammar which in turn  generates a language which i s  known by the 
person [128].
We noted above th a t  Chomsky def ines  universal grammar as the 
system of p r in c ip l e s ,  condi t ions ,  and ru les  t h a t  are elements of 
a l l  human languages, by b io logica l  necess i ty .  We have al ready 
considered some of  the problems in his  notion of  b iological  neces­
s i t y .  There are  many o ther  problems here.
As bes t  I can t e l l ,  what counts as "appropria te  s timulat ion" 
fo r  the "language facu l ty"  is  language. Confronted with these  data,  
a c h i l d ' s  mind cons truc ts  a language, the grammar of  which wil l  
accord with the ru le s  of  universal grammar. The ru le s  are already 
the re .  Chomsky denies t h a t  what i s  innate  i s  d ispos i t ion  and 
claims t h a t  the p r in c ip le s  and ru les  of  universal grammar are 
inna te .  He argues t h a t  the ru les  t h a t  a l l  ch i ldren  seem to use in 
acquir ing language--rules  t h a t  they have not been taugh t - -a re
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evidence of  the content  of universal grammar. For example, one 
p r in c ip le  i s  t h a t  a l l  ru les  must be s tructure-dependent.  "The 
c h i l d ' s  mind . . .  contains the in s t ru c t io n :  Construct a s t r u c tu r e -  
dependent ru le ,  ignoring a l l  s tructure-independent  ru les"  [129].
I t  i s  Chomsky's contention t h a t  innate p r in c ip le s  of  universal 
grammar are necessary to account fo r  c h i ld re n ' s  language acq u is i ­
t io n .  He holds th a t  t h e i r  data are i n f e r i o r ,  i . e . , the speech they 
hear i s  substandard language [incomplete sentences,  mistakes , e t c . ) , 
and there fore  could not provide a model adequate for  language l e a rn ­
ing. Recent psycholinguis t ic  s tudies  suggest t h a t  he may be wrong 
about the q u a l i ty  of  the speech chi ldren hear,  since there  is  
evidence th a t  adul ts  tend to speak in sho r te r  sentences,  s implify 
syntax, and make fewer mistakes when they t a lk  with chi ldren [130]. 
Chomsky also  claims th a t  language acqu is i t ion  i s  independent of 
in t e l l i g e n c e ,  and therefore  must be accounted fo r  by some special  
means. Recent psycholinguis t ic  s tudies  also  suggest t h a t  th i s  
claim is  too s trong. For example, ch ildren with very low i n t e l l i ­
gence do not develop language a t  a l l  [131].  Furthermore,
Chomsky holds t h a t  the process of language acqu is i t ion  i s  very 
rap id .  But recent  s tudies  have shown th a t  there  are marked excep­
t io n s ,  and th a t  these are chi ldren who have been in l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  
impoverished environments [132].  Psycholinguis t ic  s tudies  have 
shown th a t  ch i ldren do not learn  language by im i ta t ion ,  but follow 
grammatical ru les  t h a t  they devise. However, these ru les  produce 
divergences from adu l t  language and they are not necessar i ly  
sy n ta c t ic  r u le s ;  but r a th e r ,  syntax and semantics seem to  be
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intertwined in a complex way [133]. These s tudies  suggest th a t  
Chomsky may be wrong about what i s  innate ,  th a t  i t  i s  not universal 
grammar, independent of  i n t e l l ig e n c e ,  but,  r a th e r ,  a general in ­
formation-processing mechanism which, when applied to speech, 
provides fo r  an analysis  of  language. This in t e rp re ta t io n  i s  also 
cons is ten t  with the recent developments in th eo re t ica l  neurophysiol­
ogy.
Chomsky's claim th a t  the c h i ld ' s  mind contains spec i f ic  " in­
s t ru c t io n s"  does not en ta i l  th a t  the chi ld  i s  hearing in terna l  
voices.  In f a c t ,  according to Chomsky, the chi ld  does not know 
th a t  he knows the rules  of  universal grammar since th i s  is  l a t e n t  
or t a c i t  knowledge. The chi ld  knows how to acquire language, but 
he does not know how i t  i s  th a t  he knows how to do so.
Chomsky claims th a t  the mind constructs  a grammar, which gen­
era tes  a language th a t  is  known by the speaker-hearer .  What 
does i t  mean to say th a t  an adu l t  knows language?
Chomsky d is t inguishes  between l i n g u i s t i c  competence and l i n ­
g u i s t i c  performance. "Linguis t ic  competence . . .  i s  understood as 
the speaker-hearer ' s  knowledge of  his language as represented by 
a generat ive grammar. I t  i s  . . .  a conceptual confusion to f a i l  to 
d is t ingu ish  competence, in th i s  sense, from performance, in the 
sense of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior,  the actual use of language" [134]. 
Competence is  knowledge about language ( sp e c i f i c a l l y ,  knowledge 
about universal grammar) which i s  l a t e n t  and "may well not be 
immediately avai lab le  to the use of  the language" [135]. "In p r in ­
c ip le ,  one might have the cogni tive s t ru c tu re  th a t  we call
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'knowledge of English’ , f u l l y  developed, with no capacity to  use 
t h i s  s t ruc tu re"  [136].
The separat ion of  competence and performance seems odd. I f  
there  i s  no r e l a t io n  between our l a t e n t  knowledge about the s t ru c ­
tu re  of language and our use of  language, the former seems g r a tu i ­
tous. Yet i t  i s  the former, the knowledge about language s t r u c ­
t u r e ,  t h a t  Chomsky claims i s  innate and gene t ica l ly  determined.
To suppose th a t  what i s  gene t ica l ly  determined i s  l a t e n t  knowledge 
th a t  may not a f f e c t  language use (and thereby contr ibute  to su r ­
vival)  i s  sure ly  to present  an anomalous case fo r  genet ic theory.
Psycholinguists  have addressed the problem of  the re la t io n  
between competence and performance by s tud ies  designed to determine 
the psychological v a l i d i t y  of transformational  ru le s .  The studies  
of  the r e l a t io n  between the transformational complexity of  a sen­
tence and the psychological complexity in i t s  processing have been 
plagued by methodological problems, but the prevai l ing view among 
psycholinguists  is  th a t  there i s  no d i r e c t  correspondence between 
transformational complexity and psychological complexity in pro­
cessing the sentence. In other  words, understanding a sentence 
does not involve the s o r t  of  complete syn tac t ica l  analysis  of  a 
sentence t h a t  is  presented in the t ransformational-genera t ive-  
grammar-competence model. Transformational grammar i s  not a model 
of  language production and comprehension. So these s tudies  sup­
por t  Chomsky's claim th a t  his  theory does not explain language use.
There are two fu r th e r  problems here: (1) Exactly what is  i t
t h a t  Chomsky claims adu l ts  have knowledge of? (2) What s o r t  of
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knowledge i s  t a c i t  or l a t e n t  knowledge? Does Chomsky mean th a t :  Cl)
adu l ts  know the p r inc ip les  of universal grammar? (2) adul ts  know the 
grammar of t h e i r  p a r t i c u la r  language (and perhaps know th a t  they know 
i t ?  or (3) adu l ts  know proposi tions about the consequences of  the gram­
mar of  t h e i r  language, e . g . . th a t  a given sentence i s  or i s  not gramma­
t i c a l ?  Although i t  i s  not e n t i r e ly  c l e a r ,  Chomsky seems to mean a l l  
o f  these .  We have already seen th a t  he a t t r i b u t e s  t a c i t  knowledge 
of  the p r in c ip le s  of  universal grammar to ch i ld ren ;  and s ince 
these  p r inc ip le s  are b io log ica l ly  determined, there is  no reason 
to suppose, nor does he suggest ,  t h a t  ch i ldren lose th i s  know­
ledge. We have also seen th a t  grammar i s  an account of what is  
known by an adu l t  who has mastered language, i . e . , the ru les  of his 
grammar. I t  seems reasonable to suppose t h a t  "mastering" ru les  
requires  knowing th a t  they are ru le s .  Chomsky also  appeals to 
the " l i n g u i s t i c  in tu i t io n s"  of adults  as evidence fo r  the c o r re c t ­
ness of a theory of grammar, i . e . , he thinks th a t  adults  know which 
sentences are  acceptable ,  ambiguous, e tc .  With regard to the 
f i r s t  two kinds of knowledge (of universal grammar and of the gram­
mar of  a given language), there  are marked disanalogies  between a 
speaker 's  knowledge of  the grammar described by Chomsky and a 
knower's knowledge of what he knows in o ther  cases of knowledge.
In the l a t t e r  case,  genera l ly ,  a person wil l  assent  to what he 
knows, i f  asked. But i t  i s  unl ikely  th a t  a random speaker,  asked 
whether he knows the grammar Chomsky has descr ibed, will  r ead i ly  
assent .  Further ,  i f  a person knows some proposi t ion or some theory, 
he can understand a statement about what he knows. But many (per­
haps most) speakers wil l  not understand a statement about the
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grammar which Chomsky claims they know. Furthermore, speakers who 
are not very i n t e l l i g e n t  may never understand such a statement.
The sense in which speakers "know" the grammar Chomsky has claimed 
they know is  not a s tra ightforward  sense o f  "know".
With regard to  the l a s t  kind of  knowledge (preposi t ional  know­
ledge about the consequences of a grammar), i t  does seem to be the 
case t h a t  adu l ts  can make judgments about sentences.  But there  
is  an a l t e r n a t e  explanat ion fo r  t h i s  t h a t  does not involve a t t r i ­
buting t a c i t  knowledge. The a l t e r n a t e  explanation i s  th a t  adults  
can acquire preposi t ional  knowledge in c e r t a in  circumstances, e . g . , 
when confronted with a new sentence.  On t h i s  view, the adu l t  does 
not draw on his  s to re  of p roposi t ions  to make judgements, but ,  
r a th e r ,  uses his capacity  fo r  perceptual and cogni t ive  discrimina­
t ion to make judgements and acquire new knowledge. This view i s ,  
of course,  a claim th a t  some s o r t  o f  in te rna l  mechanism underlies  
a speaker ' s  a b i l i t i e s  and th a t  t h a t  mechanism produces the i n t u i ­
t ions  about language th a t  a grammar describes .  Unless one's  sym­
pathies  are  with Malebranche, the f i r s t  pa r t  of  th i s  claim is  
r a th e r  t r i v i a l .  This claim is  con tras ted  to Chomsky's st ronger  
claim t h a t  a speaker ' s  a b i l i t i e s  are  due to in te rna l  ru les  th a t  
are isomorphic with the grammar.
Chomsky i s  well aware t h a t  there  are a l t e r n a t iv e  theories  
to account fo r  the data and th a t  they are underdetermined by the 
empirical data [137].  Chomsky claims th a t  h is  theory is  b e t t e r  
because i t  has the formal fea tu re  of  s im p l ic i ty .  But the notion 
of s im p l ic i ty  i s  not a simple matter .  F i r s t ,  i t  i s  not always
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the case t h a t  the simplest explanation i s  the b es t  explanation. 
Occasionalism may be a simpler explanat ion of  c e r ta in  mental 
s ta t e s  than Chomsky's theory,  but i t  i s  not ,  merely on those
grounds, a b e t t e r  theory. Secondly, i t  i s  somewhat e a s i e r  to make
sense of  s im p l ic i ty  with reference to hypotheses (as in curve 
f i t t i n g )  than with reference to theor ies  [138].
Furthermore, i f  a l t e r n a t iv e  theor ie s  are  d esc r ip t iv e ly  ade­
quate,  data about in tu i t i o n s  wil l  not su f f ic e  to enable us to 
choose among them. Nor wi ll  appeal to a model of  language acqui­
s i t i o n  be successfu l .  Unless there are co n s t r a in t s  on the model, 
i t  cannot be used in choosing among a l t e r n a t iv e  th e o r ie s ,  but i f  i t  
i s  constructed on the assumption of universal grammar, i t  cannot 
be used to t e s t  i t .
I f  Chomsky's theory i s  a s c i e n t i f i c ,  empirical theory, as he 
claims, i t  has not been adequately confirmed, and there  are d i f f i ­
c u l t  th eo re t ica l  problems in attempting to  do so. Furthermore,
i t  would be incautious to claim th a t  i t  i s  the bes t  of a l t e r n a t iv e
theor ies  on the grounds of  s im p l ic i ty  and i n t u i t i o n s .
The major d i f f i c u l t y ,  as I see i t ,  i s  Chomsky's unsuccessful 
attempt to fuse t r a d i t io n a l  r a t i o n a l i s t  theo r ie s  of innateness onto 
a b iological  base. Biological necess i ty  i s  not logical  necess i ty  
and the epistemological s t a tu s  of  Chomsky's innate  p r inc ip les  is  
contingent .  Current neurophysiological research ,  though inconclu­
s ive ,  a t  l e a s t  cas ts  doubt on Chomsky's notion of a special  language 
facu l ty .
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Chomsky i s  s truck by the wonderful ness of  human language, but 
i t s  complexity does not seem to be a s u f f i c i e n t  reason for  a t t r i ­
buting i t  to a special innate and unique facul ty .
Music i s  a lso  wonderful and also complex. We might well 
ask how i t  is  t h a t  a ch i ld  is  able to acquire music, i . e . , to come 
to know music. We could not suppose t h a t  i t  i s  only by im i ta t ion ,  
s ince music is  character ized  by c r e a t i v i ty  (the a b i l i t y  to produce 
and to understand new phrases).  We might begin by asking what 
i t  i s  th a t  the ch i ld  knows when he comes to know music. We assume 
t h a t  there  are a p r io r i  p r inc ip les  of mind th a t  determine the form 
of music, and these are also  the necessary conditions for  learning 
music. By examining a l l  avai lab le  harmonies, we discover  cer ta in  
universal f e a tu re s ,  i . e . . the elements and rules th a t  co n s t i tu te  
music, a universal harmony. We claim th a t  these p r inc ip les  are 
b io log ica l ly  determined which explains the u n iv e r sa l i ty  of music 
(a l l  humans can produce and understand music) and i t s  uniqueness 
to humans. One might point  out th a t  other  species are  musical,  
but given our theory ,  t h e i r  noise can only be described as music­
l ik e ,  not music. We might also claim th a t  our knowledge of  the 
s t ru c tu re  of music is  l a t e n t  or t a c i t ,  and so i t  i t  i s  not 
necessar i ly  ava i lab le  to us fo r  music-making. S t i l l ,  we seem to 
have some such knowledge. We can, for  example, make judgements 
about dystonie chord s t ru c tu re s .  Although an average person may 
not know the ru le s  about chord s t ru c tu re s ,  he does know what 
sounds r ig h t .
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We could continue the music analogy, but I think th i s  sketch i s  
s u f f i c i e n t  to show th a t  i t  i s  s trongly  analogous to  the language 
case. Furthermore, i t  i s  not the only possible analogy. Arithme­
t i c  i s  another c lea r  case. Dance may also  be analogous. Are we 
to suppose th a t  innate special  f a c u l t i e s  are the best  explanations  
fo r  each of  these? Given various a b i l i t i e s ,  explanation in terms 
of  special f a c u l t i e s  i s  c e r t a in ly  not the simplest explanation, 
nor does i t  take account of the s im i l a r i t i e s  among these cases.
For example, the " ins t ruc t ion"  to find ru les  th a t  are s t ru c tu r e -  
dependent could apply in any of these cases.
Chomsky's r a t i o n a l i s t  approach points out some in t e re s t in g  
things about language, but i t  does not provide an adequate language 
paradigm.
Evidence fo r  L inguis t ic  Behavior
The purpose of examining empirical and r a t i o n a l i s t  theor ies  of 
language was to see i f  we could f ind an adequate theory th a t  would 
provide a language paradigm. I f  a paradigm were av a i lab le ,  then we 
could decide whether any given behavior counts as l i n g u i s t i c  be­
havior by comparing i t  with the paradigm. The paradigm would 
provide r e l i a b l e  c r i t e r i a .  Our survey has shown th a t  such a para­
digm does not seem to be ava i lab le .
What we have to do now, then,  i s  to consider what counts as 
evidence for  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior in the absence of a language 
paradigm. I t  i s  p a r t i c u la r ly  important here not to beg the ques­
t ion .  For example, i t  i s  not s e l f - e v id en t  th a t  language is  ne­
c e s sa r i ly  a human a r t i f a c t  or e n te rp r i s e .  Nor i s  i t  s e l f - e v id e n t
97
t h a t  there  is  a q u a l i t a t iv e  d i s t i n c t io n  between language and commu­
n ic a t io n .  Those are  p rec ise ly  the so r t s  of  things  we want to  ex­
p lore .
Chomsky's theory emphasized s t ruc tu re  and Skinner 's  theory 
emphasized use. An account of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior in terms of 
e i t h e r  s t ru c tu re  alone or  use alone i s  sure ly  an incomplete ac­
count. Both aspects  seem necessary and n e i th e r  alone seems s u f f i ­
c ie n t .
A common way of  making a d i s t i n c t io n  between human language 
and "animal communication" i s  r e la te d  to the emphasis on one or 
the other  of  these aspects .  Explanations of human speech assume 
s t ru c tu r e  because the r a t i o n a l i t y  of the speakers is  assumed. The 
problem is  seen as one of  describing or explaining the s t ru c tu r e .  
Use may en te r  in as a way to explain meaning, i . e . , meaning may be 
explained in terms of  the use of s t ru c tu red  elements ( soc ia l  or 
l i n g u i s t i c  context ,  tonal pitch  in Chinese d i a l e c t s ,  e t c . ). Ex­
planations  of animal communication do not assume s t ru c tu r e  because 
the r a t i o n a l i t y  of the " c a l l e r s "  is  not assumed. The problem is  
seen as one of explaining the use of the "ca l ls"  in given contexts .  
S t ruc ture  may enter  in in describing r e g u l a r i t i e s  of  use, but 
s t r u c tu r e  i s  not general ly  considered to be c o n s t i tu t iv e .
In the human case, s t ru c tu re  seems so important t h a t  f ac to rs  
r e l a t e d  to use are often ca l led  p a r a - l i n g u i s t i c  ( e . g . , d i a l e c t s ,  
f a c ia l  express ions,  ges tu res ) .  But these so r t s  of  p r io r  judgements 
about what i s  l i n g u i s t i c ,  p a r a - l i n g u i s t i c ,  or n o n - l in g u is t i c  are 
p rec ise ly  what we want to avoid.
98
I want to propose two c r i t e r i a  fo r  assessing behavior to 
determine whether or  not i t  counts as l i n g u i s t i c  behavior; (1) use 
of  symbols,and (2) ru le -fo l lowing .  I think th a t  each of  these is  
necessary ,  and t h a t  they are  j o i n t l y  s u f f i c i e n t .  I want to discuss 
each o f  them in order  to t r y  to specify  them as much as possib le .
I want to emphasize t h a t  my ta sk  i s  not to develop an a l t e r n a ­
t i v e  theory of  language, but r a th e r ,  to consider what co ns t i tu tes  
reasonable evidence of l i n g u i s t i c  behavior in the absence of an 
adequate theory of  language. I want a lso  to emphasize tha t  my task 
i s  not simply to l i s t  fea tu res  of  human language, a task  th a t  is  
not an uncommon e n te rp r i s e  among l i n g u i s t s  and zoo log is ts .  For 
example, Hockett and Thorpe have provided s im i la r  well-known l i s t s  
o f  what Hockett c a l l s  "design fea tu res"  or "logical  fea tures"  of  
human language. But Rockett ' s  task i s  d i f f e r e n t  from ours [139],
Hockett claims th a t  human language is  s p ec ie s - sp ec i f ic .  But 
he a lso  claims th a t  f inding the universal fea tu res  of  human language 
w i l l  provide c r i t e r i a  fo r  d is t ingu ish ing  between language and 
animal communication, i . e . , he assumes th a t  the universe of language 
i s  coextensive with  the universe of human language. Hockett not 
only takes human speech behavior as the paradigmatic case of lan ­
guage; he assumes th a t  i t  i s  the only case. His purpose is  to 
develop a l i s t  of  fea tu re s  which, taken c o l l e c t i v e ly ,  will  d i s ­
t ingu ish  language from animal "communication". Although he read i ly  
acknowledges t h a t  the "communication" of various species  is  charac­
t e r i z e d  by one or more fea tu re s  on the language l i s t ,  his claim is  
t h a t  the "communication" of  any s in g le  given animal species wil l
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not be charac ter ized  by a l l  the fea tu res  on the l i s t .  Hockett has 
published several l i s t s  t h a t  d i f f e r  in the number of  fea tures  
t h a t  are taken to be j o i n t l y  s u f f i c i e n t  to d is t ingu ish  language 
from animal "communication".
I t  seems th a t  one way to re fu te  Hocket t ' s  claims i s  to show 
th a t  some non-human species '  communication i s  character ized  by 
each of the fea tures  on Hocket t ' s  l i s t .  This i s  prec ise ly  what 
Fouts has shown with Washoe. In l i g h t  of t h i s  demonstration, one 
can e i t h e r  in fe r  t h a t  the universe of  human language i s  not co­
extens ive with the universe of language or  t h a t  Hockett has not 
y e t  produced the co r rec t  l i s t  of  f ea tu re s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  of the 
second inference shows th a t  Hockett ' s  approach i s  question-begging 
i f  the question i s  what i s  to count as l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.  But, 
indeed, t h a t  i s  not Hocket t ' s  ques t ion ,  for  he has already assumed 
t h a t  only human l i n g u i s t i c  behavior wil l  count as l i n g u i s t i c  be­
havior .  His question is  what are the fea tu res  of  l i n g u i s t i c  be­
havior ,  given the assumption th a t  only human l i n g u i s t i c  behavior
wil l  count.  Consequently, the work of  l is t -makers  l ike  Hockett
and Thorpe are mostly i r r e l e v a n t  to our concern.
What we want to know is  what wil l  count as l i n g u i s t i c  behavior
without the p r io r  assumption th a t  only human behavior wil l  count.
With t h i s  purpose c lea r ly  in mind, we can consider the following 
c r i t e r i a :  (1) use of symbols,and (2) ru le-fo l lowing.
Use of Symbols
L ingu is t ic  behavior i s  behavior in which one thing i s  s u b s t i t u ­
ted fo r  something e lse .  Whatever the l i n g u i s t i c  un i t  may be (spoken
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word, wr i t ten  cha rac te r ,  hand s ign,  e t c . ) the un i t  functions in 
place of  another th ing .  I t  i s  used as a s u b s t i tu t e  for  an ac t ,  
ob jec t ,  event,  proposi t ion,  e tc .  I t  i s  in th i s  sense tha t  the 
un i ts  of language are symbols [140].
The logical r e la t io n s  between symbols, s igns ,  and signals  
have been given considerable a t ten t io n  and are a mat ter of contin­
uing dispute  . I t  i s  c e r ta in ly  the case t h a t  a symbol may also 
be used as a sign or as a s ignal .  For example, I may hold up and 
apar t  the index f inger  and middle f inger  of my r ig h t  hand to 
symbolize "peace". I may do so a t  an ant i-war  r a l l y  as a sign of 
my ideological commitment and camaraderie with the group. I may 
also do so to signal to my fr iend  to warn him not to h i t  the on­
looker who i s  taunting him.
I t  is  a lso  the case th a t  a given symbol, s ign,  or signal may 
function in place of more than one thing.  I might use the same 
gesture to symbolize "victory" i f  I win a marathon or to symbolize
the l e t t e r  "v" in a conversation with a deaf f r iend .  I may use i t
as a sign to another f r iend ,  across a crowded room, tha t  I have 
successful ly  ex tracted  a secre t  in which we are in te re s ted  from the 
person to whom I am ta lk ing .  I t  may simultaneously be used as a 
signal th a t  he is  to in te r ru p t  our conversation immediately.
I t  is  also the case th a t  the same gesture might be made without 
symbolizing, signing,  or  s igna l l ing  anything e l se .  For example, 
while s i t t i n g  on a parkbench, I might make the same gesture in 
order to see how a d i s t a n t  t ree  looks when framed by my two f inge rs ,  
or I might want to compare the two knuckles to see whether or not 
one is  s t i l l  swollen.
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The various functions  of  the ges ture as symbol, s ign,  or 
signal  depend upon i t s  being publ ic ly  observable and upon i t s  use 
being agreed upon in a given context .  The f l e x i b i l i t y  of function 
of  the p a r t i c u la r  gesture  allows fo r  both genera l iza t ion  ( e . g . , 
many people a t  many r a l l i e s  about many wars) and ambiguity ( e . g . , 
peace or v ic to ry ) .
I might,  of course, while s i t t i n g  on the parkbench, f an tas ize  
about my p a r t i c ip a t io n  in an upcoming peace r a l l y ,  and while 
enacting the scenar io in my fan tasy ,  ac tu a l ly  make the gesture .
The passers-by are l ik e ly  to ignore me, except t h a t  the ice-cream 
vendor may think I am try ing  to get  his  a t t e n t io n .  In th i s  case, 
the gesture  is  publ ic ly  observable,  and i t  i s  being used in an 
agreed upon way ( r e l a t i v e  to my fan tasy ) ,  but not in an agreed 
upon context.
Our examples thus f a r  have d e a l t  with one symbolic ges ture.
In th i s  cu l tu re ,  there  i s  also a symbolic gesture  th a t  cons is ts  
in extending only the middle f inger  of one hand. This gesture  
symbolizes what is  usually considered to be an obscene word fo r  a 
sexual ac t ,  and i t  i s  used to express h o s t i l i t y .  Let us suppose 
t h a t  during a peace r a l l y ,  I notice  th a t ,  among the onlookers,  there 
is  a spr inkl ing  of  what looks l ik e  the "peace" ges ture .  I ask one 
of the gesturing onlookers i f  he wants to jo in  the r a l l y  and he 
seems as tonished.  I discover t h a t  he intended to be making the 
h o s t i l e  ges ture ,  but since i t  i s  more d i f f i c u l t  to sus ta in  (since 
i t  requires  ac tu a l ly  holding down the index f in g e r ) ,  his index 
f inge r  had moved up f a r  enough th a t  I took his  sloppy h o s t i l e
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gesture as a sloppy "peace" ges ture .  The problem which t h i s  exem­
p l i f i e s  is  th a t  of  id e n t i f i c a t i o n  and d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  symbols, 
i . e . , a q u a l i t a t i v e  d i s t i n c t io n .
As I glance away from th i s  troublesome fe llow, I catch a 
glimpse of a d e f in i t e  "v" sign from another onlooker,  a woman 
standing several meters behind th i s  man. She i s  ta lk ing  animatedly 
to her companion. Embued with a sense of  mission,  I t e l l  her I 
saw her ges ture and in v i te  her to jo in  the r a l l y .  She i s  nonplussed 
and i n s i s t s  she never made such a ges ture .  La te r ,  when viewing 
news c l ip s  of  the r a l l y ,  I see t h a t  she did make a momentary "v" 
sign as pa r t  of a longer period of movement of  her arms and hands, 
gestur ing while ta lk ing  to her companion. The problem th a t  th i s  
exemplifies  i s  t h a t  of individuation of  symbols, i . e . ,  q u an t i t a t iv e  
d i s t i n c t i o n .
The so r t s  of  sp ec i f ic  problems th a t  are  involved in d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t i o n  and q u an t i f ica t ion  of  symbols may vary according to the 
kinds of  symbols th a t  are used. In the cases in which we are 
in te re s t e d ,  i . e . ,  cases in which we are t ry ing  to determine whether 
or not there is  use of symbols, i t  i s  e s se n t ia l  not to conf la te  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  in d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  and quantify ing symbols with the 
assumption th a t  there i s  no use of  symbols. From the f a c t  th a t  
cases may not be c lea r  cases,  we cannot in fe r  t h a t  they are not 
cases a t  a l l .  Whether or not they are cases of  symbol use is  
p rec ise ly  what we are t ry ing  to determine.
Furthermore, i t  i s  necessary to d i s t ingu ish  between: (1) cases
of symbol use and (2) cases of use of  good symbols. Chao, for
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example, has suggested c r i t e r i a  f o r  good symbols [141]. But he 
poin ts  out t h a t  whether or not fea tu res  of  symbols are good de­
pends on t h e i r  use. Universa l i ty ,  for  example, i s  not a good fea ­
tu re  of symbols in cryptology. With regard to s iz e ,  i t  i s  de­
s i r a b l e  to  have the symbol or  symbol-complex f i l l  most of  the f i e ld  
o f  a t t e n t i o n ,  but i t  i s  a lso  des irab le  to  have small symbols in 
order  to r e l a t e  many things  in a symbol-complex. With regard to 
d isc r im ina t ion ,  the des i rab le  degree depends on the circumstances
of  use [142].  The c r i t e r i a  fo r  good symbols depend on the circum­
stances  o f  t h e i r  use. But again, these problems are d i f f e r e n t  from 
the problem of determining whether or not there  i s  use of  symbols 
a t  a l l .
To determine th a t ,  we need to know i f  the behavior; (1) cons is ts  
in using some un i t  (word, ges ture ,  e t c . ) as a s u b s t i tu te  fo r  
something e l se  ( th ing ,  proposi t ion ,  e t c . ):  (2) is  publ ic ly  observa­
b le ;  and (3) cons is t s  in using the un i t  in a conventional or agreed 
upon way in a given context.
Does the th i rd  condition imply anything about choice? That
ques tion leads to the next c r i t e r i o n ,  ru le -fo l lowing.
Rule-following
We need to consider a t  l e a s t  two questions:  (1) What is  meant
by ru les  re levan t  to l i n g u i s t i c  behavior? (2) How do we know i f  
behavior i s  ru le-following?
Rules are notorious ly  hard to def ine ,  but Garver 's  d e f in i t io n  
of  a ru le  as a "prescribed guide fo r  ac t ion" i s  adequate for  our 
purposes [143].  Rules may be e x p l i c i t  or im p l ic i t .  For many, or
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perhaps most, human natural  languages the ru les  are im p l ic i t .  The 
c o r rec t  pa t te rns  of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior are learned developmentally 
by observing a d u l t s ,  being correc ted ,  e tc .
The ru le s  may prescr ibe:  (1) the r e la t io n s  between symbols 
and o b jec t s ,  (2) the r e l a t io n s  between symbols, and (3) the r e l a ­
t ion  between symbols and contexts .  Rules of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior 
are  c o n s t i t u t i v e  in th a t  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior cons is t s  in following 
ru le s  about these r e l a t io n s .  Rules may also be regu la tory .  For 
example, a ru le  may prescr ibe  a norm for  a given hand sign and 
thereby determine the range of  allowable devia t ions .
Rules fo r  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior are necessa r i ly  publ ic ,  and the 
very notion of a ru le  implies t h a t  the behavior i s  non-necessary 
in the sense t h a t  i t  could be otherwise than prescribed.
The question about whether or not the behavior could be o th e r ­
wise i s  of ten discussed ,  fo r  b iological  organisms, in terms of 
i n s t i n c t iv e  (or innate)  behavior vs. learned (or acquired) behavior.  
This d i s t i n c t io n  i s  supposed by some to be a s ig n i f i c a n t  d i s t i n c ­
t ion  between animals and humans, but i t  is  qu i te  d i f f i c u l t  to make 
sense of the d i s t i n c t io n .  The rad ical  claim th a t  a l l  animal be­
havior i s  i n s t i n c t iv e  and a l l  human behavior i s  learned is  d is -  
confirmed by evidence about human physiological processes.  The 
weaker claim th a t  a l l  animal behavior i s  i n s t i n c t iv e  (or th a t  most 
of i t  i s )  and most human behavior i s  learned r e su l t s  in a quan t i ­
t a t i v e ,  r a th e r  than q u a l i t a t i v e  d i s t i n c t io n  between animals and 
humans. Given the q u an t i t a t iv e  d i s t in c t io n  view, there  i s  marked 
disagreement about the degrees of  i n s t i n c t iv e  behavior fo r  both
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animals and humans. Some soc iob io log is t s ,  e . g . , E. Wilson, claim 
th a t  most human behavior i s  gene t ica l ly  determined. However, i t  i s  
acknowledged th a t  i n s t i n c t  or genetic programming does not determine 
sp ec i f ic  behavior,  but a range of  possible  behaviors.  This leaves 
the p o s s ib i l i t y  t h a t  a p a r t i c u la r  impulse to behave may be i n s t i n c ­
t i v e  while the p a r t i c u la r  corresponding behavior i s  learned. That 
claim may be useful fo r  some purposes, but i t  i s  not useful for  
d is t inguish ing  between animal and human behavior.  I t  does allow 
th a t ,  for  animals and humans, there  could be a physiological ly  
motivated or  gene t ica l ly  determined impetus to l i n g u i s t i c  behavior,  
but the l i n g u i s t i c  behavior i t s e l f  may be learned, i . e . , i t  may 
cons is t  in ru le-fol lowing.
How then do we know i f  behavior i s  rule-following behavior?
We have said t h a t  we are in te re s ted  in observable behavior t h a t ,  
i f  i t  i s  l i n g u i s t i c ,  follows public ru les .  But i f  we do not 
already know th a t  the behavior i s  rule-fol lowing,  we are confronted 
with the radical  in te rp re ta t io n  problem. Observation may be use­
fu l ,  but i t  i s  l imited.  We cannot simply look. For example, an 
occurrence may not be rule-fol lowing l i n g u i s t i c  behavior and a 
non-occurrence may be. Touching one's nose may be a sign of agree­
ment t h a t  follows a ru le  r e la t in g  the sign and the agreement, or 
i t  may be s t i f l i n g  a sneeze. Not touching one's nose in the pre­
sence of  another individual may be following a ru le  t h a t  r e s t r i c t s  
nose-touching fo r  agreement to use among peers and another ru le  th a t  
agreement with non-peers is  assumed unless disagreement i s  expressed. 
I f  we know the language, we can look and l i s t e n  for  instances  of
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ru le -breaking ,  e . g . , l i e s  or word games, but th i s  i s  not possible  
i f  we do not already know whether or not the behavior i s  l i n g u i s t i c .  
Furthermore, we cannot ask the individual whose behavior we want 
to know about i f  we do not already know.
What we have to do i s  look fo r  r e g u l a r i t i e s  and make an as ­
sumption about whether or  not the behavior is  ru le -fo l lowing.  How 
do we know what assumption to make? I f  we cannot be c e r t a in ,  then 
we want to make the most p laus ib le  assumption. How do we decide 
what is  most p lausib le?
I t  i s  a t  t h i s  poin t  th a t  one 's  basic paradigmatic commitments 
become re levan t .  When Descartes faced t h i s  question,  he did so in 
l i g h t  of his commitments to the Chain of Being paradigm (including 
the gradation p r in c ip l e ) ,  to metaphysical theses about the nature 
of r e a l i t y  (including materia l and immaterial substances),  and to 
theological  b e l i e f s .  I f  some animal behavior was l i n g u i s t i c  be­
havior ,  then i t  was due to t h e i r  having immaterial and immortal 
souls ;  and i f  some animals had these ,  there  was no reason (given 
the gradation p r inc ip le )  to think th a t  they did not a l l  have them, 
and consequently, humans had no more to hope for  in the a f t e r  l i f e  
than f l i e s  and an ts .  Descartes concluded th a t  i t  i s  more p lau s i ­
ble to think th a t  animal behavior is  not ru le -fol lowing l i n g u i s t i c  
behavior.
I f  one i s  committed to the Evolution paradigm and to the em­
p i r ic a l  assumption th a t  cognit ive capac i t ie s  are r e la ted  to neuro- 
physiological o rganiza t ion ,  then Descartes '  conclusion may seem 
less  p lausib le  than the a l t e rn a t iv e .
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As a matter of  f a c t ,  the use of the Chari ty p r inc ip le  in the 
human case is  now based on the assumption of  s im i la r  neurophysio- 
logical organizat ion.  I f  others  are l ik e  us in th i s  r espec t ,  then 
i t  seems p laus ib le  to assume th a t  some of  t h e i r  behavior i s  l i n ­
g u i s t i c  behavior and th a t  t h e i r  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior i s  in many ways 
l ik e  our own. This i s  t rue  not only in those cases in which the 
behavior i s  now observable,  but also in those cases in which the 
behavior has not been and cannot be observed. An example of the 
l a t t e r  case is  the decipherment of  wri t ing  on objects  found in 
archaeological excavat ions . I f  there  are  observable r e g u l a r i t i e s ,  
then i t  i s  assumed th a t  the marks are wri t ing  and th a t  there  is  
something to be deciphered, p rec ise ly  because i t  i s  assumed th a t  
the wri t ing  was done by humans who are s im i la r  to us. I t  i s  also  
assumed th a t  the language wil l  be s im i la r  to o ther  human languages 
[144].
We saw in Chapter II  t h a t  our knowledge about the neurophys­
iol ogical organizat ion of  humans and of some o ther  species  is  
l im i ted ,  but i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to support the relevance of  neuro­
physiol ogical organizat ion to the p l a u s i b i l i t y  o f  the assumption 
th a t  some behavior is  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.  I f  another  species 
has s im i la r  neurophysiological o rganiza t ion ,  then i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  
p laus ib le  to assume th a t  some behavior of indiv iduals  in t h a t  
species  i s  ru le-fol lowing l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.  The evidence th a t  
i s  ava i lab le  supports the p l a u s i b i l i t y  of  extending the Charity 
p r inc ip le  to some o ther  species .
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In deciding whether i t  i s  p laus ib le  to assume th a t  some be­
havior i s  ru le -fol lowing l i n g u i s t i c  behavior,  neurophysiological 
organizat ion i s  one re levan t  considerat ion.  Another considera t ion 
i s  whether or not ru le -fol lowing l i n g u i s t i c  behavior would be 
useful fo r  the individual  or  the species .  Biological organisms 
are  such th a t  t h e i r  behavior i s  adaptive to  t h e i r  environment. 
Successful adaptat ion r e s u l t s  in surv iva l .  I f  ru le -fo l lowing l i n ­
g u i s t i c  behavior would con tr ibu te  to successful adap ta t ion ,  then 
th a t  f a c t  would support the p l a u s i b i l i t y  of  assuming th a t  some 
behavior i s  ru le -fol lowing l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.  I am suggesting 
th a t ,  i f  there  i s  independent evidence th a t  some behavior i s  l i n ­
g u i s t i c ,  then a fu r th e r  considerat ion is  whether ru le -fol lowing 
l i n g u i s t i c  behavior i s  a p laus ib le  explanation of some kinds of 
successful adapta t ion.
The rules  t h a t  r e l a t e  symbols and contexts would be p a r t ic u ­
l a r l y  p e r t in en t .  But t ry ing  to determine the r e l a t io n  between 
symbols and contex ts ,  and t ry ing  to determine whether or how some 
behavior con tr ibutes  to survival i s  not an easy matter ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  
when the behavior is  t h a t  of another species .  I t  is  not always 
easy to id e n t i fy  re levan t  behavior or to i n t e r p r e t  the context .
Since we are accustomed to vocal-auditory  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior,  
we are l ik e ly  to be more s k i l l f u l  in iden t i fy ing  and analyzing i t .  
But there  i s  no i n t r i n s i c  requirement (due to the nature of  symbols 
and ru le s )  t h a t  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior be vocal-auditory .  Possible 
modes of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior are determined by physiological capa­
c i t i e s .  I t  i s  lo g ica l ly  possible  th a t  vocal ,  g e s tu ra l ,  t a c t i l e .
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and o l fac to ry  modes can be modes of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior.
Non-vocal behavior has of ten been considered p a r a - l in g u i s t i c  
in  the human case e i t h e r  because: (1) the primary mode (vocal) was 
taken to be the only mode, or (2) the non-vocal behavior has been 
assumed to be non-rule-following.
Recently, more a t t e n t io n  has been given to human non-verbal 
k ines ic  behavior.  There i s  strong evidence th a t  some of th a t  be­
havior  i s  indeed ru le-fo l lowing behavior.  As with vocal l i n g u i s ­
t i c  behavior,  there  are va r ia t io n s  in non-verbal behavior r e la ted  
to  cu l tu re ,  e thnic ,group,  age, gender, c l a s s ,  and r o le ( s ) .  One 
example is  handshaking. Children in th i s  cu l tu re  learn the ru les  
fo r  handshaking in the same way they learn vocal language ru le s ,  
and adu l t  behavior general ly  follows the ru le s .  One learns in which 
contexts  handshaking is  appropria te ,  which hand is  used, how i t  is  
extended, the norm for  pressure and durat ion of  the g r ip ,  e tc .
One may choose to break the r u le s ,  e . g . , handshaking to confirm a 
con t rac t  which one intends not to honor, or extending a hand which 
conceals a party-gag "buzzer".  The f i r s t  instance is  also  a case 
o f  breaking a ru le  which r e l a t e s  verbal behavior and kinesic  
behavior,  i . e . , the ru le  of  congruity . There are also ru les  about 
the  r e l a t io n  between handshaking and the objects  (proposi tions ,  
e t c . ) fo r  which i t  stands . Handshaking i s  symbolic, rule-following 
behavior.
Our knowledge of human non-vocal behavior i s  rudimentary, and 
there  are  d i f f i c u l t  methodological problems in understanding non­
vocal behavior of o ther  species .  But our knowledge th a t  in our
n o
own case non-vocal l i n g u i s t i c  behavior may contr ibu te  to s u rv i ­
v a l ,  lends support to . th e  assumption th a t  th a t  may be the case 
fo r  o ther  species .  From the f a c t  th a t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to iden­
t i f y  such behavior,  we cannot in fe r  th a t  such behavior does not 
occur.
One of the problems in iden t i fy ing  the behavior i s  under­
standing the context.  Which behavior i s  functional fo r  survival  
i s  to some extent  determined by physiological s t ru c tu re  and capa­
c i t i e s .  The implications  fo r  survival  from the appearance of  a 
ca t  are not the same for  birds and humans, unless the ca t  i s ,  say, 
a t i g e r  or a l ion .  To make p laus ib le  assumptions about the func­
t ional  value of  rule-following l i n g u i s t i c  behavior requires  a 
non-anthropomorphic assessment of  the context.
Again, i t  i s  necessary to d is t ingu ish  between methodological 
problems in ident i fy ing  rule-fol lowing behavior and the p la u s i ­
b i l i t y  of the assumption th a t  rule-following l i n g u i s t i c  behavior 
explains some kinds of successful adaptation.
I t  might be argued th a t  i n s t in c t iv e  behavior i s  more condu­
cive to survival since i t  is  more r ig id .  We have already cons i ­
dered d i f f i c u l t i e s  re la ted  to the notion of  i n s t i n c t i v e  behavior,  
but l e t  us use the notion here simply in con t ras t  to  ru le - fo l low ­
ing behavior. In s t inc t ive  behavior is  such tha t  there  i s  an imme­
d ia te ,  fixed behavioral response (or l imited range of responses) 
to a given stimulus. Rule-following behavior i s  such th a t  there  
i s  a more f l e x ib le  range of responses to a given s timulus ,  including 
responses tha t  break the ru le  about standard responses. Our
n i
question i s  whether i n s t i n c t iv e  behavior would be more funct ional  
fo r  survival  than rule-fol lowing behavior.
I want to suggest t h a t  the answer depends on the physiolo­
gical  s t ru c tu re  and requirements of  the organism. Physical and 
physiological  f l e x i b i l i t y  (which usually  depends on complexity) i s  
the condit ion th a t  determines the usefulness of  ru le -fol lowing 
behavior.  F l e x ib i l i ty  includes such things  as mobil i ty ,  capacity 
to adapt to various environments, e tc .  For example, i f  one's 
mobil i ty  i s  severe ly r e s t r i c t e d ,  to be warned by an o th e r ' s  l i n ­
g u i s t i c  behavior of  impending danger may not be more useful than 
simply responding d i r e c t ly  to the threatening s timulus , e . g . , by 
emit t ing a foul or toxic  substance [145]. There i s  no point  in 
moving i f  one cannot adapt to a d i f f e r e n t  environment. Further­
more, mobile organisms who can adapt to d i f f e r e n t  environments 
are l i k e ly  to be confronted with a g rea te r  va r ie ty  of  stimuli 
than organisms th a t  are more fixed.  The more f l e x ib le  organisms 
could make use of  more information. So the survival value of 
ru le-fo l lowing l i n g u i s t i c  behavior depends on the physiological 
c ap ac i t i e s  of  the organism.
Summary
Since an adequate language paradigm is  not av a i lab le ,  we 
have considered what might count as evidence for  l i n g u i s t i c  be­
havior in the absence of  a paradigm. I have proposed two c r i ­
t e r i a :  (1) use of symbols and (2) ru le -fo l lowing,  and I have
pointed out some of the d i f f i c u l t i e s  involved in using these  
c r i t e r i a .  The nature of  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  i s  such t h a t  whether or
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not some behavior counts as l i n g u i s t i c  behavior must be determined 
by considering the behavior of  each given species .  Given these 
c r i t e r i a ,  there  i s  no way to make genera l iza t ions  about species .  
Using the c r i t e r i a  requires  assessing behavior species by species .
Use o f  the C r i t e r i a
I want to take the case of  one species  in order  to i l l u s t r a t e
the use of  the c r i t e r i a .  I do not intend to provide a complete
a n a ly s is ,  but r a th e r ,  a sketch adequate to i l l u s t r a t e  the use of 
the c r i t e r i a .
I want to take the case o f  the chimpanzees, since i t  i s  both
well-known and controvers ia l  [146].  Since there  are s ig n i f i c a n t
v a r ia t io n s  in the chimpanzee language p r o je c t s ,  I want to take 
the case of  one chimp, Washoe. Washoe i s  the f i r s t  chimp about 
whom i t  is  claimed th a t  she has learned a human language, i . e . , 
American Sign Language (ASL), which i s  used by deaf  humans in the 
United S ta tes .
The language-acquisi t ion  p ro jec t  was d i rec ted  by psycholo­
g i s t s  Beatr ice and Allen Gardner, and Roger Fouts was a graduate 
research a s s i s t a n t  on the p ro jec t .  A ges tura l  language was chosen 
fo r  p ro je c t  Washoe because chimpanzees lack the anatomical s t r u c ­
tu re  necessary fo r  human speech and a lso  because there i s  evidence 
of  gestural  communication among chimpanzees in t h e i r  natural 
h a b i t a t s .  Washoe's estimated age a t  the time the p ro jec t  began 
was between 8 and 14 months. For the next four yea rs ,  she was 
r a i sed  in an environment t h a t  was phys ica l ly  confortable  and fu l l  
o f  natural objects  and ordinary human domestic i tems. She s le p t
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alone,  but  otherwise,  cons tan t ly  had human companions who i n t e r ­
acted with her and used only ASL to  communicate with her and each 
o ther .
The p ro je c t  was a longi tudina l  study of  the development of  
sign language by Washoe. Washoe learned signs by shaping ( r e in ­
forcement of  acceptable  spontaneous g e s tu re s ) ,  guidance (molding 
her arms and hands in the presence of  a s t imulus) ,  and im i ta t ion .  
During the  four  years ,  she acquired 160 s igns .  When the four-  
year  i n i t i a l  p ro je c t  was terminated, Washoe was moved to a Primate 
I n s t i t u t e ,  where she has been fo r  the l a s t  e igh t  years .  Roger 
Fouts now d i re c t s  the research ,  the primary purpose of  which is  
to examine the cognit ive cap a c i t i e s  of  chimpanzees as evidenced 
by l i n g u i s t i c  a b i l i t y .
One question of i n t e r e s t  to us i s  whether the ASL signs (which 
are analogous to  morphemes) funct ion as signs o r  symbols.
Does Washoe merely assoc ia te  signs and t h e i r  r e fe ren ts  ( e . g . , the 
configurat ion fo r  "sweet" i s  somehow linked with desser t )  or does 
she understand th a t  the sign "sweet" i s  a symbolic represen ta t ion  
of  desser t?  The second ques tion i s  whether or not Washoe's use of  
the signs is  ru le -fol lowing behavior.
Does Washoe use ASL signs as symbols? I t  i s  of  considerable  
i n t e r e s t  th a t  only one of  the f i r s t  ten signs she acquired i s  a 
noun ("sweet" used fo r  d e s se r t ) .  The o the rs ,  in order of a c q u i s i ­
t i o n ,  were "come" or "ginme", "more", "up", "open", " t i c k l e " ,  "go", 
"out" ,  "hurry",  " l i s t e n " .  A c r i t e r i o n  fo r  ascr ib ing the a cq u is i ­
t ion  of  a sign was contextual ly  co r rec t  use. Acquis ition of  nouns
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was te s ted  by a double-blind procedure using exemplars. Washoe's 
e r ro r s  suggested her grasp o f  c lass  concepts.  For example, on a 
t e s t  t h a t  included t h i r t y  examples of grooming a r t i c l e s ,  she 
c o r re c t ly  named eighteen,  and seven of the twelve er rors  were 
signs fo r  o ther  items c l a s s i f i e d  as grooming a r t i c l e s .  In a t e s t  
t h a t  included e igh t  photographs of  animals,  Washoe co r rec t ly  named 
seven. In a s im i la r  t e s t  t h a t  included ten three-dimensional 
miniatures  of animals ra th e r  than photographs, Washoe cor rec t ly  
named s ix  and each of  the four  e r ro rs  was the sign fo r  "baby".
In addi t ion to the signs th a t  she has been taught ,  Washoe ac­
quired "smoke" by casual observation of her human companions, and 
she suggested a sign for  "bib" tha t  the Gardners l a t e r  learned is 
the co r rec t  ASL sign.
Besides using signs to communicate with o th e rs ,  Washoe also 
used them in other  ways. For example, when looking through a 
magazine, she signed "cat" when she saw a p ic tu re  of a t i g e r  and 
"drink" when she saw a vermouth ad.
Ten months a f t e r  the p ro jec t  began, Washoe spontaneously began 
to combine signs ("ginme sweet",  "come open"). At age two, she 
was taught name-signs fo r  her human companions and the pronouns 
"you" and "me", which she began to use in contextually  appropriate 
combinations (."Roger you t i c k l e " ,  " t i c k le  me"). During the next 
twenty-six months, Washoe used 294 d i f f e r e n t  two-sign combinations 
and 245 d i f f e r e n t  combinations of three or more s igns.  These in ­
cluded the addi t ion of  appeal-signs ("please  t i c k l e  more"), the 
add i t ion  of pronouns ( "you me Greg go"),  apologies ("hug me good").
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and the sp ec i f i ca t io n  of subject  and ob jec t  of  an ac t ion  ("you 
t i c k l e  me Washoe").
Washoe c le a r ly  t r a n s fe rs  signs to new s i tu a t io n s .  The r e f e r ­
ents include new events as well as ob jec ts .  For example, a f t e r  
she ur inated on Fouts while r id ing  on his shoulders ,  she signed 
"funny". Since she has been in Oklahoma, she has a lso  spontane­
ously combined signs she knows to descr ibe new r e fe r e n t s .  For 
example, she re fe r red  to swans as "water b i r d s " . She has a lso  made 
use of  connotation in an in te re s t in g  way. She learned "dir ty"  as 
a noun re fe r r in g  to feces.  She has spontaneously used i t  as an 
ad jec t ive  when she has been angry ( " d i r ty  monkey", "d i r ty  Roger"). 
She has also learned to use language to attempt to a l t e r  o thers '  
perception of  r e a l i t y ,  e . g . , she has l i e d .
One of  the problems in assessing Washoe's performance is  the 
lack of  agreement about what co n s t i tu te s  language and the lack of 
an adequate model of human language acqu is i t ion  th a t  might be 
used fo r  comparisons.
I have proposed th a t  rule-fol lowing use of  symbols is  adequate 
evidence of  l i n g u i s t i c  behavior. In a well-known a r t i c l e  pub­
l ished during the i n i t i a l  p ro jec t ,  Bellugi and Bronowski argued 
th a t  semantics and syntax are necessar i ly  i n t e r r e l a t e d  such tha t  
symbols have meaning only in the re la t io n sh ip s  described by sen­
tences ,  and understanding the r e l a t io n s  depends on construct ing 
general rules  by induction [147]. They did not bel ieve  th a t  
Washoe's performance showed a grasp of sentence s t ru c tu r e  because 
the d ia r ie s  did not show negation and ques t ions ,  and the word order
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of u t te rances  was loose (as compared to English grammar). Since 
they had argued th a t  semantics and syntax are  i n t e r r e l a t e d ,  they 
denied th a t  Washoe's performance gave adequate evidence of  l i n ­
g u i s t i c  behavior.
The Bronowski-Bellugi assessment is  qu i te  i n s t ru c t iv e  in 
showing problems in using the c r i t e r i a  I have proposed. The data 
t h a t  they used ( the d ia r ie s )  were incomplete.  Washoe asks and 
answers questions  and uses negation. More importantly, Bronowski 
and Bellugi used English grammar as t h e i r  paradigm, and as Bellugi 
has subsequently acknowledged, they lacked an adequate understanding 
of the grammar of Ameslan [148].
The same problem, as well as the problem presented by the 
absence of  an adequate model fo r  human language acq u is i t io n ,  is 
demonstrated by Roger Brown's assessment of  Washoe's performance. 
I n i t i a l l y  using a pr imari ly  desc r ip t ive  model of c h i ld re n ' s  lan­
guage a c q u is i t io n .  Brown proposed developmental l e v e l s ,  but he 
then explained c h i ld re n ' s  a b i l i t i e s  in terms of innate  c ap ac i t i e s .  
Brown f i r s t  argued th a t  syntax appears in the two-word combinations 
of ch i ldren  such th a t  word order r e f l e c t s  r e l a t io n s :  agen t-ob jec t ,
ac t io n -o b je c t ,  agent-ac t ion ,  lo ca t iv e ,  possessive,  and a t t r i b u t i v e .  
After  reviewing Washoe's language-acquisi tion d ia r ie s  for  the f i r s t  
three yea rs ,  he claimed th a t  her two-word ut terances  lacked a sense 
of word order,  and the re fo re ,  th a t  Washoe had not a t ta ined  what is  
Level I fo r  human chi ldren .  More recen t ly .  Brown has revised his 
model. He now holds t h a t  word order i s  not necessary fo r  communi­
cation a t  Level I ,  and t h a t  Washoe's performance i s  a t  Level I.
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He now holds t h a t  syntax appears a t  Level I I ,  the level of  th ree-  
word combinations, and he denies th a t  Washoe has a t ta ined  Level I I .
The Gardners held th a t  Washoe had a t t a in e d  Brown's f i r s t  
Level I ( syn tac t ica l  two-word combinations) by showing t h a t  the o r ­
der of  78 per cent  of her u t terances  r e f l e c te d  the r e l a t io n s  spec i ­
f ie d  by Brown. When Brown's data  on children were subjec ted to 
the same c r i t e r i a  used for  Washoe, 75 per cent of t h e i r  u t terances  
r e f l e c te d  such r e l a t io n s .  However, the Gardners re jec ted  Brown's 
explanation of  co n s is ten t  word order in terms of syntax and sug­
gested a l t e r n a t e  (behavior is t )  explanat ions,  e . g . , im i ta t ion  of 
adul ts  or  semantic s i m i l a r i t i e s .
A recurr ing  problem in comparing u t terances  of  ch i ldren  who 
speak English and Washoe or deaf  children who use ASL is  the 
s t ru c tu ra l  d i f fe rence  in the languages. I t  i s  c e r t a in ly  the case 
t h a t  the s t ru c tu r e  of  ASL has not been completely analyzed, 
but n e i the r  has the s t ru c tu re  of  English. Nevertheless,  p laus ib le  
comparisons depend on making use of what i s  known.
Variation in the formational s t ru c tu re  of  natural sign lan ­
guages i s  analogous to  v a r ia t io n  in the sound s t ru c tu re  of spoken 
natural  languages. Semantically ,  ASL allows for  a b s t r ac t io n s ,  
metaphors, and idioms. ASL signs are not ges tural  r ep resen ta ­
t ions  of English words. Although ASL signs  may be "glossed" 
fo r  English words, there  are some lex ical  items th a t  have no s tan ­
dard g loss ,  e . g . . the notion of  subjec t ive  time s ign.  Word order 
in some natural  spoken languages, e . g . , Finnish, is  l e s s  important 
grammatically than in English. Word order  in ASL is  a lso  less
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important in expressing grammatical r e l a t io n s ,  and most f lu e n t  deaf 
signers  use a f a i r l y  f re e  order  in t h e i r  cons truc t ions ,  although 
deaf chi ldren who are exposed to  English may show s ign-order  p re f ­
erences s im i la r  to English word order [149]. Consequently, the 
use of  word order as evidence fo r  syn tac t ica l  understanding is  
misleading.
Much of  the recent  work in l i n g u i s t i c s  has emphasized prag­
matics ,  the ana lys is  of  language use. Emphasis i s  on categories  
of  communicative in te n t io n s - - r e q u es t s ,  quest ions ,  agreement and 
disagreement,  s ta tements ,  d esc r ip t ions ,  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s ,  e tc .
The in ten t ions  of  young ch ildren and apes are in fe r red  on the 
basis  of  the word or  s ign,  o ther  behavior t h a t  accompanies the 
word or  sign ( fac ia l  express ions,  e t c . 1. and the context .  What 
i s  proposed is  t h a t  the uses of  language are a t  l e a s t  as impor­
t a n t  as i t s  s t r u c tu r e .  "The f a c t  th a t  apes i n i t i a t e  l i n g u i s t i c  
in t e r a c t io n s ,  ' t a l k '  to themselves, ask fo r  what they want, and 
comment on t h e i r  environment may prove to be more s ig n i f i c a n t  
than the d e t a i l s  of  t h e i r  encoded communications" [150].  Given 
th i s  approach, i t  i s  of  s ign if icance  th a t  Washoe's u t terances  
include the various categories  of  communicative in ten t io n s ,  
th a t  she uses ASL to communicate with humans and other  chimpan­
zees,  and th a t  t h e i r  behavior ind ica tes  t h a t  her in ten t ions  have 
been understood.
The arguments about whether Washoe's behavior is  l i n g u i s t i c  
behavior cen te r  around the two c r i t e r i a  of  use of symbols and 
ru le -fo l lowing.  With regard to the use of  symbols, i t  i s  argued
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e i t h e r  (a) t h a t  ASL is  not symbolic, (b) th a t  i t  i s  not adequately 
symbolic, or  (c) t h a t  Washoe does not understand the signs as 
symbols.
I pointed out the necess i ty  of d is t inguish ing  between (a) and 
(b),  i . e . , between the use of  symbols and the use of  good symbols. 
I t  could be argued th a t  ASL symbols are  good symbols ( s u f f i c i e n t ­
ly  a r b i t r a r y ,  e t c . ) ,  but th a t  question is  not germane. The ques­
t ion  of concern for  us is  whether ASL is  symbolic a t  a l l ,  and 
i t  c le a r ly  i s .  ASL signs are used to stand for  other  th ings ,  pro­
p o s i t io n s ,  e t c . , and t h e i r  use i s  character ized by displacement.
The question th a t  remains is  whether or not Washoe understands 
the  signs as symbols. Her use of the signs as su b s t i tu te s  for  
things  in the conventional way in appropriate  contexts suggests 
th a t  the ASL signs are used as symbols by her.
The second question i s  whether or  not Washoe's use of the sym­
bols is  ru le-fo l lowing.  I have j u s t  pointed out th a t  her use of 
ASL symbols follows the ru les  r e l a t in g  symbols and objects  and 
symbols and contexts .  The main l ine  of argument agains t  counting 
Washoe's behavior as l i n g u i s t i c  i s  t h a t  her behavior does not show 
th a t  she i s  following rules  fo r  r e la t io n s  between symbols. Much of
the d i f f i c u l t y  here is  disagreement about what those rules  are.
Some of Brown's arguments depended on the view tha t  the ru les  are 
the syn tac t ica l  ru les  of English grammar. I f  one argues th a t  such 
rules  are innate ,  then one does not consider other  possible  ru les .  
We have seen th a t  some rules  fo r  r e l a t io n s  between ASL symbols 
( e . g . ,  word order) are d i f f e r e n t  from the ru les  in English.
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The assessment of  Washoe's behavior as rule-following i s  made 
e a s i e r  by the  f a c t  t h a t  o ther  humans also  use ASL and some of those 
humans also speak English, so the problem i s  not one of  radical  
i n t e rp r e ta t io n .  Some human adu l t  ASL users not only a s s e r t  th a t  
they are following r u le s ,  but they are able to explain the ru les  
to non-ASL users .  ASL users  claim th a t  they understand Washoe's 
ut terances  and th a t  two-way communication occurs.
Furthermore, although the comparative s tud ies  of neurophysio- 
logical organization of  humans and chimps are  inconclusive,  there  
i s  some evidence th a t  chimps' neurophysiological organizat ion is  
s u f f i c i e n t ly  complex fo r  rule-fol lowing behavior.  Wassermann's 
model provides a biochemical explanation of  neurophysiological 
organizat ion and functioning.  Recent s tud ies  have shown marked 
s im i l a r i t i e s  between chimpanzees and humans in blood p ro te in ,  
amino ac ids ,  and blood immunology. On these measurements, there 
i s  0.27 per cent  d i f ference  in biochemical blood composition of 
chimpanzees and humans [151].
The s im i la r i ty  of neurophysiology and the claims of  human 
ASL users about Washoe's behavior provide strong evidence fo r  the 
claim of symbolic, ru le -fol lowing behavior by Washoe.
SUMMARY
The purpose of  t h i s  study was to examine the notion of  the 
r a t i o n a l i t y  of animals.  I suggested th a t  the notion might be 
c l a r i f i e d  by taking a formal fea ture  of  behavior t h a t  i s  general ly  
considered to be r a t i o n a l —th a t  i t  i s  based on sound inductive 
processes--and iden t i fy ing  c r i t e r i a  fo r  determining i f  given 
behavior is  based on such processes.
I proposed two c r i t e r i a :  neurophysiological organizat ion and
use of language. I have argued th a t  neurophysiological organization 
is  a p laus ib le  c r i t e r i o n ,  but th a t  the present  s t a t e  of empirical 
knowledge does not allow for  i t s  precise  formulation.  I have also 
argued th a t  use of language is  a p laus ib le  c r i t e r i o n ,  and I proposed 
th a t  ru le -following use of symbols i s  s u f f i c i e n t  evidence for  the 
l i n g u i s t i c  behavior of biological  organisms.
I have not suggested th a t  these are the  only re levan t  c r i t e r i a  
nor th a t  only animals who meet these c r i t e r i a  are behaving 
r a t io n a l ly .  My claim is  the more conservat ive one th a t  the 
a t t r i b u t io n  of r a t i o n a l i t y  is  appropriate  fo r  a l l  animals who 
do meet these c r i t e r i a .
I pointed out th a t  using these c r i t e r i a  precludes genera l iza t ions  
about animals and requ ires ,  ins tead ,  an examination of each given
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species .  I suggested,  for  example, t h a t  there  i s  strong evidence 
th a t  chimpanzees meet these c r i t e r i a .
Whether animals are  r a t io n a l  has been an important question in 
reasoning about the moral s t a tu s  of  animals.  The t r a d i t io n a l  
assumption has been th a t  animals are not r a t i o n a l ,  and I have 
claimed t h a t  t h a t  general assumption may be f a l s e .  I f  i t  i s  f a l s e  
in given cases,  then th a t  would sure ly  have a s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  
on arguments about the moral s ta tu s  of animals t h a t  make use of 
such an assumption.
I want to emphasize t h a t  I have not c r i t i c a l l y  assessed the 
systematic use of  the notion of r a t i o n a l i t y  in moral arguments. 
Whether r a t i o n a l i t y  ought to be a re levan t  considera t ion or  why i t  
i s  r e levan t  to moral s ta tu s  are not questions  which have been 
addressed in t h i s  study. Rather,  I have simply pointed out th a t  
r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  genera l ly  considered to be r e lev an t ,  but t h a t  the 
notion of  the r a t i o n a l i t y  of animals has been unclear .  My concern 
has been to c l a r i f y  t h a t  notion.
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possible)  natural languages. The ru le s  for  expressing the re la t io n  
of deep to surface s t ruc tu re  are ca l led  grammatical transforma­
t io n s .  Chomsky does not claim th a t  a l l  languages have the same 
deep s t ru c tu re .  What he claims i s  th a t  s t ruc tu re  i s  a f ea tu re  of  
sentences within language, and th a t  deep s t ruc tu re  of sentences i s  
u n iv e r sa l .
TZ^i b i d . , p. 39.
T^^I b i d . , p. 21.
TZ^i b i d . , p. 27.
TZ^i b i d . , p. 24.
TZBl b i d . , p. 13.
TZ^I b i d . , p. 33.
^^^Atchison, op. c i t . , pp. 76-77.
131 I b i d . , p. 53.
13^I b i d . , p. 70.
133%bid., pp. 78, 80, 116 - 24.
134Chomsky, op. c i t . , p. 7.
1 O C
Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge: 
Massachusetts I n s t i t u t e  of Technology Press,  1965), p. 21.
1 Og
Noam Chomsky, Reflections on Language (New York: Random
House [Pantheon Books], 1975).
137Chomsky has,  in f a c t ,  re jec ted  decision procedures in l i n ­
g u i s t i c s ,  t . e . , c r i t e r i a  fo r  choosing the bes t possible  theory fo r  
da ta ,  in favor of evaluat ion procedures,  i . e . , c r i t e r i a  fo r  choos­
ing between a l t e rn a te  theories  (or grammars).
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For a f u l l e r  discussion of  these po in ts ,  see Stephen P. S t ich ,  
"What Every Speaker Knows," Philosophical Review, LXXX, No. 4 (October, 
1971), 476-96.
1 oo
Chomsky himself seems to recognize t h i s .  "Although one 
wants the ' s im p les t '  l i n g u i s t i c  theory, in some sense t h a t  cannot
be spec i f ied  in a useful way " Noam Chomsky, "Some Empirical
Issues in the Theory of Transformational Grammar," Goals of  Linguis­
t i c  Theory, ed. Stanley Peters  (Englewood C l i f f s ,  New Jersey:
Pren t ice -H al l ,  I n c . ,  1972), p. 69.
1 IQ
Charles F. Hockett,  "Logical Considerations in the Study of  
Animal Communication," Symposium on Animal Sounds and Communication, 
eds. W. E. Lanyon and W. N. Tavolga ( In te l l ig e n c e r  Pr in t ing  Co.,
1960), pp. 392-427.
"*^^This view allows for  symbols of  symbols, e . g . , a wri t ten  
word may be understood as a symbol of  a spoken word which i s ,  in tu rn ,  
a symbol of an objec t  such as a t r e e .
^^^These include s im p l ic i ty ;  elegance; ease of  production, 
reproduction,  r e p e t i t i o n ,  and transmission; s u i t a b i l i t y  of  s ize ;  
balance between number of symbols and s ize  of symbol complexes; 
c learness  of  r e l a t io n  between symbol and ob jec t ;  relevance of the 
s t ru c tu re  of symbol complexes to the s t ru c tu re  of o b jec ts ;  d i s c r i ­
mination between symbols; s u i t a b i l i t y  of operat ional synonyms; and 
u n iv e r sa l i ty .  Yuen Ren Chao, Language and Symbolic Systems (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press ,  1968), p. 212.
142Chao also suggests t h a t  the use of  Euler ' s  c i r c l e s  in Venn 
diagrams may be a l e s s  c lea r  r e l a t io n  between symbol and object  
than the use of  a r b i t r a r y  o u t l in e s .  I b i d . , p. 219.
136
143Newton Garver, "Rules," The Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, ed.
Paul Edwards, VII (1972), pp. 231-33.
144See, f o r  example, John Chadwick, The Decipherment of  Linear B
(2d ed . ,  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ,  1967).
145 In Lewis C a r r o l l ' s  "Garden of Live Flowers" the flowers are 
ra t iona l  and l i n g u i s t i c ,  but t h e i r  being able  to warn each o ther  of 
danger i s  useless  since they cannot move, and t h e i r  aggressive 
th rea ts  to each other  are  id le  th re a t s .  Lewis Carroll  [Charles L. 
Dodgson], A l i c e ' s  Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking
Glass (Philadelphia:  The John C. Winston Co., 1923).
146The standard primate c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of  chimpanzees i s  as 
follows: Suborder--Simiae; Superfamily--Hominoidea (apes and man);
Family—Pongidae; Genus--Pan. Other primates in t h i s  family include
Pongo (orangutan and g o r i l l a ) .
147J .  Bronowski and U. Bel lugi,  "Language, Name and Concept,"
Science, CLXVIII (1970), pp. 669 - 73.
148 In correspondence with Fouts, Bellugi wrote,  "All of us who 
have w r i t ten  about word order and i t s  implicat ions  fo r  s t ru c tu re  
should be forced to ea t  a l l  those words." Eugene Linden, Apes, Men, 
and Language (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc. [Saturday Review
Press] ,  1974), p. 74.
149Nancy Frishberg, "Code and Culture ,"  Sign Language and Lan­
guage Acquis ition in Man and Ape: New Dimensions in Comparative
P ed o l in g u is t ie s , ed. Fred C. C. Peng ( American Association for  
the Advancement of Science Selected S.ymposia S e r ie s , Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press ,  I n c . ,  1978), pp. 45-85.
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150Lyn W. Miles, "Language Acquis ition in Apes and Children,"
Sign Language and Language Acquis ition in Man and Ape: New Dimensions
in Comparative P ed o l in g u is t i e s , ed. Fred. C.C. Peng (American Associa­
t io n  for  the Advancement of Science Selected Symposia S e r ie s , Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press ,  In c . ,  1978), pp. 103-20.
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M. C. King and A. C. Wilson, "Evolution a t  Two Levels in 
Humans and Chimpanzees," Science, CLXXXVIII (1975), pp. 107-16.
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